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CONTROL ANO DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION IN LARGE-*BRITISH'COMPANIES 
. -A*B*S'T'R A*C T 
Literature on the divorce of ownership from control has 
emphasised the declining proportion of shares owned by salaried 
managers who control large companies. Because these salaried 
managers have negligible proprietarial interest in the companies 
they manage, some writers have suggested that they will have 
different motives to owner-managers. In particular, managers' 
direct pecuniary interests may cause them to pursue company growth 
at the expense of profit, for managers' salaries tend to be related 
to the size of the companies which they manage rather than the 
profitability of those companies. These alternate motivations were 
incorporated in various managerial theories of the firm developed in 
the late 1960's which emphasised company growth as a key objective. 
An investigation of the shareholdings and salaries of the 
directors of major British companies confirms that the proportion 
of total shares held by company directors has fallen over the years, 
though it is argued that shareholdings are still large enough to 
allow directors to exercise effective control over their companies. 
In addition, while the proportion of total shares held by directors 
is small, these shareholdings are often large in absolute terms and 
constitute a significant source of directors' income, though the 
size of directors' shareholdings varies considerably between 
industries. Combined dividend income and capital appreciation of 
shareholdings match the remuneration which directors receive as 
salary income. It is argued that these profit-'related income 
elements are sufficiently large to cause directors to attach 
priority to profitability goals. This proposition is explored 
through statistical analysis of the relationship between directors' 
remuneration and company performance. Regression results show that 
as the definition of directors' remuneration is broadened to include 
dividends and capital appreciation as well as salary, company size 
variables diminish in importance as determinants of remuneration and 
profitability variables predominate. Managers do have an incentive 
to pursue profitability. 
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PREFACE 
In summarising some four years intensive efforts in collecting 
company accounting data, corresponding with Company Secretaries and 
analysing the findings, one is struck by how meagre the result is. 
A mountain of empiricism seems to have distilled to a molehill of 
conclusions, however important those few conclusions are. For the 
writer, the project has provided an opportunity to acquire and 
practise new research skills, and to exorcize some long standing 
doubts about the theory of the firm which have haunted him. One 
can only hope that the reader finds something equally valuable to 
reward his patient efforts. 
I should like to acknowledge the help of the hundred Company 
Secretaries who replied to my letters and telephone calls. Without 
their assistance the project could not have got started. I should 
also like to thank Bradford University Research Committee for their 
financial assistance with data processing. Finally, I would like 
to thank Dr Sparkes and Professor Buckley for their encouragement 
over the final phases of the project. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
As the proportion of shares owned by the directors of large 
Joint-stock companies has declined over the decades with increasing 
numbers of shareholders, two key questions have arisen. First. to 
what extent can shareholders, as owners of the business, exert 
control over company policy or does control reside with the senior 
salaried managers and directors? Second, if senior salaried managers 
I 
and directors do control large companies, what kind of company goals 
will these managers pursue and are these goals likely to conflict 
with shareholders' interests? Both these questions will be addressed 
in the chapters which follow. First though, the present chapter sets 
these questions in a long-term historical framework by looking at the 
development and financing of the Joint-stock company against the 
background of the broader context of the evolution of economic 
thought. 
The concentration by economists upon markets rather than individ- 
ual firms reflects the influence of the guideposts to economic 
analysis established by Adam Smith in the 1770's and refined by his 
successors in the classical tradition through to Alfred Marshall at 
the beginning of the present century. Their market model depicting 
self-seeking producers and consumers interacting to mutual advantage, 
guided by the "invisible hand" of competitive market forces, was 
abstracted from observations of the industrial structures of 18th 
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and 19th century Britain. Then the economy generally was composed 
of large numbers of small enterprises, managed by owner-founders or 
their heirs. 
In these p. re-Industrial Revolution days companies lacKed the 
technology to sustain large-scale production processes, served frag- 
mented local markets and found it difficult to amass large amounts of 
capital necessary to finance large-scale production, in the absence 
of a developed capital market. Consequently most businesses were 
restricted to whatever capital the founder could provide plus what he 
could raise from family and friends. The entrepreneurs who ran these 
companies sought profits because these profits constituted their own 
income and provided finance for investment; and given competition only 
those firms making good profits survived. It is only a short step 
from here to the assumption incorporated in the conventional theory 
of the firm, that entrepreneurs are motivated by a single-minded 
pursuit of profit. 
E. arly production units had relatively simple organisations, most 
of them being sole-proprietorships or partnerships with small work- 
forces. Legal restrictions on the formation of joint-stock companies 
in Britain confined this form of organisation to a severely limited 
field until the Limited Liability Acts of the 1850's relaxed the 
constraints on this method of financing business. Only after the 
passing of the Joint Stock Companies Act in 1856 was the corporate 
form of organisation able to spread throughout industry, and even 
then the limited joint-stock company did not become a significant 
form of business organisation until the last decades of the 19th 
century. Not that this made much difference to the control of firms, 
forýthe founders and heirs of companies simply converted from sole 
proprietorships to joint-stock companies in order to obtain the 
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benefits of limited liability, issued a minority of shares in order 
to raise additional capital, but kept a majority of shares themselves 
in order to retain control. At this time it remained reasonable to 
assume that these family-dominated joint-stock companies would 
operate in much the same way as their sole-proprietor predecessors, 
pursuing profit under the guidance of their entrepreneur founders. 
As the technological changes of the Industrial Revolution made 
large-scale factory production possible and as, improvements in trans- 
port and communications made it possible to serve mass national and 
international markets, companies grew rapidly. Such growth demanded 
heavy investment programmes and necessitated raising large amounts of 
new capital, which generally involved attracting many now shareholders 
through share issues, a process facilitated by the rapid development 
of sophisticated capital markets. Raising new capital inevitably 
involved diluting the proportion of shares held by the founder and 
his family so that in many larger companies the founder became at 
best a minority shareholder in the company which he controlled, the 
bulk of ownership resting in the hands of large numbers of small 
shareholders. 
Significantly, it was not until the 1930's that economists paid 
much attention to the joint-stock company, largely because of the 
impact of the work of Berle and Means (1932). Berle and Means 
pointed out how important the few hundred largest US companies had 
become, insofar as they were responsible for a large proportion of 
total manufactured output. Second, they highlighted the extent of 
the splitting of the share atom, with the typical large US company 
having many thousands of shareholders. Finally, they argued that 
the dilution of shareholdings had continued to the point where in 
many large companies founding families owned only a tiny proportion 
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of shares and control had passed into the hands of salaried profess- 
ional managers, effectively divorcing control of the company from 
ownership. Though the methods of analysis employed by Berle and 
Means have been criticised (see Chapter 2), their work had a seminal 
influence. Economists began to look more closely at large companies 
rather than dismissing them as a simple building block in a larger 
theory of markets. 
As industrial economists elevated firms to the forefront of 
discussion, some began to speculate about the motives of the salaried 
professional managers who control resources within large firma and 
set company goals. Gordon (1945). for example, emphasised the import- 
ance of financial incentives in motivating managers and the extent to 
which their pecuniary self-interest would guide their behaviour. 
However he also acknowledged the importance of non-financial motiva- 
tions of managers such as their urge for power, their desire for 
prestige, their creative urge, their identification with their 
companies and associated feelings of loyalty, and their need for 
security. 
Many of these management motivations were examined further in the 
managerial theories of the firm developed in the late 1950's and 1960's 
which explored the organisational complexities-of the modern large 
corporation and suggested that salaried professional managers would 
tend to pursue company growth as their prime goal rather than profit. 
Their arguments for choosing growth goals are explored in chapter two 
and need not be pursued in detail here. Suffice it to'say that they 
suggest that senior managers' salaries are more likely to be related 
to the size of the companies which they control rather than their 
profitability, so that managers' own pecuniary interests will incline 
them to growth goals. In addition, power, status and prestige 
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considerations will also cause managers to favour growth, since 
these factors are more related to size than profitability. 
The link between the salaries received by senior managers and the 
size of the companies they manage has been subjected to extensive 
empirical investigation since the late 19501s. The findings of these 
studies are reported in detail in chapter three. In essence, the 
majority of these studies looked at the salaries receimed by directors 
of large companies and found that salaries were more strongly related 
to company size than profitability. This leads directly to the 
inference that the pecuniary interests of senior managers will cause 
them to pursue company growth rather than profitability. Indeed 
this presumption has become so widely accepted as to be axiomatic. 
For example, in a recent empirical study of the*performance of large 
British companies, Luffman and Reed(19841 adoptedgrowth in company 
sales as the success measure of greatest interest to managers, 
arguing that: 
"There is now considerable evidence that there is a positive 
correlation between the size of the company and the remunera- 
tion of senior managers. Thus growth in size is of particular 
interest to the managers. " (Luffman and Reed, p 51) 
While the majority of empirical studies of the salary/size 
relationship focussed upon directors' salaries, two US studies took 
a broader view of directors' remuneration and arrived at somewhat 
different results. Lewellen (1969) pointed out that whilst directors' 
shareholdings generally constitute only a small proportion of total 
shares, they are still quite large in absolute terms and that income 
derived from these shareholdings compares favourably to salary income. 
In a follow-up study relating these remuneration measures to company 
6 
performance, Lewellen and Huntsman C1970) found that when a broader 
directors' remuneration measure was employed embracing both salary 
and share-related income, profitability rather than size appeared to 
be the determinant of remuneration. Cox and Shauger (1973) performed 
a similar, though less extensive, analysis which confirmed Lewellen 
and Huntsman's finding fot the USA. To date no parallel study has 
been undertaken of the extent of directors' shareholdings in major 
British companies, income derived from these shareholdings and the 
links between directors' total remuneration and company performance. 
The present study seeks to remedy this deficiency. I 
Detailed information was collected about the shareholdings of the 
directors of 100 large quoted British companies selected from the 
"Times 1000" and the dividends and share appreciation of these shares 
was calculated for a ten-year period. These share income data werethen 
added to information about directors' salaries and bonuses to arrive 
at a broader remuneration measure. The methods employed in collecting 
this information are reported in detail in chapter four. Directors' 
salaries and their broader remuneration were then related to company 
performance measures using multiple regression techniques, and the 
results of these analyses are reported in detail in chapter five. 
Ip essence, these results suggest a relationship between company size 
and directors' salaries, along the same lines as the results of the 
majority of previous studies, but when directors' remuneration is 
broadened to include share income, profitability predominates as the 
key determinant of remuneration and company size becomes insignificant. 
The implications of these findings for the control of large companies 
and the company goals set by managers are explored in chapter six. 
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CHAPTER 2 
0 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE*THEORY OF THE FIRM 
In recent decades economists have paid increasing attention to 
the theory of the firm and speculated about the motives of the tranagers 
who run companies. The present chapter traces this developing interest 
in large companies and the objectives their managers might pursue, 
under two broad headings. First, various empirical studies of the 
ownership and control. of large companies are reviewed, which trace 
the emergence of salaried professional managers as the potential 
controllers of many large companies. Second, a number of alternative 
theories of the firm are outlined which speculate about the motiva- 
tions of the new breed of salaried managers and the kinds of company 
goals which they might pursue. 
2.1 Ownership and Control of Large Companies 
Despite the rapid growth in joint-stock companies in the United 
States and Britain from the late decades of the nineteenth century 
onwards, it was not until 1932 that the significance-of the limited 
liability company came to the forefront of economic discussion, as a 
direct result of the work of Berle and Means. With the publication 
of "The Modern Corporation and Private Property" Berle and Means 
performed a valuable service in pointing out, first of all, the 
growing importance of a few hundred very large companies in the US 
economy, and second, the wide diffusion of share ownership within 
these companies. 
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Some examples from Berle and Means' study illustrate the extent 
of this diffusion of share ownership. By 1929 the American Telephone 
and Telegraph Company had almost half a million shareholders, the 
principal shareholder owning only seven-tenths of one per-cent of the 
voting shares, while aggregate holdings of the twenty largest share- 
holders amounted to only four per-cent. Similarly the United States 
Steel Corporation had 182,000 shareholders, the largest of whom owned 
only nine-tenths of one per-cent of the voting shares, while aggregate 
holdings of the twenty largest shareholders amounted to only 5.1 per- 
cent. More generally, out of 144 companies for which complete share- 
holder list data could be obtained, only twenty companies had less 
than 5,000 shareholders each, while as many as 71 ccmpanies had over 
20,000 shareholders each. 
In order to Structure their data Berle and Means concentrated 
upon the 200 largest American non-financial companies, and starting 
from a definition of control which entailed "... actual power to select 
the board of directors (or its majority)" Cibid p 69) they classified 
the 200 companies under a series of five headings: 
1 Privately-owned A firm was placed in this category if an 
individual, family or group of associates held 80% or more 
of its voting shares. 
2 Controlled through the ownership of a majority of the 
voting shares. For majority ownership the individual, 
family or group of associates needed to own between 50% 
-and 80% of voting shares. 
3 Controlled through the ownership of a dominant - minority 
of voting shares. Here share ownership of between 20% and 50% 
was deemed generally necessary for*minoritq'control. This 
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they regarded as being a sufficiently dominant minority 
block of shares to be used as a nucleus for the accumula- 
tion of a majority vote in a proxy battle. However, in 
several specific instances a smaller holding was credited 
with power of control, based upon supplementary evidence. 
4 Controlled by means of a legal device such as pyramiding 
or the use of non-voting shares. 
5 Management-controlled Companies were assigned to this 
category where ownership was so widely distributed that no 
group of shareholders would be able under ordinary circum- 
stances to muster enough votes to challenge the rule of 
management. Few of the companies thus classified had a 
dominant interest greater than 5%, though Berle and Means 
acknowledged concern about the grey area represented by 
cases falling between 20% and 5%, acknowledging that the 
dividing line between minority-control and management-control 
is not clear. 
Application of these classifications-to the shareholder lists of 
the 200 largest companies in 1929 showed a high proportion of firms 
which rated as management-controlled, 88 in fact, or 44% of the 
total. This was by far the largest category: only 6% fell into the 
private-ownership category, 5% were majority-controlled and 23% 
were minority-controlled. 
An examination by Berle and Means of a further 42 companies 
smaller than the largest 200 indicated that dispersion of share 
ownership had progressed to a considerable extent in medium-sized 
companies too, with an indication that as company size increases 
the tendency to dispersion increases too. They consequently 
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predicted that further diffusion of share ownership and increases in 
management-control would accompany the growth of large companies. 
This prediction was lent some weight by the evidence of a follow- 
up study by Larner (1966). Following closely the definitions, 
procedures and classifications used by Berle and Means, Larner looked 
again at the 200 largest non-financial companies in the United States 
in 963. Even though Larner applied a less stringent test of minority 
shareholder control, reducing the lower limit for minority-control 
from 20% to 10% of voting shares held by an individual or small group, 
to offset the greater size and more diffuse ownership of the 200 
largest companies in 1963, he still found that by 1963 the number of 
minority controlled companies had grown from 44% in 1929 to 84% in 
1963. 
An analysis of the shareholder lists of large English companies, 
conducted by Sargant Florence (19611 revealed a similar trend of 
declining vote concentration with the suggestion of growing management 
(as opposed to shareholder) control. Sargant Florence concentrated 
upon large companies with share capital of 13 million or more, noting 
the total number of voting shares held by the twenty largest share- 
holders. He found that between 1936 and 1951 the average number of 
shareholders in these companies changed little, but that the average 
percentage of votes held by the twenty largest shareholders decreased 
from 35% to 22%. He used several criteria to distinguish owner- 
controlled companies from management-controlled ones, specifically: 
1. The largest single shareholder had 20% or more 
of the votes 
2. The twenty largest shareholders had 30% or more 
of share votes 
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3. Another company held 20% or more of share votes 
4. The directors, between them, had 5% or more of the 
ordinary shares 
Using these tests, Florence identified 89 out of 268 large 
companies as being owner-controlled, leaving two-thirds of the large 
companies in 1951 as probably not owner-controlled. 
j'The evidence presented so far suggests that the growth of large. 
business units has been accompanied by a wide dispersion of share 
ownership, diluting the proportion of voting shares in the hands of 
any one individual or group, and leaving these large companies under 
the control of salaried professional managers. This opens up the 
possibility that those controlling large companies might not manage 
them solely in the shareholders' interests, but might use the 
discretion allowed them to pursue goals of their own. Such a 
possibility was explored in various managerial models of the firm in 
the late 1950's and early 19601s. 
However, over the years'there has been mounting disquiet about 
whether management-control is as complete as Berle and Means suggested. 
A very early study supervised by Goldsmith and Parmalee for the 
Temporary National Economic Committee (1940) gathered information on 
the 20 largest shareholders of each of the 200'largest US companies. 
The study found ownership and family control to be substantially more 
important than did Berle and Means. Whereas Berle and Means found 
only 34% of the 200 largest companies to be owner/family controlled, 
the TNEC study found 46% of companies to be owner-controlled, though 
many of these owners turned out to be other companies. These results 
are not strictly comparable because the TNEC classification included 
a category of inter-company control, whereas Berle and Means used an 
ultimate control basis of classification'. 
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Another early study by'Chevalier C1969) challenged the as'sertion 
that there is a significant separation of ownership and control, 
suggesting that minority control could be exerted with an individual 
or family shareholding of as little as 5%, and that most of the 200 
largest US manufacturing companies were still owner-controlled on 
this criterion. Of the 200 he found that 69 companies were controlleCL 
by individuals or families, 31 by banks and*f; nancial institutions and 
20 by other groups, leaving only 80 which could be said to be management- 
controlled. Working along similar lines, Burch (1972) found 41% of his 
sample of 450 large US firms to be management-controlled and 42% to be 
family controlled, suggesting that owner and family control was still 
important, though subject to a historical downtrend. 
A later study by Pederson*and Tabb (1976) challenged the Berle 
and Means and Larner contention that the shares of large companies are 
so widely dispersed that non-owning managers have control. They 
presented an overview of large shareholdings in almost 600 large US 
industrial and retailing companies in 1976/72. Pedersen and Tabb 
divided the companies by the ýollowing criteria: 
Control of 5% or more of a company by a person, family 
or another company, on the grounds that 5% share control 
is sufficient to challenge the contention of management 
control. 
2. Control of 5% or more of company shares by insiders as a 
group. This category covers cases in which the management 
of a company is composed primarily of owners rather than 
salaried employees. 
1 
3. Management-control: where insiders own between I and 5 per- 
cent of shares, leaving the company controlled by managers, 
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but managers with a large monetary staKe as owners; or 
where insiders own less than 1% of shares. 
Applying these categories, Pederson and Tabb found that only 88 
firms, slightly less than one-seventh of the sample, appeared to be 
management-controlled. By contrast, in the great majority of cases 
there was single party control by an individual, family or company. 
Theisample suggested industry differences in single party control, 
such control being more prominent in merchandising and transport than 
amongst industrial companies. 
Nyman and Silberston (1978) presented new evidence on the extent 
of ownership-control in British industry and showed that the extent 
of managerial control of large firms in Britain was more limited than 
had been thought. However, they suggested that the situation differs 
very much by industry, and that this may have affected the results of 
previous empirical studies. 
Nyman and Silberston differentiated between different types of 
ownership control, distinguishing between firms which w3re controlled 
by professional managers, by families, by other industrial firms or 
by financial institutions, arguing that each of these types of company 
may display different behavioural characteristics. In addition, they 
discussed the importance of interlocking directorates as a means of 
control by interest groups, citing evidence on the extent of inter- 
locking directorates in both the US and the UK. These observations 
led Nyman and Silberston to conclude that to locate control in any 
given company it is not adequate to set up arbitrary statistical 
criteria such as the percent. age of shares which must be owned by 
the. largest holder. Rather a case by case approach is necessary, 
because any company may be related to other companies or 
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financial institutions and family owners via complex patterns of 
shareholdings, interlocking directorates and kinship networks. 
Nyman and Silberston took the power to select and change senior 
management as being the main indicator of control, and they attempted 
to define the circumstances in which someone is able to exercise 
control. This led them to generate a short-list of criteria for 
estimating the extent to which large UK companies are effectively 
controlled by proprietary interests: 
The percentage of votes held by a known individual, 
institution or group. Potential control was assumed to 
be present with a shareholding oý more than 5%. 
2. The percentage of votes held by the board of directors 
and their families. Again potential control was assumed 
to be present with a shareholding of more than 5%. 
3. The identity of the Chairman and Managing Director, 
and their relationship to the firm's founder and his 
family. 
This last criterion was added an the grounds that detailed 
studies of large companies by Nyman and Silberston had emphasised 
the power wielded by the Chairman in controlling board meetings, 
making contact with major shareholders and monitoring company 
performance. Thus they argued that if the Chairman was the founder 
of the company or one of his descendants, then the firm may be 
designated as family, even if the family were not large current 
shareholders. 
Applying these three criteria to the 250 largest UK quoted 
companies selected from The Times 1000 for 1975/76, Nyman and 
Silberston found that 56% of their companies had at least some 
15 
proprietary interest and could be classified as owner-controlled. 
One interesting point which they noted was the relative lack of 
ownership by financial institutions. In only nine companies was an 
institutional shareholding of more than 5% found, four of these being 
shareholdings by the Prudential Assurance Company. 
Nyman and Silberston discovered big industry differences in the 
extent of shareholder control, with a high proportion of owner- 
controlled companies in the food, construction, retailing and merchandi- 
sing industries, and predominantly management-controlled companies in 
chemicals, metal goods and building materials industries. Nyman and 
Silberston suggested that this was because non-manufacturing industries 
are less capital intensive so that there is less need for firms to 
raise outside finance and dilute their equity holdings. Whatever the 
reason, it does mean that the results of any ownership-control study 
will tend to reflect the industrial makeup of the sample of companies 
chosen. 
Reviewing empirical studies on the effect of the nature of control 
on company performance, Nyman and Silberston found that the only clear 
pattern which emerged was that owner-controlled companies had a higher 
rate of profit than management-controlled companids. However they 
argued that it may be impossible to infer anything about management 
motivation from statistics of controlling ownership. For though the 
percentage of a firm's shares which its management owns may be very 
small, the absolute value of those shares may be high, and may well 
induce shareholder orientated behaviour. 
In a final section Nyman and Silberston stressed the growing 
importance of financial institutions in the UK, especially insurance 
companies and pension funds which have become increasingly large 
holders of industrial shares. They Pointed out that to date British 
financial institutions have generally been passive in the affairs of 
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the companies in which they hold shares, limiting their equity holding 
in any one company. However, Nyman and Silberston argued that the 
growing staKe of the institutions has made this an increasingly 
difficult stance to adopt. They therefore saw the role of these 
institutions growing, so that as owner-managers give way to profession- 
al managers, they in turn are being forced to cede control to financial 
forc6s. This development would, they felt, tend to strengthen the 
forces making for greater profits, 
tions. 
by influencing'management motiva- 
In an extensive new inquiry into the accountability and control 
of large US coTnpanies, Hetman C1981) reassessed Berle and Means 
in the light of post-war changes in industrial structure. He looked 
at the 200 largest companies in 1974/75, distinguishing between 
management-control Csome ownership'interest plus board representation); 
majority ownership control (with 50% or more of shares); minority 
ownership control (with 5% or more of shares); intercompany ownership 
and control (through a corporate minority interest); and financial 
control (by bankers or other creditors); with subdivisions of the 
major categories. These categories resolve ultimately on determining 
who has the power to appoint or displace top executives in the company, 
which was Judged from basic structural factors such as ownership 
concentration and board composition supplemented by evidence of 
participation by large owners and creditors. 
Using these categories Herman traced the evolution of corporate 
control in the USA from 1900 through the mid-1970's, detecting a 
steady increase in management-control and a parallel decline in 
direct ownership-control. Twenty four per-cent of a sample of very 
large companies in 1900 were under ultimate managament-control, 
rising to 40% in 1929 and 82% of the largest 200 companies in 1974/75. 
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By contrast direct ownership-control fell sl . 
ightly from 45% in 1900 
to 42% in 1929, then fell markedly, thereafter to 16% in 1974/75. 
Herman attributed these trends to the diffusion of ownership, 
pointing out that as firms grow to large size over an extended period, 
numbers of shareholders grow and individual ownership becomes diffused; 
family dominated blocks in particular diminish in importance and 
institutions tend to displace individuals as holders of the largest 
blocks of shares. Contrasting 1929 and 1974, Herman noted a fivefold 
increase in the median number of shareholders in the top 200 companies. 
Focussing specifically on 43 companies from the top 200, he was able 
to trace more directly the decline of family control, the holdings of 
the major family groups who dominated these companies in the late 
1920's having fallen by 50% or more in four-fifths of the cases, and 
with control passing out of the hands of the founding families in 
over half the cases during this era. 
Herman's analysis of the share ownership of company directors also 
offered some useful insights. Holdings of directors in the top 200 
companies showed a skewed distribution: in 28 companies the, board 
owned 5% or more of shares and in 68 companies the board owned 1% or 
more, but at the other end of the distribution in 109 companies the 
directors owned less than 0.5 per-cent of shares. Looking at the 
market value of shares, in 26 companies board ownership was worth 
$50 million or more, whilst in 118 companies directors owned under 
$5 million worth of shares. This distribution tends to support the 
view that there is a high degree of separation of ownership from 
control. However, with an average officer/director shareholding worth 
$920,000 in 1974/75, not counting options, senior managers still 
tefided to have a large ownership stake. 
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Ultimately, Herman saw the basis for corporate control not in 
the shareholdings of the controllers but in what he called their 
strategic position: - their established position as directors inside 
the company, their links with financial institutions and the like, 
so that shareholdings at best only strengthen strategic position. 
A conference on the modern corporation, arranged to mark the 50th 
anniversary of the publication of Berle and Means' book, provided an 
opportunity to take stock and reappraise the divorce of ownership and 
control thesis. The proceedings of this conference, published in the 
Journal of Law and Economics, provided some interesting insights into 
the present state of the debate. In particular, Stigler and Friedland 
(1983) and Hessen (1983) outlined the historical background to Berle 
and Means' work, criticising its methodology and conclusions. 
In the same journal*Demsetz (19831 challenged the premise that 
the separation between ownership and control would cause managers to 
behave differently from owners, because it ignores the fact that 
'company 
executives receive incomes that are highly correlated with 
share performance. Demsetz outlined the standards used to determine 
the degree of ownership representation, these being the fraction of 
shares owned by the largest shareholder, largest 5, largest 10 or 
largest. 20 shareholders; or alternatively group ownership of 5% or 
10% or 20% of outstanding shares. However these criteria ignore 
directors' share income and the fact that a substantial fraction of 
outstanding shares are owned by directors and senior managers. For 
example, he found that for the 10 largest US manufacturing firms from 
the Fortune 500 for 1975, directors' s"hareholdings averaged 2.1% for 
the period 1973-82, but that for the middle 10 the proportion averaged 
19.3% and for the last 10 in the Fortune 500 the average was 20.4%, 
suggesting continuing ownership interests outside the very largest firms. 
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In a further contribution to the conference, Easterbrook*and 
Fischel C1983) discussed the role of voting within the company and 
the tendency, pointed out by Berle and Means, for managers to use the 
voting machinery and proxy balloting system to seize control of 
companies. They argued that the apathy of ordinary shareholders was 
understandable in the light of the diffusion of share ownership and 
that the present rules on voting could be construed as an attempt to 
reduce the agency costs involved in monitoring managers' performance 
and acting to remove them. 
Pursuing the theme of voting, Cubbin'ahd'Lee--h C1983) reviewed 
the various criteria used by previous researchers to distinguish 
management-control from minority ownership control, pointing out how 
virtually all of them use the size of the largest shareholding block 
as the main criterion. with blocks ranging from 25% down to 4%. 
However they pointed out that this simple criterion takes no account 
of the dispersion of the remaining sharehcidings. This led Cubbin and 
Leech to consider an explicit voting model which olucidated*the role 
of the size distribution of smaller shareholdings and which led to a 
measure of the "degree of control" in companies, using a summary index 
of dispersion. 
Cubbin and Leech started by distinguishing between the location 
of control and the degree of control. Location of control can be 
either internal or external, and external control can be further sub- 
divided into control by a single large individual shareholder; control 
by an institutional investor or control by another firm. The degree of 
control is a continuous-variable measuring the discretion which the 
controlling group has to pursue its own objectives, and boils down to 
the probability of the board being dismissed for a given poor standard 
of performance. The degree of control is not independent from its 
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location though, for internal controllers have control over the 
agendas of meetings, of internally generated information and 
the 
communication machinery and can generally rely on shareholder inertia, 
which gives them a greater degree of control than an external 
controller would have with the same shareholding. They went on to 
generate a probabilistic voting model for degree of control using a 
modified Herfindahl index to measure the probability of the controlling 
shareholder securing majority support. 
Cubbin and Leech took a sample of 85 large British companies taken 
from the top 400 of The Times 1000 for 1970/71, and found a generally 
high degree of dispersion with the largest shareholder owning more than 
20% of shares in only 10 cases, and in 44 cases owning less than 5%. 
Applying their index to this sample, they found that in many cases the 
shareholding needed for control was quite small. Contrasting their 
own measure of owner-versus-management control with a fixed "5% of 
shares held" measure, they suggested that the latter measure tends to 
misclassify companies in making no allowance for variations in share 
dispersion between companies. - 
A more fundamental criticism of the methods employed to distinguish 
ownership and control has recently been voiced by. Pitelis and Sugden 
(1984). They argued that classifying firms as either owner- or 
manager-controlled using an ex Post analysis of share distribution is 
wrong and that control must be explained in terms of a dynamic frame- 
work. Specifically, they argued that beginning from a position where 
an owner has control of his company, he will assess the percentage of 
shares others can obtain before control is lost and cease selling his 
shares to avoid falling below that percentage. Thus for them 
causality runs from control to share distribution, not the other way 
around. 
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pitelis and Sugden defined control as the ability to determine 
broad corporate objectives, despite resistance from others. Having 
taken these strategic decisions the controller can then leave the 
implementation of these decisions to others, so that control can be 
exercised via a shareholding whether or not owners play a role in day 
to day decision making. Recognising the benefits of control and the 
dilution of control where shares are issued to numerous shareholders 
to f inance company growth, the controller will at most obtain finance 
from others just to the point prior to loss of control. (The percent- 
age of shares required for control varies across firms - in one for 
example, it may be 1%, in another 5%, depending upon the distribution 
of ownership and groupings amongst shareholders. ) Pitelis and Sugden 
acknowledged that some owners can lose control by misjudging the 
critical percentage of shares necessary for control, but considered 
it highly unlikely that all owners in all firms misjudge the critical 
percentage. Thus they argued that if managers have control it is 
because owners allow them to, and that owners will continue to 
exercise bacKground latent control. Acceptance of this thesis would 
considerably weaKen the arguments of those who detect a divorce of 
ownership and control from ex post share distributions. 
Before leaving the subject of ownership and control, it is 
necessary. to trace the growth of the financial institutions - pension 
funds, insurance companies, unit trusts and investment trusts, and 
their potential role as external controllers of large companies. 
Over recent decades these institutions have tended to grow rapidly in 
both the USA and the UK and as they have grown their investment in 
the shares of large quoted companies has grown apaces 
Various studies have highlighted the tendency for the equity 
portfolios of institutional investors to grow. One early British 
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study by Moyle (1971) showed that institutional shareholders 
had 
increased their share of UK quoted equities from 17.9% to 31.7% 
during the thirteen years from 1957 to 1970. Estimates of the 
pattern of ownership of quoted ordinary shares, made by The Royal 
Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth (1975), confirm 
this trend: they found that the combined holdings of institutions had 
increased from 25.5% in 1963 to 38.3% in 1973. More recent studies 
by Briston and Dobbins (1978) and by Erritt and Alexander (1979) show 
this trend continuing:. Briston and Dobbins's findings suggesting 
that combined institutional holdings have increased from 26.0% in 
1966 to 42.5% in 1975, while Erritt and Alexander reported a 
comparable institutional holding of 42.9% in 1975. 
Whether growing shareholdings by institutional investors serve 
to increase their potential control over the companies in which they 
invest depends upon the degree to which shareholdings in any company 
are concentrated into the hands of a few institutions able to act 
cohesively in using their voting strength. Even where institutions 
control 50% of the equity of a company, if these holdings are evenly 
distributed amongst several hundred independent institutions then 
managers of that company may still be left with wide discretion over 
company goals. To the extent that institutions pursue policies of I 
extreme diversification, spreading their big equity investments over 
a large number of companies, then the proportion of shares held by any 
institution in one company will be too small to allow that institution 
to exert control over the company. Evidence from the UK would suggest 
that this has been the case. For example, the study by Briston and 
Dobbins of the holdings of 62 institutions in go companies over the 
period 1950-1970 led them to conclude that financial institutions 
systematically avoid building up holdings in individual companies, 
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preferring to spread their investment over large numbers of companies 
(Briston and Dobbins, 1978). This no doubt is why Nyman and Silberston 
(op cit] found that in only 9 of their 250 large companies did a 
single institutional investor hold more than 5% of the company's 
equ ity. 
In contrast, financial institutions in the United States have 
tended to concentrate their holdings in smaller numbers of companies. 
The Metcalf Report (1978) showed that at the end of 1976, in 19 of 122 
large American corporations a single institutional investor controlled 
over 5% of toe voting rights. Farra. r and Girton's (1981) findings 
confirm that US institutional holdings are concentrated in big share- 
holdings in a few large companies, rather than spread around in small 
holdings of shares in many different companies. 
British fund managers seem to prefer to adopt a passive role and 
to minimise their intervention in portfolio companies. Some reasons 
for this are offered in Dobbins, Lowes and Pass (1981). First, a 
conflict between a major shareholder and management would exaggerate 
a company's problems and the subsequent publicity could depress the 
share price, exposing the institution to further loss. Second, the 
institutional shareholders may wish to avoid being held publicly 
accountable for decisions affecting employment, factory closures and 
the like. Also institutional investors may feel that they do not have 
the expertise to advise management. Finally, the financial institu- 
tion's primary responsibility is to its policyholders or pension fund 
contributors, and where an investment proves unsatisfactory, the 
investment manager may find it easier and cheaper simply to sell the 
shares and invest elsewhere. 
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2.2 DeVelopment of'Managetial'Thbbriet. *Of'the'Firm 
It is not part of our present brief to provide a comprehensive 
review of the managerial theories of the firm which emerged in the 
1950's and 1960's, nor is it necessary given the substantial published 
reviews and shorter synopses already available (Wildsmith 1973, 
Curwen 1976, Lowes 1978, Pass and Lowes 1978). However it is necessary 
to S'ay something about the attempts to develop broader theories of the 
firm to explain decision making within large, manager controlled 
I companies, in particular the motivational characteristics of these 
alternative theories. For in essence, 'these theories starý from the 
I divorce of ownership and control phenomenon, then go on to argue that 
this divorce allows managers a'certain amount of discretion to pursue 
non-profit goals, discretion which they exercise in their own self- 
interest. Most of the alternative theories then add the thought that 
the self-interest of salaried professional managers will incline them 
towards growth objectives at the expense of profit. The result is a 
set of "managerial" theories of the firm which emphasize tho growth 
goal or contain a significant growth component, rejecting completely 
the traditional prEfit-maximising theory derived from neo-classical 
economics. 
In an early seminal contribution Gordon (1945) discussed the 
nature of managerial motivation, drawing upon company case studies. 
Gordon started by emphasising the importance of financial incentives 
like salaries in motivating managers, then turned to non-financial 
incentives. He pointed out that one of the most important spurs to 
action by the businessman is the opportunity to satisfy the urge for 
personal power, this power being a product of the manager's position 
in the company rather than his personal wealth. This power consists 
of authority over subordinates and control of the disposal of company 
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resources and it increases with the size of the firm, providing a 
tendency for firms to growý even if. the profitability of expansion is 
questionable. Gordon adds other suggested motivations to this, 
talking of managers' desire for prestige, the creative, urge, the 
propensity to identify oneself with a group and the related feeling 
of group loyalty, the urge for adventure and the desire to serve 
others. Gordon also adds that managers desire security, large 
companies generally accommodating this desire by offering security 
of tenure and fairly stable executive compensation. Gordon's motiva- 
tion list was subsequently utilised by various managerial model 
builders, in particular Marris (1964). 
Simon (1957) was another early seminal influence, in particular 
his ideas on managerial remuneration and the relationship between 
remuneration and organisational structure. He argued that businesses, 
like all 1ýrge-scale organisations, take on a pyramid form, because 
of the hierarchical structure induced by the authority relation. Thus 
each executive has a certain number of subordinates at the level 
immediately below him, this number varying only within moderate limits 
at executive level: ý-. Also he pointed out a widely accepted attitude 
in industry that an appropriate differential in salary must exist 
between an executive and his immediate subordinates, this differential 
being necessary to ensure the authority of the superior over his 
subordinates. 
Putting together these two features regarding span of control and 
salary differentials, Simon proposed a theory of executive compensation 
which related the salaries of top executives to the sizes of their 
companies. His suggestion was that the salaries of top managers depend 
upon the size of the companies they manage, measured in terms of 
employees, rather than upon their marginal contribution to company 
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profits, as suggested by traditional theory. Simon's company size/ 
salary relationship has subsequently been incorporated in various 
managerial theories of the firm, particularly those of Marris (1964) 
and Williamson (1907). 
Building upon the seminal influence of Berle and Means, Gordon, 
and Simon, various writers set out to create alternative growth 
models of the firm. These growth models are invariably based upon a 
management utility function which managers seek to maximise subject 
to certain constraints, and they all emphasise company growth or 
contain a-growth component. We shall concentrate on the three 
maximising models which have received most attention in the economics 
literature: those of Baumol, Marris and Williamson. 
Baumal C19591 relegated profit considerations to the periphery 
and concentrated upon sales factors as the core of his theory. He 
suggested that in general managers will seek to maximise not their 
profits but their total sales revenue subject to a profit constraint. 
His major argument in support of this contention was that the separa- 
tion of ownership from control and the link between salaries and sales 
would lead managers to maximise sales rather than profits: 
"Even if size did not promote profits, personal self- 
interest could well induce the managers of a firm to 
seeK to maximise sales. Executive salaries appear to 
be far more closely correlated with the scale of 
operations of the firm than with its profitability. " 
Rbid p 46) 
Baumol then introduced the idea of a profit constraint, arguing 
that managers need to earn sufficient profits to finance future 
expansion of output and sales. Some of these funds can be obtained 
out of retained profits, the rest must be raised from external sources 
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by borrowing or issuing new equity. Such external funds can only be 
raised if the firm can generate sufficient profit to keep the share- 
holders happy and make certain that the company's shares remain 
attractive to the capital market. He went on to argue that: 
7So long as profits are high enough to keep stockholders 
satisfied and contribute adequately to the financing of 
company growth, management will bend its efforts to the 
augmentation of sales revenue rather than to further 
! increases in profits. " Cibid p 491 
Baumol'smodel contains only one objective which managers pursue. 
E3y contrast Marris (1964) incorporated two conflicting objectives in 
his model: growth and security. 
The starting point for Marris's analysis was the suggestion that 
the separation of ownership and control, and market power of large 
companies leaves their managers with a large amount of discretion over 
which goals to pursue: 
"Under any conditions of less than perfect competition, 
profit maximisation is rarely compulsory, and when the 
decision-taker is not directly the profit receiver, 
profits need not necessarily represent even one 
dimension of motivation. " Cibid p 186) 
Marris then went on to suggest several reasons why managers 
derive utility from growth, looking at salary, power and status 
factors. On the salary factor he made the point that managers' 
salaries are larger in larger firms, pointing to statistical studies 
which suggest that measures of size, rather than measures of profit- 
ability explain the lion's share of inter-firm variations in executive 
compensation rates. He also relied at this point on Simon's argument, 
stated earlier, that expansion will generally require an increase in 
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the number of hierarchical levels in the o. rganisation and so will 
increase the salaries of those already occupying senior positions. 
Finally he argued that shara, option schemes for senior managers on 
their current scale cannot ensure profit maximisation, and that many 
management bonus schemes are dependent on size rather than profit- 
ability. Thus he suggested that the personal economic interests of 
senior managers will incline them towards growth. 
With regard to the psychological and sociological motives of 
managers, Marris argued that power and status considerations will 
also induce senior managers to pursue growth. He pointed out that 
individual managers can satisfy their dynamic aspirations by rising 
within one firm or by moving progressively from one firm to another. 
However, given a general preference for internal promotion and low 
mobility, managers are likely to see the growth of their own organisa- 
tion, with the promotion prospects this brings# as one of the best 
methods for satisfying per3onal needs arid ambitions. This is 
particularly true of senior managers and as they approach the top 
they can often only progress further by inducing the firm itself to 
grow. Finally, growth itself is an index of professional competence I 
insofar as a manager's reputation as a good organiser will depend upon 
the size of the company or department which he controls. Thus size 
becomes a source of status and prestige for managers. 
Although managers may pursue growth for economic and status 
reasons, increasing the rate of growth will be costly in terms of 
profits so that more and more growth may depress the stock-market 
value of the company to, the point at which it risks being taken over. 
Therefore to the extent that top managers are security conscious, and 
attach significant disutility to the risk of dismissal, they will not 
commit themselves totally to growth. Rather, they will pursue growth 
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whilst maintaining a minimum share value to avoid 
the sanction of 
takeover with the threat to their job security which this entails. 
Indeed they may even strive to maintain share values somewhat in 
excess of the minimum value needed to forestall takeover raids, 
to 
the extent that they derive satisfaction and status from stock- 
market approval. 
Marris thus arrived at a simple managerial utility function 
encompassing the two competing aims of rapid growth of net assets 
of the company and an acceptable share valuation: 
u=u Cg, v) 
where g stands at a proxy variable for the satisfaction derived by 
managers from power, prestige and salary, and v stands for the 
related but different satisfactions of security from takeover on the 
one hand and stock-market approval on the other. 
The general conclusion which emerged from Marris's analysis was 
that utility maximisation for managers generally involved a faster 
growth rate and a lower profit rate than would utility maximisation 
for owners. 
LiKe Baumol and Marris, Williamson (1967) developed a theory of 
business behaviour which focussed attention upon the self-seeKing 
behaviour of corporate management in companies characterised by 
separation between ownership and control, operating in marKets where 
competitive conditions typically are not severe. Williamson argued 
that in such conditions management enjoys significant discretion in 
developing its strategy, and that the firm's preference function 
should therefore be extended to include certain expense components in 
addition to the usual profit term. 
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Where weak market forces and dispersed ownership allow the firm 
a certain amount of discretion, it is not unreasonable to suppose 
that this discretion will be exercised in a fashion that reflects the 
individual interests of the decision-makers. Therefore Williýmson 
started with the assumption that managers conduct the affairs of the 
firm so as to attend to their own best interests and went an to 
isolate for special consideration the objectives of the group that 
eff' ectively C ontrals the activities of the firm - the management. 
As a first step in his analysis, Williamson considered the major 
managerial motives identified by organisation theorists and economists: 
salary, security, power, status, prestige, social service and profess- 
ional excellence. Unfortunately, such managerial motives are difficult 
to incorporate directly in any theory of the firm, for as Williamson 
acKnowledged, these considerations are analytically evasive. 
Williamson set about rendering these motives amenable to analysis 
by focussing attention not on the managerial motives thomselves, but 
rather by concentrating upon the behaviour such motives produce. 
Thus he was able to relate the non-pecuniary motives of managers to 
operational variables which can be incorporated into a formal model. 
The mechanism which Williamson used to translate the managerial 
motives into operational variables was the concept of expense 
preference. 
Since most managerial decision-making in the firm ultimatelY 
involves spending, Williamson felt that expense preference offered a 
useful way of studying the behaviour of the firm. He suggested that 
management does not have a neutral attitude towards costs, and that 
certain types of expenses are incurred not merely for their contribu- 
tion to profitability but also for the manner in which they enhance 
the individual and collective objectives of managers. Thus the 
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classical assumption that costs are minimised is abandoned in favour 
of an argument that certain classes of expenditure have positive 
utilities for managers. Williamson isolated three such expenditure 
classes in constructing his model: staff expense, expenditures for 
emoluments, and funds available for discretionary investments. 
Managers are interested in the number of staff under their 
control, because more staff can lead to managers getting more salary. 
Williamson argued that staff expansion provides an indirect means to 
the attainment of salary objectives, and that the salary objective 
can therefore be subsumed in the "staff" term. He offered several 
arguments for this proposition. He employed the Simon argument that 
extra junior staff generally necessitate more tiers in the organisa- 
tion hierarchy and so, given the traditional salary differentials 
between tiers, will increase the salaries of those nearer the top. 
Thus he suggested that managers can achieve their salary objectives 
indirectly by building pressure from below through staffing. William- 
son also argued that extra staff would provide greater promotional 
opportunities for managers and would increase the jurisdiction even 
of those who are not promoted, so enhancing their salary prospects too. 
Management values staff not only for salary reasons, but also 
because extra staff are a source of job security, power, status and 
prestige and'professional achievement. Growth in staff size tends to 
reduce insecurity, because the larger a manager's department or 
function in the organisation, the more likely it is to survive. Also 
the larger a manager's department the more power, status and prestige 
he will possess both inside and outside the organisation. Finally the 
size of a manager's department serves to some extent as an index of 
his professional competence, insofar as departments which continuously 
provide more and better services tend to be viewed as more progressive. 
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For all these reasons management can be expected to have a 
positive preference for staff and to attempt to expand general admin- 
istrative and selling outlays. Consequently what may originally 
appear as a legitimate expansion in staff can easily lead to a 
general condition of excessive staff throughout the firm, as outlays 
on staff are pushed beyond the point where their marginal profitability 
is zero. Such a steady accumulation of excess staff can only be halted 
when*adverse economic pressures appear, at which time the excess will 
tend to be removed. 
Managerial emoluments represent a second group of discretionary 
expenditures from which managers derive positive utility. Managers 
like various "perks" such as plush offices, big expense accounts and 
company cars because they are a source of material satisfaction and 
an indirect source of status and prestige. And because managers have 
a strategic advantage in distributing resources within the company, 
they are able to grant themselves salaries and perquisites in excess of 
the minimum amounts needed to keep them in their present jobs. In this 
sense emoluments feature as an economic rent, with zero productivity. 
Generally managers would prefer to take these emoluments as salary 
rather than as perquisites of office, because in salary form the money 
can be spent however the manager wishes. However it is often advanta- 
geous for tax purposes to withdraw at least part of discretionary funds 
as perquisites rather than salary. Also perquisites are much less 
liKely to attract the critical attention of other groups in the organisa- 
tion such as shareholders or worKers, being a less visible reward than 
salary. 
A company needs to earn a certain minimum profit to prevent share- 
holders from mobilising their forces for resistance, and so assure that 
the managers can operate the firm without interference. 
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Williamson argued that management will find it desirable to earn 
"discretionary profits" over and above this minimum acceptable level. 
He offered two main reasons why managers will strive for profits. 
Firstly, he suggested that managers will derive satisfaction from 
self-fulfilment and organisational achievement, and that profits will 
be pursued because they are one measure of this success. Secondly, 
hh argued that such excess profits are a source of discretion, insofar 
as they provide a source of funds which can be allocated freely by the 
managers themselves in their own interests. Some discretionary profit 
can serve to make expansion of staff and emoluments possible. Other 
discretionary profit can be devoted to discretionary spending for 
investment. Insofar as managers can increase their status and prestige 
and security by increasing the amount of physical plant and equipment 
they control, they will seek to divert investment funds to their area 
and to undertake investments which may not be strictly economically 
essential. 
Putting these three terms together in a specific managerial 
preference function, Williamson suggested that generally the firm is 
operat. ed so as to maximise a utility function whose principal 
components are expenditure on staff CS), emoluments (E), and 
discretionary profit (P): 
U (S, E. P) 
subject to the constraint that after-tax profits are big enough to 
pay*satisfactory dividends and to pay for'economically necessary 
Cas opposed to discretionary) investments. 
The organisational theorists' contribution to the development of 
managerial models is wide-ranging, touching as it does upon problems 
of communication within large organisations, goal conflict and the 
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like. For our purposes just one aspect of their work is relevant, 
this is the'Cyert. *and'M6rch (1963) notion of o. rganisational slack. 
CYert and March argued that because of the internally contra- 
dictory and continually changing nature of the organisation, any 
problems of unsatisfactory performance serve to increase inter-group 
I 
conflict and so can threaten the stability of the organisational 
coal, ition. Fortunately, this rarely leads to a breakdown of the 
i 
org6nisation, for the existence of "organisational slack" tends to 
stabilise the system, by providing a pool of emergency resources which 
permit aspirations to be maintained during relatively bad times. 
Cyert and March originally devised their model to explain the 
- internal organisational processes which underlie resource allocation 
patterns in firms operating in oligopolistic market conditions. Here 
the market power possessed by firms affords them a certain amount of 
organisational slack. However as the firm's market power decreases 
then the organisation has to be increasingly run as a -ight ship" 
and slack will be trimmed, until in the limiting case of perfect 
competition organisational siack will be zero and profit maximisation 
becomes the rule. 
The concept of organisational slacK incorporated in behavicural 
theory is very similar to a parallel concept, IIX inefficiency", 
developed by Leibenstein (1966). Leibenstein challenged the 
assumption in neo-classical theories of the firm that for a given 
output, the least possible cost combination of inputs is always 
achieved, so that regardless of marKet structure, firms operate on 
'their minimum possible cost curves. The basis of his argument was 
that human beings, unlike other factors of production, can adjust 
the quality and pace of their work in line with their own preferences, 
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and will settle somewhere between the minimum output they must 
achieve to keep their jobs and the*maximum output they are capable 
of producing given all the right sticks and carrots. Anything less 
than this maximum represents X inefficiency which causes the firm to 
produce at some point above its minimum cost curve. 
Leibenstein felt that X inefficiency would be more liKely in 
firms with monopoly power, for competition serves as a policing device 
to check X inefficiency. Firms isolated from competition are more 
likely to tolerate inefficiency, be overstaffed, spend on prestige 
buildings and make less effort than they could to Keep technology up 
to date, develop export markets and the like. Where this competition 
pressure is lacking Leibenstein felt that other policing devices are 
needed to moderate the incidence of X inefficiency. These can include 
monetary incentives such as profit-related bonuses for management and C2 
control devices such as management consultants and financial controls. 
Since the mid 1970's an alternative interpretation of the divorce of 
ownership and control issue has been developed, following Jensen and 
MecKling's (1976) popularisation of the concept of agency costs. 
Jensen and MecKling started out by defining an agency relationship as 
a contract under which the principals engage an agent to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating decision maKing 
authority to the agent. Inevitably the agent will not always act in 
the best interests of the principal, but, the principal can limit 
divergences from his interests by establishing appropriate incentives 
for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the 
aberrant activities of the agent. They then went on to apply this 
agency concept to the relationship between the shareholders and the 
managers of a company. 
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To analyse the effect of outside equity on agency costs, Jensen 
and Meckling compared the behaviour of a man. ager when he owns'all 
shares in the firm to his behaviour when he sells off a portion of 
those shares to outsiders. If a wholly-owned firm is managed by the 
owner, he will make operating decisions which maximise his utility. 
These decisions will involve not only the benefits he derives from 
pecuniary returns but also the utility generated by various non- 
pecuniary aspects like a nice office, big computer and easy worker- 
relations. If the owner-manager sells some of his shares then agency 
costs will be generated by the divergence between his interests and 
those of outside shareholders, since he will then only bear a fraction 
of the costs of any non-pecuniary benefits he takes out. As the owner- 
manager's fraction of the equity falls, his fractional claim on the 
outcomes falls and this will encourage him to appropriate larger 
amounts of company resources in the form of perquisites, and his 
incentive to search out new profitable ventures is reduced. This 
makes it desirable for the other shareholders to expend more resources 
in monitoring his behaviour. 
Jensen and Meckling pointed out that the magnitude of agency costs 
will vary from firm to firm, depending on the tasks of managers, the 
ease with which they can exercise their own preferences in decision 
making and the costs of monitoring activities. Ultimately the size of 
the agency costs will be directly related to the cost of replacing the 
manager, and if his responsibilities require very little knowledge 
specialised to the firm and if replacement search costs are modest, 
then competition from other potential managers will limit agency costs. 
Other writers have touched upon various aspects of the agency 
problems caused by the separation of decision and risk-bearing 
functions within firms. Some, such as Fama (1980) and Fama and 
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Jensen (19831 concentrated upon the organisation's decision process 
and how different organisational forms control agency problems 
in 
the decision process. Of greater interest in the present context are 
those writers who have focussed on how to structure contractual 
relationships between the principal and agent to provide appropriate 
incentives for the agent to cause him to pursue the principal's 
interests. These include Ross (1973), Lambert C1982), Waegelin C19B23 
and Beck and Zorn 11982). 
Beck and Zorn emphasised the importance of managerial incentives, 
pointing out how in the Jensen and MecKling study incentives were 
related directly to the manager's ownership proportion and how studies 
of managerial incentive contracts have sought to find the optimal 
share of the business that the principal should assign the agent. 
Their study suggests that shares should be priced differently to the 
manager than to other investors, this incentive pricing being required 
to taKe into account the manager's affect on productivity. This means 
that where the manager has less than an optimum ownership share, 
managerial ownership must be subsidised by discounting share prices. 
To this extent the BecK and Zorn study adds theoretical legitimacy to 
the increasing use of management share option and share incentive 
plans. 
Not all economists accepted that salaried professional managers 
are free to pursue alternative goals at the expense of shareholders' 
interests as a result of the divorce of ownership from control. Some 
argued that inefficient or deviant managers if not responsible to, 
and subject to. displacement by, owners directly, can be removed by 
I 
shareholders' acceptance of takeover bids induced by poor performance 
and a consequent reduction in share price. Here discipline is imposed 
upon salaried managers via the takeover mechanism and the market for 
corporate control. Baldwin (1964) was an early'subscriber to this 
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view, arguing that the rise of institutional investors 
in the USA and 
the threat of takeover associat ed with low share prices act as 
significant checks on the freedom of managers to pursue non-profit 
goals. 
Peterson (1965) also denied that the receding of ownership 
interests and the rise of non-owning professional managers would 
cause shareholders to lose their status as prime corporate benefic- 
iaries. Firstly, he suggested that managers will feel subjectively 
that they have little discretion in the face of considerable, 
uncertainty about changing costs and prices. Secondly, he suggested 
that managers may not want to use any limited discretion they might 
have to pursue non-profit goals, because they operate in a business 
culture which measures management success in profit terms. Thirdly, 
he argued that the close constraints imposed by capital markets and 
I the threat of takeover reinforces the legal rights of shareholders. 
Fourthly, he pointed out that a sizeable concentration of sharesin a 
few hands, though but a small minority of shares, often establishes 
a dominant position, allowing shareholders to exert less formal 
influence. Finally, he pointed out that senior executives generally 
come to acquire considerable shareholdings through share bonuses and 
options, strengthening their identification with shareholders. 
The present chapter has explored the phenomenon of the divorce 
of ownership from control in large companies and has outlined various 
managerial theories of the firm which recognised this divorce. These 
theories developed the possible alternative motives which managers 
may have, compared to owner-managers, and the kinds of company goals 
they might set. Both the extent of the divorce of ownership from 
control and the assumed motivations of managers will be challenged in 
later chapters. Before doing so though, the next chapter explores 
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various empirical studies of company control, managerial remuneration 
and company performance which have tended to lend authority to the 
managerial models. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTROL TYPE, 
DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE 
Following the structure established in chapter two, previous 
empirical worK will be reviewed under two headings: firstly, -tests 
of control type and, company performance and secondly, studies focussing 
more narrowly on directors' remuneration and company performance. 
Separating the two sections is a short discussion of the general 
statistical problems involved in using regression procedures to evaluate 
the determinants of directors' remuneration. 
3.1 Control Typeand Company Performance 
A number of studies have attempted to discern whether management- 
controlled companies perform differently to owner-controlled companies 
in terms of growth and profitability. Monsen, Chiu and Cooley's work 
(1968) is typical of the early studies. Monsen et al set out to test 
the hypothesis that the self-interest of managers in managerially- 
controlled firms would give rise to motivations different from those 
of owners and so would lead to poorer performance than in owner- 
controlled firms. 
In their empirical study Monsen et al classified firms as owner- 
controlled where active control was known to exist in the hands of a 
party with more than 10% of the voting shares, and management -controlled 
where there was no recent evidence of owner-control and no single 
block greater than 5% of the voting shards. Their sample data were 
drawn from the 500 largest firms in the United States in 1963. 
Recognising that profitability varies greatly fron, one industry to 
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another, they classified firms by industry and selected 12 industries 
with 3 matched firms of each control type in each. In this way they 
were able to isolate performance differences attributable to control 
type. Data were collected from these 72 firms for a twelve-year 
period from 1952 to 1963, and an analysis of these data seemed to 
confirm their hypothesis. 
. Monsen et al 
found that the owner-controlled group of firms 
outperformed the management-controlled firrns by a considerable margin. 
For the twelve-year period the net income to net worth ratio was 75% 
higher for owner-controlled firms than management-controlled firms. 
The evidence therefore suggested that the presence of a powerful 
owner group did produce an appreciable increase in managerrent attention 
to owner interestg. 
By contrast, Kamerschen (1968) found that the extent of management 
control had little effect an rates of return. Hc drew several sub- 
samples from Lamer's 200 firm sample, amassing data on 192 US 
companies for the five-year period 1959-64. TaKing the average rate 
of return on equity over the five Years as the dependent variable 
he related this to various independent variables including two control- 
type variables, two monopoly-power measures, two industry-growth terms, 
sales revenue. total assets and invested capital. 
Simple correlation analysis of Kamerschen's eleven variables 
revealed substantial multicollinearity between some independent 
variables (see later), but nevertheless suggested that the management- 
control variables did not seem to be consistently important determinants 
of profit rates. Application of multiple correlation analysis showed 
the control-type variable to have statistically insignificant results, 
which led Kamerschen to reject the proposition that management- 
controlled firms are less concerned with profit maximisation. 
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The results of Monsen, Chiu and Cooley for the US are supported 
by a later study by Radice (1971) based on UK company data. Radice 
examined the differences in long-run performance between large firms 
under owner-control and those under management-control to see whether 
management-controlled firms were less profitable though faster growing 
than owner-controlled concerns. To allow for industry differences in 
profitability he took a sample consisting of all firms with net assets 
exceeding 15 million in the food, electrical engineering and textile 
industries. Data for 89 firms in these three industries were collected 
for the ten-year period 1957-67. Firms in each industry were 
classified as owner-controlled if there was a definite interest grcup 
holding more than 15% of voting shares and management-controlled 
where the proportibn wýs less than 5%. Comparing the ten-year average 
rate of growth in net assets and the ten-year average rate of return 
for the two types of company, Radice concluded that owner-controlled 
firms were both more profitable and faster growing. 
A further trend emerging from Radice's data was that, for the 
firTns in the sample, there was a clear decline in voting and share 
concentration during the period, confirming a similar trend of 
increasing divorce of ownership and control in the United Kingdom 
as existed in the United States. The results of both Monsen, Chiu and 
Cooley's study and Radicals survey indicate a tendency for large 
management-controlled firms to be less profitable than owner- 
controlled concerns, suggesting different goals and motivations for 
managers in each type of company. 
Testing of the goal priorities associated with different control 
types has continued to the present day. One recent US study by 
Fatemi, Ang and Chua (1983) concentrated on goal priorities within 
large management-controlled firms. Excluding firms where a single 
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party owned 10% or more of the shares in order to select management 
(as opposed to owner) controlled firms, they ended up with a sample 
of 326 firms. For these companies they collected information on four 
goal variables: growth in return-on-equity, annual sales growth, 
smoothing of earnings-per-share and change in the liquidity ratio, 
for the nine-year period 1967 to 1975. Pooling time-series and 
cross-section data, they applied correlation techniques to estimate 
the priority scheme of the four goals. The goal variable with the 
I 
highest correlation - the one considered as the most important goal - 
was shareholder wealth maximisation, with sales growth second in 
priority. They concluded that large management-controlled companies 
have two important goals: - shareholder wealth maximisation and sales 
maximisation, with the former being the dominant goal. 
In 1982 Levin and Levin added an interesting footnote to the 
numerous tests of managerial and owner theories of corporate performance 
with a study which evaluated the effect of control by banKs or large 
financial institutions on company performance. They analysed data for 
200 US companies for the period 1967-76 which were classified into 
owner-cont. rol, manager-control and financial-control groups. Eight 
performance variables were defined, including measures of returns to 
owners, risK measures, growth, reliance on debt financing and earnings 
retention. Significance tests of differences in performance due to 
control type were then conducted within an analysis of covariance 
frameworK. Comparisons of regressions suggested significant 
differences between companies in each of the three control categories 
in earning returns for owners, and in achieving growth. 
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3.2 General Considerations in the Statistical Analysis of 
Remuneration Data 
In order to determine the influence of factors such as company 
size, company profitability and industry upon directors' remuneration 
it is necessary to employ techniques of multiple regression analysis. 
However the application of least-squares regression to company 
performance data poses problems because of the high correlation 
between various company measures like sales, net assets or profits 
that serve as independent variables. In addition, the application of 
linear regression techniques may not be entirely appropriate where the 
relationships between variables is not strictly linear. Both of these 
problems are discussed extensively in the general statistical 
literature (Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner and Bent, 1975; 
Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1979; Chou, 1975). 
Where some or all of the independent variables in a multiple 
regression are highly intercorrelated. this multicollinearity can 
cause problems. In particular the use of multiple regression as an 
interpretive tool to evaluate the relative importance of the 
independent variables is blunted. For with greater intercorrelation 
of the independent variables the partial regression coefficients 
become less reliable as indicators of the relative importance of the 
independent variables. Ideally one does not want to include in a 
regression equation two or more independent variables that are highly 
correlated between thEmselves, nor does one wish to include independent 
variables with low correlation with the dependent variable. For 
when two regressors are highly correlated the influence of one cannot 
clearly be distinguished from the influence of the other. Consequently 
the first regressor introduced will tend to capture the effect of both 
regressors, thereby increasing the regression coefficient R2 on both 
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counts, so that when the second regressor is introduced it may have 
2 
little additional effect on R. This will tend to make the 
decision about which of the correlated independent variables is 
most important in explaining variance in the dependent variable 
heavily dependent on the order in which independent variables are 
introduced. 
Fortunately, where two or more independent variables are highly 
correlated no information is lost by removing some of them. So where 
a number of independent variables are highly correlated, we can use 
just one of these variables from the highly correlated set to 
represent the common underlying dimension. 
In specifying an equation to explain a dependent variable, it is 
necessary to postulate the explicit mathematical relationship linking 
O.. he dependent variable to a set of explanatory variables. The 
4" 
simplest form of equation is a linear one of the form: 
Remuneration =a+b. Sales + c. Return an Capital 
This is quite acceptable if unit changes in sales are associated 
with unit changes in remuneration. However if the relationship 
between remuneration and sales is curvilinear then the relationship 
between remuneration and sales may be better represented by a 
power function of the form: 
bc Remuneration = a. Sales . Return on Capital 
This format is not directly suitable for multiple regression 
based an ordinary least-squares. because the relationship is not 
linear. However, the power function can be transformed into a linear- 
style equation by taking logarithrns of both sides to yield the 
4 
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logarithmid: form: 
log Remuneration =a+b. log Sales + c. log Return on Capital 
This latter form is particularly useful because in estimating the 
partial regression coefficients, b and c, through linear regression, 
one gets direct estimates of'eldttitity, showing the percentage 
change in remuneration resulting from a one per-cent change in sales 
or return on capital. 
Where linear regression is performed upon independent and 
dependent variables which do not have a linear relationship then 
this will tend to show up in the residual error term - the 
variation in the dependent variable not explained by the independent 
regressors introduced. With a properly specified linear model the 
error terms should be independent, have a mean of zero and demonstrate 
the same variance throughout the range of the dependent variable. 
If a scatt6rplot of the residuals shows a distinct trend, violating 
the above error term conditions, then the regression model is 
inadequate; either the function form is incorrect or an important 
variable has been omitted. In particular, where the variance of 
the error term is not constant-but grows or declines as the 
independent variable increases, then this'heteroscedasticity of 
the error term is suggestive of an incorrect function form. 
Further problems arise in pooling cross-sectional 
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and time-series data, for the error term then includes time period 
effects and time invariant cross-sectional effects as well as the 
residual random effects (see Dielman 1983). All previous researchers 
have been confronted with problems of multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity. 
3.3 Empirical Studies of Directors' Remuneration and Company 
Performance 
Whereas the studies reviewed in section 3.1 related company 
performance to control type, the present section is concerned with 
studies which implicitly presume that most large companies are 
management-controlled. Operating an this presumption these studies 
then go on to test the links between management compensation and 
company performance, in order to infer from these links something 
about managerial motivations a, nd goals. Various studies are reviewed 
in chronological order and summarised in table 3.1 at the end of the 
chapter. 
Some earlY studies of executives touched upon facets of the 
remuneration and performance issue. One study by Taussig and Barker 
(1925) collected data an executives and their compensation from 400 
US companies for the period 1904 to 1914. They found that executives 
usually owned few shares especially in large companies, so that 
shareholding income was only a small part of their compensation. 
These findings were corroborated in a later study by Gordon (1940) 
who looked at information on directors' share ownership and 
compensation which large US quoted companies have to disclose under 
Securities and Exchange Commission requirements. He found that the 
median proportion of shares held by all officers and directors was 
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less than 4% in the largest companies, and concluded that neither 
dividend income nor possibilities of appreciation in the value of their 
negligible shareholdings could compare with compensation as a source 
of income. 
The first comprehensive study was undertaken by Roberts (1959) 
who 
/ 
examined the relationship between top executive compensation and 
saleýs or profits, based on a sample of 410 US quoted companies for 
the years 1945,1948,1949 and 1950. Remuneration data for these 
companies came from Securities and Exchange Commission returns, and 
consisted of the salary and bonuses of the highest-paid director 
in each company and the average salary and bonuses of each board of 
directors. This was a fairly narrow definition of remuneration, as 
Roberts himself acknowledged, since it ignored pension contributions 
and excluded any share ownership/option income. Emphasis an the 
highest-paid director or average director was justified by Roberts 
on the grounds that compensation of the lower management echelons is 
related systematically to that of the top officials so that findings 
regarding -the 
top officials are applicable beyond that group. 
Evaluating various alternative size measures, Roberts opted for 
sales as the best of the available measures. He rejected capital 
employed because of incomparabilities introduced by differences in 
asset valuation and depreciation rates. He also felt uneasy about 
both asset and employee measures of size because they can reflect 
differences in mechanisation between firms. However, he 
acknowledged that sales was far from an ideal measure because of 
differences in the value of bought-in materials between companies. 
Profit was defined as net profit before tax and interest charges, 
to avoid incomparabilities caused by different company tax burdens 
and differences in company financing as between share capital and 
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fixed interest loans. 
Looking at trends over time, Roberts found that remuneration 
and sales showed little variation from year to year, but that profit 
was much more volatile. So to avoid taking a profit figure for one 
year that might be unrepresentative, Roberts took average figures 
for the years 1948 to 1950. 
jSubdividing the sample into 21 industry groups and applying 
statistical tests to these sub-samples showed no statistically 
significant inter-industry differences in executive compensation, 
justifying Roberts's decision to ignore industry in formulating a 
compensation model. Roberts found an economic logic in this result, 
arguing that with a properly functioning labour market executive 
mobility should act in the long run to eliminate industry differences 
in the remuneration of top executives. 
Roberts found sales, profit and executive compensation all varied 
together when graphed, noting: 
"The fact that an increase in any one of the variables 
is associated with an increase in each of the others 
is merely a graphic expression of the con-non sense 
proposition that large corporations usually have 
larger sales, profits and compensation than small 
corporations. " (Roberts, D. R., 1959 p. 24) 
Roberts's first calculations, based on a linear model showed 
a weaK relationship between the salary and bonus of the highest- 
paid director, and sales and profit: 
Compensation of highest paid director a+0.04 Sales + 0.36 
Profit 
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However, for his sub-sample of 77 companies the correlation between 
sales and profits was as high as 0.91 so that the-procedure for 
eliminating the influence of either independent variable 
inadvertently eliminated most of the influence of the other, 
resulting in low partial correlation coefficients. Substituting 
profit rate for the absolute profit figure largely solved this 
problem because sales and profit rate were not highly intercorrelated, 
the correlation coefficient falling from 0.91 to 0.23. 
Switching from the question of whether companies which differ 
by a given absolute amount in sales or profit rate differ 
consistently by a given absolute amount in compensation, Roberts 
inquired as to whether companies which differ by a given percentage 
in sales or profit rate differ consistently by a given percentage in 
compensation. This led Roberts to graph the relationships on a 
logarithmic scale where distances between points showed percentage 
differences in variables. The better defined linear path of the 
logarithmic plots led Roberts-to the conclusion that the relationship 
between variables could be described more accurately in percentage 
rather than absolute terms. Consequently, he formulated new 
equations, replacing the absolute figures for variables with their 
logarithms. 
Two log-linear equations were fitted to the 1948-50 data for 77 
companies with the following resultsý: 
log Compensation of Highest Paid -ý 1.55 + 0.35 log Sales + 0.20 log 
Profit/Not Worth CR 2.0.59) 
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log Compensation of Highest Paid = 1.67 + 0.35 log Net Worth + 0.24 
log Profit/Net, Worth CR 2.0.61) 
Most of the t-values associated with the coefficients were 
significant at the 5% level. Tbe second equation fitted the data 
2 bett7r than the first, goodness of fit being measured by R. The 
i 
t-va'lues suggested that a measure of the scale of operation of the 
firm, and not the level of profitability, was the best explanatory 
variable. However, the average effect of increased profitability on 
compensation was relatively large. On average, a doubling of 
profitability was associated with a 24% increase in compensation, 
while a doubling of the size of the firm, measured by either sales 
or tangible net worth, was associated with a 35% increase in 
compensation. The general conclusion of the study was that the 
relationship between executive compensation and sales was stronger 
than the relationship between executive compensation and 
profitability. 
McGuire, Chiu and Elbing (1962) tested the claim made by 
Baumol (1959) that executive salaries appear to be far more closely 
correlated with a company's scale of operation than with its 
profitability. They undertook a longitudinal statistical 
investigation for the period 1953-59 into the relationship between 
executive incomes, sales and profits for 45 of the largest 100 
industrial companies in the United States. The companies chosen 
were those for-which data on the compensation of the highest-paid 
executive were available from "Business Week" for each of the 
seven years covered by the study. Where shares were given to an 
executive, McGuire. Chiu and Elbing computed their market value 
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and added this amount to the executive's other income. In this respect 
their definition of executive compensation was broader than that 
employed by Roberts. 
To test the economic relationship between executive incomes, 
sales and profits. McGuire et. al tested seven sets of (linear) 
relationships between these three variables over the seven-year 
peri 
I 
od: 
Gross relationships between executive income, sales and 
profit for identical years. 
2. Executive compensation lagged one year behind sales 
and profits. 
3. Executive incomes lagged two years behind sales and 
prof its. 
4. Sales and profits lagged one year behind executive 
compensation. This tested the proposition that high 
compensation stimulates executives to work harder and 
thus'produce larger sales and profits. 
5. Year to year changes in incomes correlated with year 
to year changes in sales and profits. 
6. Year to year changes in executive incomes lagged one 
year behind year to year changes in sales and profits. 
7. Year to year changes in executive incomes lagged two 
years behind changes in sales and profits. 
In each year significantly high correlations between compensation 
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and sales, and between compensation and total profits, were found. 
However, because of collinearity between sales and profits, the 
researchers were forced to examine partial correlation coefficients 
between executive compensation and the other two variables. 
McGuire et al's general conclusion was that sales and 
compensation were more highly correlated than profits and compensation. 
This, result supports the Baumol hypothesis, although because of the 
statistical problems of multicollinearity involved, the tests employed I 
do not completely rule out the possibility of a valid relationship 
between profits and executive incomes. 
Williamson's study of managerial discretion (1963) indicated 
that business managers could afford to pursue goals other than profit 
maximisation, when competition is weak, and management is free from 
control by the shareholders. Williamson discussed, among other things, Q 
the effect of managerial discretion on management compensation. 
According to his hypothesis, managers maximise a utility function 
which includes as one component their own remuneration. He postulatod 
that increased discretion would lead to higher compensation, and set 
out to test this proposition. 
Williamson's compensation measure embraced the salary and value 
of shares given to the top executive, using the same remuneration 
measure adopted by McGuire, Chiu and Elbing, and deriving his 
compensation statistics from the-same source: - "Business Week". 
He defended focussing upon a single representative of management 
on the grounds that payments between executive levels are scaled so 
that the factors which influence compensation to the top executive 
can be presumed to affect the level of staff compensation generally. 
The independent variables included in his model were: 
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(1) the sales concentration ratio of the firm's industry. 
(2) the height of the barriers to entry for the industry. 
(3) general, selling and administrative expenses. 
C4) the degree of shareholder diffusion. 
The effects of each independent variable were assumed to be 
multiplicative of the form: 
Compensation = a. Concentration Ratio. 
b Entry Barrier. C 
Staff Expense. d Shareholder Diffusion e 
which was converted to linear form by taking logarithms of both 
sides, to get: 
log Compensation =a+b. log Concentration Ratio + c. 
log Entry Barrier + d. log Staff Expense 
+ e. log Shareholder Diffusion 
Williamson's sampling procedure was to take the two largest 
firms in terms of sales in each of 26 major US manufacturing industries. 
However, because of data deficiencies, only 25-30 observations were 
available for the three years concerned, those years being 1953,1957 
and 1961. These statistics were used to undertake cross-sectional 
tests of the above log-linear model. The research conclusion was 
that only the two coefficients associated with general, selling and 
administrative expenses and the degree of shareholder diffusion were 
significantly different from zero in any one year, at the 5% level. 
When the profit ratq was added to the model as an extra variable, 
it was found that its coefficient was significantly positive only in 
1957, and had a negative sign in 1961. 
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The results suggest that the level of directors' remuneration 
is dependent not upon profitability but upon the amount of managerial 
discretion and the size of the firm as measured by the amount of 
general, selling and administrative expenditure. However, given the 
very small sample size, it is difficult to attach too much confidence 
to these conclusions. 
Baker (1969) noted that in previous studies attempting to relate 
executive incomes with profits and sales. both linear and logarithmic 
functional specifications have been used. The purpose of his own 
paper was to review previous work done and to suggest an alternative 
functional specification that complied better with the assumptions 
of the regression model. Baker argued that the statistically correct 
functional form of the relationship between income and sales or profits 
may not be linear, as assumed by McGuire, Chiu and Elbing, or 
logarithmic, as argued by Roberts. As sales or profits increase, 
reported executive incomes may increase at a decreasing rate, in order 
to avoid possible adverse shareholder or employee comment. 
Consequently, one might expect a declining elasticity of top 
executive income with respect to sales or profits. 
BaKer's sample of 30 company presidents was drawn from annual 
data published in "Business WeeV for the period 1962-65 on executive 
incomes for the largest 100 US firms. As in the McGuire, Chiu and 
Elbing, and Williamson studies, the marKet value of shares given to 
the president was included in annual income. For each firm a four- 
year average of the variables was taKen for the period 1962 to 1965. 
Focusing on the president's compensation was justified by the 
widespread practice of scaling down executive salaries under the 
chief executive. The cross-section data consisted of each firm's 
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four-year averages of the president's measured compensation, sales, 
and profits and the common logarithms of each of these variables. 
Baker ran six multiple regressions with a dependent compensation 
variable in an attempt to find a functional specification of the 
relation that satisfied the ordinary least-squares assumptions. 
The best result was: 
Compensation = -261.38 + 75.06 log Sales + 142.08 log Profits 
2 ER . 0.761 
The coefficients of both the profit and sales variables were positive 
at the . 05 level of significance. This semi-log function which 
employed the natural value of the dependent compensation variable and 
the logarithms of the independent variables, provided the best 
specification. By contrast, the linear specification understated the 
effect of the profit variable coefficient, producing a bias towards 
size variables. On the other hand the log function employing logs 
of both dependent and independent variables, understated the effect 
of the sales variable coefficient, by discounting size, and therefore 
imparted a bias towards the profitability variable. 
Summarising Baker's study, for a sample drawn from the largest 
100 US manufacturing firms, a semi-log function relating executive 
compensation to sales and profits performed better than either a 
4 
linear or double-logarithmic function. The results suggest that profits 
have a separate influence on executive compensation, as well as sales. 
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The studies reviewed to date rest on the implicit assumption 
that professional managers' earnings largely take the form of 
salaries related to the size of the firms they manage rather than 
financial incentives linked to profitability, so that it might be in 
the interests of managers to pursue sales growth rather than the 
maximisation of shareholder wealth. However, evidence presented by 
Lewellen (1969) suggested that the proportion of a typical US 
executive's earnings from, share options, from dividends and capital 
gains on shares owned, and from profit-sharing plans, has increased 
dramatically in recent decades, so that remuneration from such sources 
now typically exceeds that from salaries and bonuses. Lewellen's 
research indicated a steady transformation of the pay package of 
executives over the years with a growth of sharb-based rewards which 
might incline senior executives towards profitability goals, rather 
than objectives such as sales or growth maximisation. 
Lewellen's paper originated from his empirical study of US 
executive compensation practices for the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. In that study, a -record was constructed of the value to 
senior corporate executives of all'major items in their compensation 
packages, including pension benefits, share income, options, profit- 
sharing plans, and deferred pay contracts as well as salaries and 
bonuses. The sample consisted of those executives who occupied the 
five highest-paid positions every year between 1940 and 1963 in each 
of 50 of the largest American manufacturing firms. An analysis was 
made of the rewards enjoyed by a total of 558 executives. This showed 
that although the fraction of shares held by the top five executives 
declined from 1.06% in 1940 to 0.59% in 1963, the mean value of their 
holdings rose from $575,000 to $2,366,000. On average, Lewellen found 
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that senior executives owned between $1 million and $2 million of their 
company's shares. 
The significance of Lewellen's work lay in the detailed and 
comprehensive information about executive remuneration which he was 
able to report. To collect remuneration information about executives, 
Lewellen turned to annual company proxy reports an compensation and 
directors' shareholdings which are required by the American Securities 
and Exchange Commission for quoted companies. These reports gave 
information about annual gross salary and bonus payments for each 
executive officer. For deferred pay arrangements Lewellen constructed 
a "current income equivalent" - the amount of current salary which 
would be as valuable to the executive as the particular deferred 
pay arrangement. For company pension plans, the amount of extra 
after-tax salary which the prospective pension recipient would require 
to enable him to purchase a retirement annuity of equal value to the 
company pension was calculated. All elements of the pay package 
were summed in after-tax terms. 
The SEC proxy reports on executives' shareholdings in their 
companies showed sizeable ownership positions among top executives 
and their immediate families. Lewellen noted the shareholdings of 
each executive included in the compensation sample then calculated 
their share-based remuneration by adding information on share prices 
and dividend payments. 
To calculate total capital gains on shareholdings, one should 
take increases or decreases in the market value of any shares held by 
an executive throughout the year and add realised profits or losses 
from share sales during the Year, allowing for shares bought during 
the year and. held until the year end. Actually, a somewhat cruder 
4 
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method was adopted by Lewellen in practice. He simply noted the 
difference between a director's start-year and end-year shareholdings 
and assumed that any net purchases or sales were made at a price 
midway between the opening and closing share prices of the year, 
then went on to calculate capital appreciation. Share splits and 
bonus shares were corrected for within this frameworK. Capital 
appreciation of share options granted to executives were calculated 
in similar fashion. Lewellen's booK (1971) provides details of the 
methodology employed. 
Dividend receipts on directors' shareholdings were adjusted to 
allow for differences in start-year and end-year shareholdings, the 
executive being credited with half the annual dividend pairinent per 
share on any incremental shares. For comparability, all dividend 
and capital appreciation was estimated on an aft -er-tax basis. 
Lewellen's study highlighted the pronounced shift within the pay 
package away from direct salary and borius payments towards deferred 
and contingent rewards. In the early 1940's, salaries and bonuses 
accounted for some 75% to 80% of total executive incomes. After 
1955, the figure was in the range of 35% to 50%. Whatever the cause 
for the change, it is no longer sufficient to discuss executive 
rewards in terms of salary and bonus alone. More specifically, a 
huge increase in the importance of share options had taken place. 
They contributed nothing to the total remuneration of the average 
chief executive in 1940, and only 3% in 1950, but 58% in 1960; whilst 
salary and bonus fell on average from 65% to 10%. 
One outcome of this shift in emphasis has been increasing 
volatility of total remuneration, with year to year changes in market 
conditions giving rise to sharp changes in total remuneration. Share 
options are a particular sourc e of instability. This led Lewellen 
(I 
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to argue that for purposes of drawing conclusions about longer-term 
movements in the level of executive earnings, long period averages 
are a better standard than the data for any single year. 
To summarise, Lewellen's conclusion was that the shareholdings 
of senior executives of large US public companies are much more 
extensive than is commonly supposed. A considerable portion of their 
compensation is provided by devices that utilise the firm's shares as 
a means of pay, and the income attributable to such devices has come 
to outweigh that supplied by salary and bonus. Consequently, the 
separation of ownership and control in large corporations need not 
lead to managerial objectives widely divergent from present-value 
maximisation. 
However, the period examined by Lewellen was one of great stock- 
market euphoria with rapidly rising share prices, and share options 
and capital gains were major factors affecting his results. In a more 
recent study following the end of the stock-market boom, Lewallen (1975) 
noted a sharp decline in share options from 36% of the compensation 
package in 1955-63 to only 12% in 1970-73. 
In dealing exclusively with mean values, Lewellen acknowledged 
that he was measuring a "typical" executive's shareholdings; and may 
have a distorted average where a small number of executives have 
extraordinarily large shareholdings. Given the presence in his sample 
of firms with a family owner-manager history this possibility for 
distortion exists. To test the effect of very large shareholders on 
the results, Lewellen computed standard deviations of the 
distribution of shareholdings for each year then removed all 
individuals with shareholdings more than two standard deviations 
greater than the calculated mean. The effect of this adjustment was 
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to remove 6 per cent of executives from the sample but the 
recalculated average shareholding for the remaining 94% of executives 
was diminished by anywhere from one-third to one-half. This suggests 
considerable skewness in executive share distributions, though the 
revised shareholding averages were in no sense trivial. 
Building upon the work by Lewellen on remuneration, Lewellen and 
Huntsman C1970) set out to examine empirically the question of 
whether the financial rewards reaped by top corporate executives 
were more strongly influenced by company performance as measured by 
total revenue, or alternatively as measured by standards of share- 
holder welfare. Their sample of 50 companies drawn from the Fortune 
Top 500 industrial firms matched the earlier Lewellen sample, with 
comprehensive measures of managerial remuneration available for these 
companies. Compensation of the highest-paid executive in each firm 
was taKen as the dependent variable. The study examined the cross- 
sectional relationship between executive compensation and company 
performance at three-year intervals, beginning in 1942 and ending in 
1963, using a multivariate regression model, designed to reduce the 
effects of statistical biases. 
Lewellen and Huntsman began by specifying a possible linear 
relationship between the top executive's compensation and the profits 
and sales of the firm he manages, of the form: 
Executive Compensation =a+b. Profit + c. Sales 
This should have provided a vehicle for inferring the relative 
influence of the two independent variables upon compensation. 
However. -examination of the scatter diagrams of pilot regression runs 
using this equation revealed that the error terms were not constant 
but approximately in proportion to the dependent variable. 
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Such heteroscedasticitY seriously impairs the efficiency of the 
least-squares estimates. In addition, there was a scale-associated 
linkage between the natural forms of the independent variables, simple 
correlation coefficients between them exceeding 0.9 in most cases. 
I 
This collinearity between independent variables was too high to 
permit the generation of reliable estimates. 
In an attempt to ameliorate scale-related problems Lewellen and 
Huntsman specified a multiplicative relationship and converted the 
I 
natural values of variables into logarithns. These log transforms 
did have lower correlation coefficients between sales and profits, 
but the scatter diagrams still suggested the presence of excessive 
heteroscedasticity. They therefore rejected the log transform 
specification as a device for testing their hypothesis. 
To attacK the twin problems of multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity, Lewellen and Huntsman turned to a weighted 
regression specification, dividing each variable by a scale-related 
deflator: - net book value of-assets. This created ratios in which 
both the numerator and the denominator were associated with the firm's 
size, eliminating the basic reason for expecting high degrees of 
correlation between variables as a consequence of a common scale 
factor. Two equations were specified: 
Compensation a+b. Profit c. Sales 
Assets Assets Assets Assets 
Compensation a+b. Market Value of Shares + c. 
Sales 
Assets Assets Assets Assets 
The scatter diagrams associated with these specifications showed 
homoscedastic residuals. In addition, the deflated variables showed 
materially smaller collinearity and so did not interfere with the 
63 
formation of reliable coefficient estimates. 
Each equation was fitted to the data twice each year, once with 
compensation defined as basic salary plus bonus only and once using 
a more rigorous measure of executive compensation which included 
dividends, share appreciation, option appreciation and the present 
values of pensions and deferred compensation. The narrower 
compensation definition allowed comparability with earlier empirical 
I work which had used only partial indices of compensation, whilst 
the second used a more highly developed measure of compensation. 
Because of measurement problems involved in using after-tax profit 
as a criterion of shareholders' interests - in particular the 
variations in profit associated with accounting depreciation and 
stock valuation methods - an alternative measure of shareholder 
welfare was used in the second equation. This was the market value 
of the firm's shares. 
Lewellen and Huntsman's results offered strong support for the 
hypothesis that top management's remuneration is heavily dependent 
upon the generation of profits. In particular, the signs of the 
coefficients of the profit measure were positive for each cross- 
section regardless of the compensation measure employed. Moreover, 
the profit variable proved highly significant for all runs in which 
the dependent variable consistedof executive salary plus bonus 
payments, and for six of the eight years with total compensation as 
the dependent variable. By contrast, the sales measure was in no 
instance statistically significant, and the sales coefficients were 
approximately equally divided among years with respect to sign. The 
specified model displayed a high degree of explanatory power overall, 
the coefficients of determination exceeding 0.9 for five of the eight 
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years and never falling below 0.74. 
An important feature of the results was that the cruder measure 
of executive compensation gave the better fit to the data, using the 
coefficient of determination as the criterion. The increase in R2 
obtained by taking compensation as basic salary Plus bonus was quite 
marked in some years, moving from the 0.43 to 0.91 range to the 0.74 
to 0.94 range. This result suggests that equations utilising salary 
plus bonus payments alone as a measure of executive remuneration 
yield better regression fits than do those employing total 
compensation. Lewellen and Huntsman suggested that this was because 
a sizeable proportion of the broader compensation measure wascomposed 
of capital appreciation of options which depend Upon short-term 
fluctuations in share prices, thereby introducing random short-term 
fluctuations Into the compensation figures. 
Regardless of which compensation measure was adopted, reported 
company profits appeared to have a strong and persistent influence 
on executive rewards, wheroas--sales appeared to have little impact. 
Furthermore, the total explanatory power of equations containing 
equity market value as a control variable roughly matched that of 
corresponding equations in which book profit was employed. Thus, 
the substitution of equity market value for profits in the equations 
had no material impact on either the nature or the interpretation of 
the findings. 
Lewellen and Huntsman concluded that their results support the 
view that managers aim to maximise the profits of the firm rather 
than sales revenue. These findings run counter to those of most 
previous studies which suggest a stronger relationship between 
executive incomes and sales than between executive incomes and profits. 
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undertook a study of executive remuneration and 
company financial performance based an a sample of 39 American 
electronics, aerospace and chemical companies for the years 1947-66. 
This study suggested that companies in which top executives were 
rewarded mainly in the form of share options and dividends on shares 
rather than predominantlyin the form of salaries have performed 
better in the stock-market over the post-war period. However, Masson's 
small sample maKes it difficult to generalise on his results. 
Masson criticised previous studies like those of Roberts and 
McGuire et al on a number of grounds. Firstly, Masson argued that 
by including the profits of only one year, cross-sectional studies 
examine only short-term profit maximisation, ignoring any possible 
longer-term effects on net worth of investment in capital equipment 
at the expense of short-term profit. Secondly, Masson criticised 
previous studies on the grounds that they have omitted a full definition 
of executive compensation in ignoring retirement benefits and executive 
returns from share ownership and options. 
To counter these perceived deficiencies Masson took long-run 
data for a nineteen-year period and took a broad measure of 
remuneration following the methodology employed by Lewellen. Gathering 
the required data from Securities and Exchange Commission forms and 
company proxy statements necessitated a restricted sample size, only 
39 companies being included. Though no precise figures are given, 
Masson claimed that the sporadic growth of firms in the industries 
chosen gave low collinearity between company performance variables. 
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The specified form of Masson's estimating equation relating 
executive financial return to firm performance emphasised percentage 
changes RA) in the variables: 
U Executive Return = a. + b. %A Sales + c. %A Previous Sales 
+ d. 5A- Earnings per Share + e. %A Previous 
Earnings per Share + f. %A Return an Equity 
This became the basis for Masson's statistical tests. 
The main conclusion of Masson's paper was that a significant 
number of firms did have stock-market return as an important 
determinant of executive compensation. Masson's results suggested 
that stock-market performance was the most important determinant of 
executive income. He rejected the hypothesis that firms pay their 
executives primarily for sales maximisation. 
Briston and Pass's study (1971) was one of the first to analyse 
information an UK companies, using data on directors' remuneration 
and shareholdings made available through the disclosure requirements 
of the Companies Acts. They tooK a sample of 248 quoted companies, 
examining their accounts for the years 1968 and 1909. Extracting 
information on the remuneration of the highest-paid executive and 
average directors' remuneration, Briston and Pass applied correlation 
analysis to try to establish possible hypotheses about directors' 
remuneration. Correlations between remuneration and various measures 
of company size - sales, capital employed, profits and number of 
employees, were low (0.29 to 0.47) casting doubt upon the suggestion 
that larger companies pay higher salaries. 
Yarrow's study (1972) was based on a sample of 85 large US 
industrial companies for the years 1963,1965 and 1968. The sample 
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was not random but depended on the availability of compensation data 
for the years in question. Yarrow took published data an basic salary 
plus bonus from "Business Week". Share options were not included. 
The data an compensation were therefore rather crude and the errors 
involved are probably greater than those in previous studies using 
the same source, since basic salary plus bonus as a percentage of 
total compensation has declined over time, as Lewellen showed. 
Yarrow adopted a log-linear specification, using equations of 
the same form as those used by Williamson. He acknowledged that to 
include all variables in one equation would lead to substantial 
collinearity. To ease this problem, only two of the variables that 
tend to be correlated closely with the scale of operations of the 
firm were included in any one equation. Administration' and selling 
expenses were included in all equations on the grounds that they are 
a useful proxy measure for the size of the staff and best represent 
the number of managers in the management hierarchy. 
Four equations were fitted to the data for each of the three 
years; the dependent variable being salary and bonus of the highest- 
paid executive: 
log Compensation =a+b. log Sales + c. log Admin Expenses 
d. log Return on Capital 
log Compensation =a+b. log Employees + c. log Admin Expenses 
d. log Return on Capital 
log Compensation =a+b. log Assets + c. log Admin Expenses 
+ d. log Return on Capital 
log Compensation =a+b. log Invested Capital + c. log Admin 
Expenses + d. log Return on. Capital 
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All variables relate to a given year apart from return on 
invested capital which was shown for the previous year on the grounds 
that profitability is likely to affect compensation only after a lag 
because profitability is difficult to predict in advance or record 
immediately. The equations were tried with no lag with very little 
difference in the results, confirming the McGuire et al finding 
thatiintroducing short lags has very little effect. Lagging 
compensation behind the size variables had little effect because size 
variables were so highly correlated with their own previous values. 
The equations were also run substituting the valuation ratio - 
the ratio of the market value of shares to invested capital - in place 
of profitability. This alteration to the equation made little 
difference to the results. 
Fitting the four equations to data for the three years, Yarrow 
found that the best fit was obtained when either total assets or 
invested capital was used in the equation. In all three years R2 
fell slightly when either of these was replaced with sales or number 
of employees. He concluded that a measure of the capital input was 
more closely correlated with executive compensation than the sales 
of the firm. 
0 
Yarrow's results support the hypothesis that the size of the 
firm rather than profitability determines the level of executive 
compensation. Managers apparently attempt to maximise the scale of 
operations, and not profit. The significantly positive coefficient 
of general, selling and administrative expenses in eleven out of 
twelve runs support this conclusion. Yarrow's analysis confirms 
the results of those studies that found profits have no significant 
effect on compensation. The scale of operations and the size of 
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the staff hierarchy were the important determinants of director's 
remuneration. 
In a final analysis of his data, Yarrow tested whether the 
pooling of data from different industries, as done by McGuire et al, 
and Lewellen and Huntsman, may lead to errors. This is a contentious 
point because Roberts could find no significant industry effects in 
his sample, whilst Williamson suggests that industry variables have 
marked effects on compensation. Disaggregating his sample into 
consumer goods and capital goods subgroups, Yarrow found that this 
broad "industry" variable added significantly to the explanatory 
power of his equations, casting doubt on. the conclusions of studies 
based upon pooled data from all industries. 
Cox and Shauger (1973) examined the cross-sectional relation- 
ship between the level of executive compensation, firm; sales, and 
profitability in 1969 and 1979 for a sample of 100 US manufacturing 
companies. They found that executive compensation was significantly 
related to both firm sales and profitability; but that the relative 
importance of profitability increased with more inclusive measures 
of executive compensation. 
Using remuneration data from the annual "Business Week" survey 
of top executive earnings, Cox and Shauger examined three measures of 
compensation of the top two executives in each firm, in order to test 
for sensitivity in the statistical results. The three remuneration 
measures were: 
1. salary plus bonus awarded in the year. 
2. salary plus bonus plus deferred compensation arrangements awarded 
in the year. 
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3. salary plus bonus plus deferred compensation plus share options 
exercised in the year. 
Sales was chosen as the best company size measure and return on equity 
as the profitability measure, and these were linked in a linear, 
additive regression model: 
Compensation =a+b. Return on Equity + c. Sales 
This model was applied to the cross-sectional data but was 
rapidly abandoned in favour of a combined linear and log model which I 
gave a better fit: 
Compensation =a+b. Return an Equity + c. log Sales 
Here the absolute measure of firm nize: - sales, was replaced 
with a measure of relative firm size: - log sales, an the grounds that 
an executive's compensation may be morp closely related to his firm's 
sales relative to others than to his firm's absolute level of sales. 
This equation gave R2 values in the range 0.2 to 0.4. depending on 
the compensation measure used. Since firm profitability may be 
volatile from year to year, five-year average profit rates were tried 
as opposed to current year's profitability. A simple one year lag 
structure was also tried on the grounds that executive salary is 
established at the beginning of the accounting year rather than after 
the firm's performance for the year is recorded. Neither profit- 
ability averaging nor lagging helped to improve the fit to the data. 
The regression coefficient estimates showed the increasing 
importance of firm profitability with more comprehensive measures of 
executive compensation. Also in explaining the variance in total 
compensation, profitability turned out to be relatively more important 
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than sales. Cox and Shauger argued that this finding was reasonable 
since firm size, and thus executive responsibility, will influence 
the executive's salary; but additional compensation is based on the 
firm's profitability record. The more comprehensive the compensation 
measure, the smaller will be the percentage accounted for by salaryJ 
consequently, the more important company profitability will be in 
explaining total pay variance. This led them to stress the critical 
need for an accurate, inclusive measure of executive compensation 
in any empirical investigation of the relationship between executive 
remuneration and firm performance. 
The objectives of, Wallace's study (1973) were to resolve the 
controversy over the relative importance of size and profitability 
as bases for establishing executive pay and to establish the relation- 
ship of those factors with two characteristics of the industrial 
environment, namely market concentration and the type of control of 
the firm. Top executive compensation was analysed in a stratified 
random sample of 120 US companies, 30 in each of four classes; 
(1) management-controlled firms in high concentration markets, 
(2) management-controlled firms in low concentration markets, 
(3) owner-controlled firms in high concentration markets, 
(4) owner-controlled firms in low concentration markets. 
Wallace's companies were selected from the "Fortune 500 
V 
Industrial Firms, 50 of the largest retail firms, and 50 of the 
largest transportation firms during the years 1964-69. Measures of 
variables investigated were averaged over the years studied to smooth 
any temporary fluctuations. Salary, bonuses and current dividend 
awards of the chief executive officer were taken as the compensation 
variable. 
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Wallace found that executive compensation, sales and assets 
varied in the same direction with market concentration and type of 
control. The highest average compensation, sales and assets occurred 
in the management-controlled/high concentration group. The 
management-controlled/low concentration group and the owner-controlled/ 
high concentration group followed next in order of compensation, sales 
and assets. Change in profitability did not vary in a discernible 
pattern with type of control'and market concentration. Overall, 
group differences in executive compensation corresponded most closely 
with group differences in sales and assets, apparently not responding 
to any differences in profit rates or change in profit rates. 
. 
The primary purpose of Wallace's survey was to discover if market 
concentration and type'of control influence the relative importance 
of size and profitability in determining executive compensation. The 
data demonstrate that size was clearly stronger than profitability in 
determining compensation among firms that are management-controlled 
and/or in markets characterised by high degrees of concentration. In 
every case, among the management-controlled/high concentration, 
management-controlled/low concentration and owner-controlled/high 
concentration firms, the practical correlation coefficients associated 
with size (sales and assets) were significantly larger than those 
associated with profitability (net income/sales, net income/assets, 
not income/net worth). This was not true among firms that were 
controlled by owners and whose product markets were characterised 
by low concentration. 
Wallace's study confirmed that size measured by sales and assets 
was a primary determinant of executive compensation among companies 
characterised by a iýide dispersion of share ownership and high 
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industrial concentration. These results suggest that goals of 
corporate performance depend upon type of control over the firm and 
market concentration, and that executives are paid in relation to the 
desired performance. Wallace showed that size and growth were more 
important to the shareholders and executives of management-controlled 
companies and companies in highly concentrated markets than in those 
companies that were owner-controlled in markets characterised by low 
concentration. I 
Ciscel (1974) sampled 210 of the 250 largest US industrial 
companies for the years 1969-1971 to test some tentative ideas about 
the determinants of executive remuneration. Ciscel took the 
executive income data published annually by "Forbes"; this consisted 
of salary plus bonus, all other payments being ignored. The 
compensation of the chief executive, and the total remuneration of 
all officers and directors were taken as two alternative dependent 
variables. The independent variables were sales, assets, after-tax 
profit and numbers of employees, data on these variables being 
extracted from the "Fortune 500". Simple correlations between these 
variables showed fairly weak correlations between the independent 
variables and the chiefýexecutivels remuneration, r ranging from 
0.35 to 0.40, and strong collinearity between the independent 
variables. Correlations were higher when total remuneration of all 
officers was introduced, but collinearity remained high. The tentat- 
ive conclusion was that size measures were better related to 
remuneration than profit measures. 
One interesting test applied by Ciscel was whether compensation 
of the chief executive was correlated with his years of service, to 
determine the importance of longevity in the payment structure. He 
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found that length of service of the senior officer had no impact on 
remuneration. 
Cash C1975) collected data on the profitability and asset size 
of 1,600 UK industrial and commercial companies for the period 
1969-71, and related these variables to the remuneration of their 
chief executives. The size of sample used in Cosh's study allowed a 
more comprehensive analysis than had previously been undertaken. The 
data were provided by the Department of Trade and Industry and 
consisted of the consolidated accounts, for the years 1969-71, of 
companies in manufacturing, distribution, construction, transport 
and other services which had net assets of E2 million or more, and 
a gross income of E200,000 or more in 1968. The 1,600 companies 
included in the sample for 1971 were estimated to represent about 
two-thirds of the total net assets of all UK industrial and 
commercial companies. 
Cosh's paper focused on the remuneration of the highest-paid 
director who is entitled the chief executive. Remuneration was 
defined as including salary, bonus, fees and percentages, expense 
allowances charged to income tax and the estimated money value of 
benefits in kind, following the definitions employed in the 1967 
Companies Act. This definition does not include pension contribut- 
ions paid in respect of directors nor the value of any share options 
or share incentive schemes, or dividends on shares held, so that it 
gives a fairly narrow view of remuneration. Since changes in company 
chief executive are likely to bring changes in remuneration unrelated 
to changes in the company's size or profitability, and since it is 
possible that remuneration will not respond instantly to changes in 
the company's size and profitability, average values were taken for 
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the variables during the period 1969-71. 
Cosh's sample was divided into quoted and unquoted companies with 
807 quoted companies and 231 unquoted companies. Unquoted companies 
were an average much smaller than quoted companies, and consequently. 
the remuneration of the chief executive was lower an average in 
unquoted companies. It was also noticeable that unquoted companies 
were on average more profitable than quoted companies. 
The mean values of chief executives' remuneration, rate of 
return, and net assets over the period 1969-71 were calculated for 
each company and formed the basic data for a cross-sectional analysis 
of the companies. The basic regression equation fitted was: 
log Remuneration = -a + b. Return on Assets + c. log Net Assets 
This model was favoured because it was les's liKely to give 
heteroscedastic error terms. Alternative functional forms of the 
regression equation and alternative measures of company size, 
profitability and remuneration were tested then discounted because 
they gave larger errorsý 
The regression equation was fitted to the data for quoted and 
unquoted companies separately, with R2 of 0.51 and 0.19 respectively, 
and with marKed differences in the regression coefficients. The 
results suggest significant differences between the relationship 
of remuneration to the other variables for quoted and for unquoted 
companies. Cosh gave two reasons which might explain the differences 
between quoted and unquoted companies. Firstly, about half of the 
unquoted companies were subsidiaries of overseas companies, and as 
such may have their remuneration Policy determined overseas. 
Secondly. unquoted companies were on average smaller than quoted 
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companies and, therefore, the differences between quoted and unquoted 
companies may arise from size-class differences. 
Further tests showed significant industry differences between 
the relationship of remuneration to size and profitabil. ity; so 
Cosh fitted the regression equation to 17 separate quoted-company 
industry groups and 5 unquoted-company industry groups. 
Results of quoted industry groups indicated that the degree of 
explanation was quite high in all industry groups. Size and profit- 
ability explained, on average, 54% of the variance of the remuneration 
of the chief executive. It was found that size alone explained, on 
average, 49% of the observed variance of the remuneration of the 
chief executive. The additional degree of explanation achieved by 
including the profitability variable was on average quite small. 
In addition, in all the 17 industry regression runs the 
coefficient of the size variable was statistically significant 
whereas in only 7 of the 17 industry groups was the profitability 
cocfficient significant. To check whether the latter finding was 
the result of less competition in the high concentration industries 
in the. sample being associated with less emphasis on profitability 
as a management goal, Cosh tried a further test. This found no 
evidence of any association between an industry's calculated 
regression coefficient for the profitability variable and the industry's 
concentration ratio. 
Cosh's findings confirm that size was the dominant determinant 
of executive remuneration in quoted companies. In contrast, results 
for unquoted industry groups showed that profitability was clearly 
a relatively more important explanatory variable for unquoted as 
opposed to quoted companies. 
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In summary, Cosh's paper focused attention an the extent to 
which chief executives' remuneration could be explained by company 
size and profitability, using cross-sectional data for over 1,000 
UK companies. He showed that for quoted companies size, measured 
by the natural logarithm of net assets, was the major determinant 
of the remuneration of the chief executive. He also showed that size 
alone explained on average 49% of the observed variance of the 
natural logarithm of the chief executive's remuneration, and that the 
inclusion of profitability as an additional explanatory variable 
did little to improve the degree of explanation, as size and profit- 
ability together explained only 54%. The final conclusion drawn 
by Cosh was-that, if remuneration either influences or reflects the 
goals of the chief executives of major companies, increased company 
size rather than increased profitability will be the major objective 
of these companies. 
Meeks and Whittington (1975) also conducted a large-scale UK 
study using the same data source as Cosh, namely published accounts 
data on UK companies collected and written to magnetic tape by the 
Statistics Division of the Department of Trade and Industry. Their 
sample consisted of 1,008 major UK quoted companies for the years 
1969,1970 and 1971. Executive compensation was taken as the narrowly- 
defined pay of the highest-paid director, sales were used as the size 
measure and the current year's rate of return was employed. Meeks 
and Whittington used cross-section data for each of the three years 
to estimate the model: 
Directors Pay =a+b. log Sales + C. Rate of Return 
using the log form of the sales variable on the grounds that directors 
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are liKely to be paid'according to the proportionate growth rather 
than the absolute growth of their firms. 
The results suggested that in terms of economic and statistical 
significance, size appeared to trump profitability, the sales 
coefficient being much greater than that of the profitability 
coefficient in each of the three years, and being more statistically 
reliable. The overall explanatory power of the three equations was 
2 
modest, with R values ranging from 0.35 for one year to 0.40 for I 
another. 
However-, MeeKs and Whittington cautioned against the use of 
cross-sectional data to maKe estimates of developments over time. 
If the cross-section relationship represents the payment rates 
applicable to the average firm then the estimated slope coefficients 
can be used to infer the relative rewards directors might expect 
from alternative policies with various growth and profitability 
implications. So if the size coefficient is larger than the profit- 
ability coefficient then size--would appear to be the more important 
determinant of pay. However, just because the premium on size 
outweighs that on profitability it is not legitimate to infer that 
the premium on changes in size, that is, growth. will be paramount. 
MeeKs and Whittington argued that whilst the range of experience 
represented in their cross-section observations may be attainable by 
the individual firm in the case of profitability, this is not possible 
in the case of size. Although swift progress between the lower and 
upper tails of the profitability distribution is possible, a comparative 
drastic shift within the size distribution is most unlikely. With a 
750 fold difference in the size of the largest and smallest companies 
in their sample, a large movement up the size distribution is likely 
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to take many years. Consequently, they argued that the use of cross- 
section regression coefficients to evaluate the impact on salary of 
the two explanatory variables, by comparing "equivalent" shifts 
within their distributionz., produces misleading results. Instead one 
needs to confine predictions of pay increases1to those associated 
with the feasible growth and profitability achievements of the 
individual firm. 
Having argued that it is misleading to rely on the relative 
statistical reliability of the estimates of the effect of size an 
pay in drawing inferences for the effects of growth, Meeks and 
Whittington were led to a more direct investigation of how pay is 
affected by growth. They formulated an alternative model for 
changes in the vafiabIes (A): 
A Directors Pay =a+b. A log Sales + c. A Rate of Return 
where the change in directors' pay was expressed in constant prices. 
This model was fitted to cross-sectional data for changes in the 
variables between 1969 and 1971, and the results confirmed their 
reservations about making inferences about the effects of growth by 
drawing upon size variables. F or in the second model the regression 
coefficient for the change in size variable was much reduced in 
comparison with the first model and the premium on profitability 
was as great as that for growth. The overall fit of the equation 
was somewhat reduced though, R2 falling to under 0.1. 
In a final section Meeks and Whittington amended the Lewellen 
and Huntsman specification and fitted the amended equation to their 
own data. They introduced log assets as a size variable, giving 
the equation: 
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Directors Pay =a+b. log Assets + c. Return on'Capital + d. 
Sales 
Assets 
Fitting this specification to their data for the three years, Meeks 
and Whittington found the influence of the sales/asset ratio to be 
very weak compared with that of profitability, as Lewellen and 
Huntsman had found. However, the coefficients of the size variable 
were both large and statistically significant, testifying to the 
importance of size rather than profitability as the crucial variable 
affecting pay. The coefficient of determination, R2 was around 0.4 
for each year. 
In conclusion, Meeks and Whittington found that size was of 
overwhelming importance in the explanation of directors' pay, though 
the influence of profitability on pay was not trivial and could not 
be dismissed as having no effect on salaries. 
Yet another large scale UK study of the Cosh, and Meeks and 
Whittington type was undertaken by HAY-MSL consultants as part of a 
Background Paper for the Royal Commission on the Distribution of 
Income and Wealth (1976). Drawing upon the Department of Industry 
database of accounts of larger companies, they generated a sample 
of 1,771 companies for the year 1970171. The emoluments of the 
highest-paid director in each company were taken as the dependent 
variable, emoluments being defined as salaries, fees, bonuses, 
commissions and taxable expenses, but excluding employers' pension 
contributions, dividends or share options. The independent variables 
were net assets, net income, sales turnover, the number of UK employees 
and the aggregate wages of UK employees. 
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In order to reduce the skewness of the variables they were all 
subjected to a logarithmic transformation, giving the equations: 
log Emoluments =a+b. log Wage Bill + c. log Assets + d. log Income 
e. log Sales + f. log Employees 
log Emoluments =a+b. log Wage Bill + c. log Income y 
These equations were fitted to the sample data using multiple 
regression techniques. The logarithms of all the independent 
variables were highly correlated, with correlation coefficients 
ranging from 0.68 to 0.98 between the five independent variables, 
which must cause some apprehension about the reliability of the 
estimates of the coefficients. The coefficient of determination 
(R 2) for the five-variable equation was 0.35 while that for the two- 
variable equation was 0.34, indicating that the fit of this second 
equation was almost as good as that of the first. The study 
concluded that company size, measured by the wage bill, and company 
profitability influence the highest-paid director's remuneration, 
but that the relationship was not a particularly close one. 
Yet another large-scale remuneration and performance study was 
published in 1975 by Smyth, Boyes and Peseau as part of a general 
analysis of the 500 largest industrial companies in the UK and USA. 
Their empirical evidence on remuneration was restricted to the 
United States and encompassed a sample of 557 American companies for 
1971. Executive compensation data were derived from the "Forbes 
Annual Directory" and included salary, bonus and directorE? fees, 
excluding deferred compensation and share options. They divided 
total remuneration for the officers and directors of-each company by 
the number in the group to calculate average executive compensation. 
82 
Data for profitsp sales and total assets were obtained from the same 
publication. 
Reviewing previous US compensation studies, Smyth et al identified 
two major weaknesses of these studies: firstly, the small sample 
sizes; secondly, inadequate treatment of the statistical problems of 
heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity. Starting with a basic 
linear model of the form: 
Executive Compensation =a+b. Profit + c. Sales 
they fitted an ordinary least-squares regression, using their cross- 
section data. The proportion of the variance of the dependent 
variable explained by the model CR 
23 
was 0.21; and the coefficient 
of sales was highly significant, whilst the coefficient of profit 
was discounted. However, the formulation showed marked collinearity 
between profit and sales, with a correlation coefficient of O. B7, 
causing the estimates of the regression coefficients to be 
unreliable. In addition, the variance of the error term tended to 
rise with executive compensation Cheteroscedasticity). 
Rejecting a logarithmic specification of the model on the grounds 
that it did not solve the multicollinearity problem, Smyth et al 
turned to a scale-deflated specification of the type used by Lewellen 
and Huntsman (1970). This considerably reduced collinearity, the 
correlation coefficient between the profit/assets and sales/assets 
ratios falling to 0.28. However, they found that the variance of 
low compensation firms was greater than for high compensation firms, 
suggesting that the procedure of weighting by assets had 
overcompensated. This led them to try a more general asset weighted 
regression of the form: 
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Executive Compensation a+b. Profit + c. 
Sales 
Assets 
Q Assets 
Q AssetsQ AssetsQ 
The basic linear model can be regarded as a special case of this 
model with the Qs set to zero, whilst the Lewellen and Huntsman 
model can be regarded as the other extreme special case where 
Q=1. Smyth et al varied Q and found that with a value of Q=0.8 
they had a model that lacked serious collinearity problems but yet 
was homoscedastic. With this specification the overall explanatory 
2 
power of the equation was high (R = (3-65), and both the profits 
variable and sales variable were highly significant. Results for 
the average compensation of officers and directors as a group were 
similar. Smyth et al concluded that the firm has a utility function 
that includes both sales and profits. 
In contrast to the large sample, cross-sectional studies 
reported above, McKean and Monsen (1975) took a longitudinal view, 
working with a small sample of US firms over an eleven-year period. 
The study differed from previous ones in that it used more variables 
and models than had been tried previously. The sample consisted of 
yearly observations for 37 firms during the period 1954-65. A total 
of 428 observations was obtained by pooling data across firms and 
over time. All money variables were adjusted to constant dollars 
by means of the Consumer Price Index. Executive compensation was the 
dependent variable. Salary and bonus were included in executive 
compensation, though share options were excluded. 
The objective of the statistical analysis was to determine that 
measure of a firm's performance which had the greatest influence on 
the compensation of the chief executive. Other variables were 
introduced to determine if these characteristics of a firm had 
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significant influence. The control type dummy variable was set equal 
to one for firms classified as effectively controlled by owners and 
zero if the firm was considered to be controlled by management. 
tince many chief executives were replaced or retired during the study 
period, McKean and Monsen introduced summary variables corresponding 
to the reign of each chief executive to account for possible changes 
in compensation of the chief executive attributable to replacement. 
In order to determine which variables statistically had the 
greatest systematic effect an executive compensation, McKean and Monsen 
used two alternative models. The first short-term model attempted to 
explain compensation on the basis of the current or previous year's 
performance of the firm. The second long-term model related 
executive compensation to the cumulative performance of the firm 
rather than to recent performance, 
The short-time-horizon model related executive compensation through 
a linear equation to sales, sales in the previous year, assets, assets 
in the previous year, profits'-, profits in the previous year, share 
price, industry, control-of the firm, tenure and time. A log-linear 
equation was rejected in favour of a linear equation because the log- 
linear equation provided a poorer fit to the data than the simple 
linear relation. Variables for the linear model were selected through 
the stepwise regression procedure; with all variables included, the 
coefficient of determination CR 
2) 
was 0.71. 
Findings an the first, short-terTn model, showed that when total 
sales in current years were analysed in relation to executive 
compensation they appeared to be by far the most significant variable. 
In fact, when sales were included in the model, profits were not 
statistically significant. The regression analysis showed a definite 
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relationship between tenure of the chief executive and compensation. 
Thus, a new chief executive was likely to start below the average 
remuneration level. When control was considered, it was found that 
in owner-controlled firTns, the chief executive averaged $20,000 more 
compensation a year than the chief executive of a manager-controlled 
firm. Industry type was also significant although it was not as 
significant as sales. When assets, profits, share price, the previous 
year's assets and previous year's profits were included, none proved 
to be significant. 
A variant of the first, short-term model was constructed relating 
yearly changes in executive compensation to yearly changes in sales 
revenue, assets and profits. Sales again proved to be the determining 
variable, whilst profits showed little correlation to executive 
compensation. 
The second, long-time-horizon model focussed on cumulative 
performance. McKean and Monsen justified this model with the 
argument that executives are compensated on the basis of current 
performance with an adjustment lag in setting their rate of compensat- 
ion. Again variables were selected for this model through the 
stepwise regression process, the coefficient of determination CR 
2 
reaching 0.72 when all significant variables were introduced. 
Findings for the second. long-term model, showed that revenue 
was again highly significant. Control was also significant. Change 
in sales was found to have a significant effect upon executive 
compensation. Higher relative growth, apparently led to higher 
executive compensation. 
McKean and Monsen concluded that the evidence does not support 
the hypothesis that executive compensation is related solely to profit 
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performance of the firm. Secondly, the data were consistent with 
other empirical studies relating executive compensation to firm size, 
defined as the level of sales. ' Thus McKean and Monsen argued that 
high executive salaries are associated more with high sales than with 
high profits, concluding that sales may be judged more critical than 
profits in the short run. 
A further study, undertaken by Dobbins, Lowes and Pass (1978) 
served as a pilot study for the present research, using a small sample 
and trying a'number of alternative analyses of the data. Information 
was collected for 38 large UK quoted companies selected from the top 
500 of the "Times 1000" for the eight years from 1968 to 1975. These 
38 companies were divided into four size-groups according to their 
reported sales in 1968/69. The dependent variable for the study was 
taken as the remuneration of all directors together, rather than 
average remuneration, because it was impossible to distinguish between 
executive and non-executive directors. 
Dobbins et al's remuneration figures included salaries, fees and 
bonuses but excluded dividends on directors' shares and changes in the 
market value of directors' shares and options. Seventeen selected 
financial variables were introduced as potential independent 
variables, in particular, sales, capital employed, net profit, number 
of UK employees, and market value of the company. The previous year's 
values of each of these variables were introduced in a lagged relation- 
ship with remuneration; and the annual changes in each of these 
va'riables were also tried. 
A correlation matrix of all 18 variables was produced for the 38 
companies for 1968-75; and separate correlation matrices for each of 
the four size-groups. Information from these matrices helped in the 
formulation of regression models of the levels of directors' 
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remuneration and the independent variables; and au:: dels based on 
directors' remuneration and annual changes in the independent 
variables. The correlation matrix showed a strong relationship 
between all the independent variables and remuneration, with 
correlation coefficients ranging from 0.50 to 0.74. However, the 
matrix also revealed substantial collinearity between the absolute 
values of the independent variables, with coefficients in the range 
0.82 to 0.90. By contrast, the changes in the independent variables 
showed negligible collinearity 10.19 at most). Changes in directors' 
remuneration were not highly correlated with changes in the independent 
variables though, the largest coefficient being only 0.31. 
In an attempt to formulate a general model of directors' 
remuneration twelve regression equations were f itted to the pooled 
cross-sectional and time-series data, each equation containing a 
different independent variable or combination of two independent 
variables. The best models were those using capital employed and 
employees, and sales and empl6yees, with R2 values around 0.581 but 
even the poorest model using net profit and market value had an R2 
of 0.49. Next, separate models were generated fo-& each of the seven 
years 1969 to 1975 and for the period as a whole. The constant 
intercepts of these models increased progressively over the period, 
reflecting the impact of inflation upon remuneration. Net profit 
and market value appeared in only two years' equations, whilst capital 
employed and numbers employed were dominant throughout the period. 
2 R values ranged from 0.54 
; 
or one year to 0.69 for another. 
Following previous studies, models were tried which used the 
logarithms of the dependent and independent variables rather than 
their natural numbers. Separate logarithmic regrp-ssion equations 
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were fitted for each year separately and for the period as a whole. 
Again the results suggested that size dictates the level of aggregate 
remuneration, with employees and capital employed predominating. R2 
values ranged from 0.48 one year to 0.69 for another year. Lagged 
models were tried relating present year. 's remuneration with the 
previous year's independent variables. These showed that previous 
year's capital employed, sales and employees were more powerful 
determinants of compensation than the current year's variables. 
Dobbins et al tried another group of regression equations which 
mixed previous year's independent variables with changes in these 
variables to test whether current remuneration is based on last year's 
sales, capital employed, etc., and is then increased by some 
proportion of the change in sales, capital employed, etc., during 
the current year. These Ppecifications mostly failed to generate 
statistically significant results. A further group of equations 
linked present year's remuneration with the previous year's 
remuneration plus other variables, to test whether incremental 
remuneration is related to any particular variable. Sales and 
employee variables appeared most frequently, suggesting that if 
remuneration this year is last year's remuneration plus an increment, 
then the increment will be based on size rather than profit. R2 
values for these equations were very high (0.84 to 0.94) which is 
hardly surprising given the high correlation between present and past 
remuneration. 
Dobbins et al used yet another group of equations which linked 
the level of remuneration with changes in the various independent 
variables, and again size appeared to be the dominant factor. 
However, these equations had poor explanatory power, the R2 values 
89 
ranging from 0.10 to 0.44. at best. A final set of regressions took a 
general model based on changes in remuneration and changes in the 
independent variables and fitted this for the four separate size- 
groups 
/ 
of companies to test for size-class differences in the variables. 
Again the degree of overall explanatory power was low, R2 ranging 
from 
t 
0.29 for the largest companies to 0.22-for the smallest ones, 
but ýsales and employees were the predominant variables. 
It is difficult to summarise such an exploratory study and little 
confidence can be placed in the significance of the regression 
coefficients given the multicollinearity between variables. However, 
over a wide range of model specifications size, measured by number 
of employees and sales and capital employed, seemed to offer better 
explanations of remuneration than profit or company market value. 
Ciscel and Carroll (1980) tried a novel approach to the method- 
ological problem of interdependence between net income and sales by 
introducing the term ". residual profit" in their study of US 
executive salaries. They argued that not only are profits and sales 
highly correlated in raw. Torm but that sales are causally prior to 
profit insofar as profit is simply sales minus cost. Because sales 
is one constituent of profit, the significance of sales as an 
explanatory variable of executive compensation is compatible with 
the assumption that increasing sales tends to increase profit (the 
neoclassical model) and the assumption that a firm's manager seeks to 
increase the sales size of the firm (the managerial hypothesis). 
Consequently, results can support both views. Ciscel and Carroll's 
methodology attempted to cope with this interdependence. 
Ciscel and Carroll began by specifying a simple linear, additive 
model linking the salary and bonus of the chief executive with his 
so 
company's after-tax profit and sales revenue, of the form: 
Chief Exec's Compensation =a+b. Profit + c. Sales 
They selected as their sample the two hundred plus largest US industrial 
companies in 1974 and used remuneration and performiance-data published 
in "Fortune" and "Forbes" for each of six years from 1970 to 1976. 
Cross-sectional, step-wise regressions for each year showed that the 
profit and sales variables were entered in more or less random order 
from one year to another, and that whichever variable entered first 
seemed to destroy the statistical significance of the other variable, 
suggesting multicollinearity. 
To eliminate multicollinearity Ciscel and Carroll started by 
regressing observed profit against observed sales for each of the six 
years in order to arrive at "profit predicted by Bales" from the 
model: 
Profit Predicted by Sales =a+b. Sales 
Their next step was to calculate residual profit, the difference 
between observed profit and "profit predicted by sales": 
Residual Profit = Observed Profit - Profit Predicted by Sales 
They suggested that this residual profit can best be interpreted 
as profit due to reducing production costs or increasing efficiency 
and it is, by definition, uncorrelated with sales. This term became 
the basis for an alternative model which was estimated for each of 
the six years; which tooK the general Lewellen and Huntsman form, but 
with the net assets deflator weighted following the procedure used by 
Smyth, Boyes and Peseau. Specifically their model was: 
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Chief Exec's Comp_. 
_= 
a. 1+b. Residual Profit C. Sales 
(Net Assets) Met Assets) (Net Assets)' (Net Assets) 
where each variable was divided by the square root of assets. A further 
variant of this model included assets as a separate explanatory 
variable, to test the validity of the managerialist hypothesis, on the 
grouAds that if the level of assets (independent of both sales and 
residual profit) influences executive compensation, then the argument 
that managers are compensated for firm growth gains'support. 
I 
Estimation of these equations showed that the coefficients of the 
constant term and the sales variable had the expected signs and were 
statistically significant in all six years, while the coefficient 
for residual profit was significant in five of the six years. The 
asset coefficient was significant in five of the six years in the 
alternate model. Coefficients of determination CR 
2 
s) were high, 
ranging from 0.86 to 0.91. These results conform with both a neo- 
classical and a managerialist interpretation of firm behaviour. 
Executives were paid Tor increasing profits whether through sales 
growth or cost control, but measures of firm size like sales and net 
assets also had an important'influence on executives' salaries. Ciscel 
and Carroll concluded that the published accounting data available for 
analysis of the issue do not allow construction of a model robust 
enough to differentiate between the contending schools of thought. 
In what is effectively a postscript to the present research, a 
symposium on management compensation published in the "Journal of 
Accounting and Economics" presents findings of three further empirical 
studies. These are interesting insofar as they report US findings 
and lend support to the results of the present study an British 
remuneration patterns reported in chapter five. In essence these 
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studies find that executive compenaation is positively related to share 
price performance, that executives hold relatively large amounts of 
their firms' shares with annual changes in the value of these holdings 
often being three to five times greaterýthan the executive's cash 
compensation, and that in the USA executive compensation packages help 
align managers' and shareholders' interests. 
The first of these studies by Murphy (1985) offers a useful 
methodological insight, for by comparing cross-sectional and time- 
series analyses of the pay-performance relation he explains why earlier 
cross-sectional studies failed to find a relation between pay and 
performance. Murphy argues that omitted variables such as firm size 
that are correlated with the performance measure will bias the 
estimated pay-performance relation in cross-sectional regressions, and 
that it is only possible to assess correctly the relationship between 
compensation and performance by analysing time-series regressions for 
individual executives. 
Pursuing the logic of this point, Murphy analyses his data in two 
ways. First, he estimates the executive's compensation in relation to 
company performance over time, focussing only on the variation over time 
in compensation and performance for each individual executive. Then 
for comparison he estimates the cross-sectional relationship between 
performance and compensation by averaging the compensation and company 
performance over time for each executive, generating a-data set 
containing only one observation for each sample executive, and using 
this to analyse the effect of performance and compensation across 
executives. 
Murphy's sample consisted of 73 large manufacturing firms 
selected from the 1981 "Fortune 500". Performance data for these 
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companies werecollected for the 18 year period from 1964 to 1981, 
using computer accessible material from "Standard and Poor's Compustat 
Annual File" and Chicago University's "Monthly Stock Returns Tape" to 
identify company sales and percentage change in sales (proxies for 
company size and growth) and cumulative shareholder returns (share 
appreciation plus dividends). Four hundred and sixty-one executive 
directors who had held board positions for five years or more were 
selected from the 73 companies, and executive compensation data for 
these directors extracted from company annual reports. All compensat- 
ion, sales and shareholder return variables were inflation-adjusted in 
1983 dollar values, and for subsequent analysis the variables were 
transformed into logarithm3. 
Directors' compensation was rather narrowly defined in terms of 
pre-tax salary and bonus plus the current value of share options 
granted in each year. This deliberately ignores the incentive effects 
of previously granted options. Murphy also excludes dividends and 
share appreciation of directors' shareholdings in order to focus on 
remuneration in the current year. Consequently his results under- 
estimate the relationship between firm performance and a director's 
total equity interest, as Murphy himself acknowledges. 
This seems a strang3cmission, for Murphy stresses that directors 
typically own large quantities of their firm's shares and large 
quantities of previously-granted share options, so that the wealth of 
a director will be tied to the wealth of the firm's shareholders. 
Murphy's own data underlines this point, his 461 executive directors 
holding on average $4.7 million worth of their companies' shares (in 
1983 dollars), and their gains (or losses) from share appreciation 
(depreciation) were more than three to five times as great as their 
salaries and bonuses. 
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Murphy's results show a positive link between directors' salaries 
and bonuses and both shareholder return and growth in firm sales. 
Specifically. the time-series regressions linking shareholder returns' 
and remuneration consistently suggest a pronounced positive effect of 
performance on compensation, with high R2 values of around 0.8. By 
dontrast the cross-sectional regressions yield anomalous and counter- 
intuitive results, with negative relationships between shareholder 
returns and salaries and low coefficients of determination of around 
0.3, suggesting that the cross-sectional regressions are mis-specified. 
Adding sales as an additional, explanatory variable alongside share- 
holder returns showed that the coefficients of the log of sales and 
the log of shareholder returns were both significantly related to 
directors' salaries in-the time-series model. 
In addition, whilst Murphy's simple cross-sectional model relat- 
ing compensation to shareholder return showed a negative relationship 
between the two, once the sales variable was added as a control for 
firm size, the relationship between shareholder return and compensat- 
ion became positive with estimated coefficients similar in size and 
magnitude to the time-series estimates. Adding a company size 
variable to the cross-sectional regression model gives much the same 
results as time-series regressions and would appear to ease many of 
the reservations expressed by Murphy about cross-sectional studies of 
remuneration. 
A further study by Coughlan and Schmidt C19853 provides some 
support for Murphy's findings. Coughlan and Schmidt hypothesise that 
the board of directors will establish compensation policies for senior 
managers which create managerial incentives consistent with the 
firm's owners, and they attempt to test this hypothesis by looking at 
empirical evidence on share-price performance, sales growth and 
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management compensation. 
Their sample consisted of the chief executives of around 200 
large US companies for each of three years 1978.1979 and 1980. Using 
compensation data derived from "Forbes" magazine, they calculated the 
real rate of change of salary and bonus of the chief executives between 
consecutive years and related this to the share-price performance of 
their companies in the current year, using share-price data from the 
Chicago University Share Price Computer Tape. 
In Coughlan and Schmidt's initial regressions the logarithm of 
the real rate of change in pay was linked as the dependent variable 
to cumulative share return as the independent variable for each of the 
three years and for the combined sample. In all cases the coefficient 
of the cumulative share return variable was positive and statistically 
significant, though low R squared values indicate that share price 
performance explains only a small portion of the variation in salary 
plus bonus. When real percentage sales growth is added as an 
additional independent variable, its coefficients are both small and 
statistically insignificant. From their evidence on the significant 
positive linK between salary plus bonus and share-price performan - ce, 
Coughlan and Schmidt conclude that boards purposefully set pay 
components to induce executives to increase shareholder wealth. 
A further study by Benstan (1985) emphasizes the importance of 
share income to executive directors. Benston took a fairly small 
sample of 29 large US companies and collected data an the salaries, 
bonuses, share options and shareholdings of the executive directors 
of these companies in each of the six years 1970 to 1975 from company 
annual reports and accounts. Total share gains and losses from 
dividends and share appreciation; share option appreciation; and salary 
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and bonuses of each executive dire ctor were summed and averaged for 
each company to arrive at the total pre-tax monetary rewards of the 
average executive director. Returns to shareholders of the 29 companies 
showed considerable variation over the years 1970 through 1975 and 
Benston divided his observations into five broad categories of share 
returns ranging from +30% to -30%. 
-Overall, Benston's results showed that salaries and bonuses were 
a relatively small portion of executive directors' changes in wealth. 
The typical director's remuneration averaged $174,000 per year 
(in 1975 $ values) and did not vary much among companies with widely 
differing returns, but his annual share-determined gains were over 
$1 million in a year when his company's share prices and dividends 
increased by more than 30% and he lost over $1.1 million when company 
share returns decreased by more than 30%. 
Benston's results showed that executive directors gained and lost 
personal wealth as their companies' shareholders gained and lost, and 
that though individually thei'did not own more than small percentages 
of total company shares, - the amounts they owned yielded annual gains 
and losses that swamped their salaries and bonuses. These results 
are inconsistent with the self-serving management hypothesis that 
suggests that top management will pursue growth to benefit themselves 
at the expense of their shareholders. Rather the results suggest that 
managers do have a motivationally-meaningful interest in their 
companies because they gain and lose along with their shareholders. 
Benston concludes that share ownership is an important means by which 
managers are induced to act in the interests of shareholders. 
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3.4 Summary 
In relation to the detailed review of the methodologies and 
results of previous researchers, the patient reader may find the 
conclusions drawn from these studies rather slim. The research an 
control type and performance offers some contradictory results, but 
with a tentative view that owner-controlled companies are more profit- 
able-than managment-controlled companies. Previous research an 
executive remuneration and performance has been beset by methodological 
problems and the search for an appropriate model specification which 
might deal with multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. Most of 
these studies have failed to find a relationship between profitability 
or shareholder wealth and executive compensation but rather have 
tended to emphasiSe size as the primary determinant of compensation. 
However, since most of these studies have employed a very narrow 
definition of management remuneration this may not be too surprising. 
The few studies which have employed a broader definition of executive 
compensation including shareholding income as well as salary and fees 
items have tended to show profitability and shareholder wealth 
predominating rather than company size. The characteristics and 
results of these studies are summarised in table 3.1. 
In Chapter Five the results are reported of a study by the author 
which adopts a broader remuneration definition and tests this 
remuneration variable against various performance variables for UK 
companies. First, though, Chapter Four explains the methodology 
employed in gathering and analysing data an directors' remuneration. 
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'CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
The present chapter provides an outline of the methodology of the 
study and discusses the problems encountered in attempting to evaluate 
theirelative importance of the factors which affect directors' 
remuneration. The chapter starts with some discussion of data i 
sources. A second section describes how the sample companies were 
selected and gives some characteristics of the sample firms. The 
third and fourth sections describe how the company financial 
information and directors' remuneration data were compiled. A final 
section touches upon the particular statistical problems encountered 
in studies of this kind and describes the analytical approaches 
employed in ihe present study. 
4.1 Data Sources 
Virtually all studies of company performance and management 
remuneration have relied upon data bases which were already available, 
rather than collect primary data in the form of survey results or 
utilise immediate secondary sources such as company accounts. The 
reluctance to use questionnaire survey techniques is understandable, 
given the confidential nature of remuneration information, which would 
tend to result in poor response rates. 
Most of the earlier surveys tended to have fairly small sample 
sizes. For example, McGuire, Chiu and Elbing (1962) sampled only 45 
companies over a seven-year period; Williamson C1963) examined 52 
companies over three separate yearsj Baker C1969) looked at 30 
r 
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. companies for 4 yearsi Masson (1971) traced 39 companies over an 
18 year periodj and Yarrow (1972) took 85 companies for three separate 
years. Later studies such as those by Cosh (1975), Meeks and 
Whittington (1975) and Smyth, Boyes and Peseau (19751 used samples of 
more than a thousand companies for a single year or two, using 
essentially cross-sectional analyses rather than longitudinal studies 
spread over many years. These analyses only became feasible with the 
availability of large company data bases with computer access such as I 
the Department of Trade and Industry data-base used by Cosh or 
commercially-produced data bases like those compiled by Standard and 
Poor in the USA or Extel and Datastream in the UK. Lewellen's work 
was an exception to this trend, since he collected direct data on 
50 large US companies over a 22 year period, looking at company 
annual returns to the Securities and Exchange Commission to determine 
remuneration earned by directors within each company. 
The present study represents'a compromise between the large- 
sample, cross-sectional studies of later years, restricted in their 
information an remuneration to that available on computer data basesi 
and the small-sample, longitudinal studies of earlier years. Choice 
of one hundred companies for a ten-year period offers sufficient 
range of companies and industries to make limited generalisation 
possible, but over a long enough period to allow historical trends to 
be detected. Whilst not as detailed as Lewellen's comprehensive 
study of remuneration which included information on salaries, bonuses, 
profit shares, deferred compensation, dividends and share options, 
the present study is able to take a broader view of remuneration than 
the cross-sectional studies which looked only at the chief executive's 
salary and bonus. In this study remuneration encompasses salary, 
dividends, capital appreciation of shares, pbnsions and appreciation 
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of share options, through recourse to company accounts. 
4.2 The Sample 
Initial company data were extracted from "The Times 1,000". 
I 
covering the period from Ist April 1973 to 31st March 1983, to give 
a ten-year run of company information. The first edition of The 
Times 1,000 used, the 1974/75 edition, covered companies with 
accounting year-ends falling between Ist April 1973 and 31st March 
1974, whilst the final 1983/84 edition encompassed company year-ends 
falling between lst April 1982 and 31st March 1983. 
One hundred companies were randomly selected from the top 500 
ranked by sales turnover in the 1979/80 edition of The Times 1,000. 
I 
Sampling from the sixth year of the ten-year period rather than the 
first year does tend to impart a slight bias towards surviving 
companies, though among the large companies in the top 500, corporate 
mortality rates are fairly low. Choice of the mid-period year as 
the basis for sampling represents a compromise between the desire to 
give equal selection weightings to successful and failing companies on 
the one hand; and the need to provide reasonably long data runs for 
the companies selected. All one hundred companies were included for 
the first six years of the ten-year period, theieafter seven companies 
were taken over, two merged, one re-registered as a private limited 
company and one company was liquidated. The final sample therefore 
included information on 89 companies for the full ten years and for 
periods of between six and ten years for the remainder. 
Companies were only considered eligible where The Times 1,000 
indicated that they were quoted companies, so that reliable share 
price information was availablej and where Britain was the country of 
control. This latter condition was designed to exclude foreign 
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companies where the British operation is part of global market 
servicing arrangements, on the grounds that management remuneration 
levels in such companies are likely to be determined an broader, 
world-wide criteria. Csee Roberts 1959, and Cosh 19753 
These two criteria severely reduced the population from which 
the sample was drawn, since 172 companies from the top 500 were. either 
fore, ign-controlled or unquoted private companies. The final list of 
companies selected is included as an appendix. 
The Times 1,000 ranks companies according to their reported sales 
e- 
turnover, so that in selecting from the top 500 companies prominýnce 
is given to sales as a size measure rather than net assets or numbers 
of employees or market value of equity. To some extent this tends 
to bias the sample towards less mechanised industries where companies 
have large sales turnover in relation to capital employed. Ranking 
by sales may also bias the sample slightly towards proprietorially- 
controlled companies, since companies with smaller capital require- 
ments can fund much of their expansion from internally-generated 
funds without as much need to raise outside capital and dilute 
owners$ shareholdings. Other publications such as the Stock Exchange's 
"Top 1,000 UK Listed Companies" (1982) give a somewhat different 
ordering of the major, UK companies, ranking by descending order of 
equity market value, though differences in rankings are not large. 
Justification for the choice of sales as the most appropriate 
size measure rests on the greater reliability of sales turnover 
information compared with alternative measures such as net tangible 
assets, which is subject to great uncertainties regarding age profile 
of assets, depreciation provisions and frequency of revaluation. 
Smyth, Boyes and Peseau (1975) undertook a detailed discussion of the 
pros and cons of various size measures. coming down in favour of sales 
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as the least unreliable criterion. Furthermore, as the previous 
discussion emphasised, different size measures are highly correlated 
so that the choice of any one measure would not give results 
too 
different from those generated by an alternate measure. 
Sample companies were spread fairly evenly over the size range, 
23 companies falling within the top 100,18 into the next 100,26 
into the next 100,18 in the penultimate 100 and 15 companies in the 
last 100. The largest companies (SP, ICV had sales one hundred 
times as large as the smallest (see appendix). 
With only 100 companies it was difficult to provide a detailed 
industry breakdown, though previous researchers such as Yarrow (1972) 
and McKean and Monsen (1975) have emphasised the importance of industry 
as an explanation for company performance differences. To provide an 
industry breakdown across a small number of broad industry divisions 
the author employed the framework provided by the revised Standard 
Industrial Classification (CSO 1979). This provides for ten broad 
Divisions which are then sub-divided into progressively narrower 
Classes, then Groups, then Activity Headings. Using these sub- 
headings as a guide, companies were allocated to one of five divisions, 
an the basis of information taken from the Directors' Reports about 
their principal activities, review of operations and breakdown of 
sales turnover. Sixteen companies fell into the first division 
(minerals, metals, chemicals); twenty-two into the second (engineering, 
and vehicles); twenty-one into the other manufacturing division 
(food, textiles, clothing, timber, paper)j ten into the construction, 
civil engineering and building division; and thirty-one into the 
services division Cwholesale and retail distribution and catering). 
108 
Such an industry assignment was somewhat arbitrary but it did 
limit the number of categories whilst providing a reasonable number 
of companies in each. The alternative of using the group headings 
employed by the Financial Times for their daily company share price 
I 
listings was briefly considered but rejected on the grounds that 
twenty categories were too many for a mere hundred companies. 
4.3 Company Financial Data 
Accounting information reported in The Times 1,000 was used to 
record dompany Sales, Capital Employed and Net Profit before Interest 
and Tax. This information is compiled by Extel Statistical Services 
for The Times using detailed accounting definitions of these account- 
ing terms to ensure maximum consistency between companies. For 
example, sales turnover is defined to exclude the sales of associated 
companies and VAT; while capital employed is measured as the year-end 
total tangible assets less current liabilities. Where, 'as sometimes 
happened, accounting information arrived too late for inclusion in a 
particular edition of The Times 1,000, the same company entry could 
appear in two consecutive editions, leaving a gap to be filled from 
back issues of Extel cards or by extraction from Annual Reports and 
Accounts, using the Extel definitions. 
Share price data were extracted from back issues of the Financial 
Times, using the FT issues dated nearest the companies' accounting 
year-ends. This was felt to be more accurate than simply taKing 
share prices for all companies at 31st March or 31st December or some 
other arbitrary common date, insofar as it corresponded exactly with 
the end of the performance period for each company. This has the 
added advantage that share prices'are not affected by speculation 
immediately prior to publication of a company's annual results. 
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which does not occur until several months after the year-end. 
Company accounting year-ends varied greatly, December being the 
most popular (39 companies), followed by March (24 companies), and 
September (16 companies). Three companies changed their accounting 
year-ends during the period so generating two unequal successive 
accounting periods: for these companies annualised figures for 
dividend rates, sales, salaries and the like were calculated. 
The bulk of the remaining information was extracted from back 
issues of the companies' Annual Reports and Accounts. Total number 
of ordinary shares issued are reported in the annual accounts. 
Generally these had a nominal value of 25p, though a minority of 
companies had different nominal values such as 10p, 50p or El. Two 
companies each had two different classes of ordinary share with 
different nominal values: these different classes of share were 
added together by converting them to a common nominal value (25p) and 
adjusting the number of shares and dividend rates accordingly. 
Dividend rates were calculated by adding the interim dividend- 
per-share paid each year to the proposed final dividend to be 
approved at the Annual General Meeting after the accounting year-end, 
regardless of when the dividends were actually paid. This is just- 
ifiable on the grounds that dividends relate to the company's accounting 
year. even though they are paid in instalments near the accounting 
year-end and several months after the year-end. The first year of 
the study predated the introduction of the imputation system for 
charging taxes on corporate profits and shareholders' dividends so 
that dividends were quoted gross in the first year and net-of-tax 
thereafter. To ensure consistency all dividends were converted to 
gross, before-tax terms, which also made the figures compatible with 
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tha gross salary figures. 
In the first four years of the study dividend restrictions were 
in force as part of the government's anti-inflation incomes policies 
(Counter-Inflation Dividends Order 1973). These restrictions had 
the effect of constraining dividends-per-share to an increase of, 
say, no more than 10% over the previous year's rate, regardless of 
a company's own wishes. To this extent dividend incomes tend to be 
understated compared with what they might have been in the absence 
of restraints, though presumably where profits were ploughed back 
because of dividend restrictions, shareholders benefitted through 
capital appreciation of their shares. 
Since the 1967 Companies Act, the Annual Report and Accounts 
has provided information about the aggregate remuneration paid to 
company employees based in the UK and the average number of UK 
employees. Dividing the former figure by the latter generated an 
average figure for wages of-UK employees. Some care has to be shown 
in using these figures though. ' Firstly, companies with large 
overseas operations are likely to have many more employees in total 
than the number working in the UK which they are required to disclose 
by the Companies Act. so that UK employees can be a misleading 
size measure for multinational companies. Secondly, average numbers 
employed are calculated by adding all male and female workers 
according to a set formula with pre-determined weightings given to 
part-time workers. Consequently, where companies operate in sectors 
such as retailing, characterised by many part-time women or Saturday 
workers, they are likely to have much lower average wages than in 
sectors like engineering dominated by full-time skilled employees. 
To ensure comparability between sales, wagos, etc., over the 
ten-year, period some inflation adjustment was necessary. The 
ill 
adjustment factor chosen was the General Index of Retail Prices 
reported monthly in the Employment Gazette. Two series of price 
index numbers with different base years were chained to generate a 
comprehensive monthly index covering the whole ten years, based on 
January 1974 prices. The monthly index corresponding to each 
company's accounting year-end was used to convert nominal values to 
real terms. Since sales and wages accrue over the whole year this is 
a crude adjustment, other than for balance sheet asset items which 
are recorded at year-end values. However, this monthly adjustment 
is more accurate than an annual price index chosen for some arbitrary 
date such as March or December and then applied to all companies, 
regardless of their accounting year-ends. 
4, '4 Directors and Their Remuneration 
The Annual Report and Accounts lists directors serving a company 
at the date when the Directors' Report is compiled, generally some 
three to four months after the accounting year-end. Since the period 
between the company's accounting year-end and the company Annual 
General Meeting is when most directors retire and new directors are 
provisionally appointed by the Board subject to ratification at the 
AGM, such a list gives an up to date account of serving directors. 
However, it is deficient in a number of respects. Firstly, it does 
not show all directors who served the company during the year, since 
it omits those who retired or left during the year or in the period 
immediately after the year end, and counts those appointed after the 
year end. Secondly, companies are not obliged to indicate which 
directors hold executive appointments as company managers and which 
are non-executive, though a n. umber of firms voluntarily reported 
this information in later years. 
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Theae deficiencies in reporting Board members were remedied. 
Perusal of the detailed notes in the Directors' Report on retiring 
and newly-appointed directors allowed the directors' list to be 
amended. An exact breakdown of the Board between executive and 
non-executive directors was effected by writing personal letters 
addressed by name to the Company Secretaries of the companies 
concerned. These letters briefly explained the purpose of the 
I 
author's research and requested help in the form of informations 
Appended to each letter was a complete list of all directors who had 
served the company over the ten-year period, -compiled from past 
Annual Reports. Secretaries were asked to indicate which directors 
were executive and which non-executive by ticking and crossing the 
names an the list. They were also asked to record the month and 
year that any director changed from one category to the other and 
any overseas based directors. A follow-up letter was sent two months 
later to companies which did not respond promptly, whilst personal 
telephone calls and third letters stirred the final few recalcitrant 
companies, so that in the end executive/non-executive breakdowns 
were obtained for all one-hundred companies. 
The most direct way to gather information about directors' 
remuneration would obviously be to write to the companies concerned 
requesting data. This approach would also have the advantage of 
yielding precise and comprehensive details, such as the breakdown 
of each director's remuneration between executive salary, any 
performance related bonuses, benefits like company cars, perquisites, 
pensions, directors' fees, dividends on shareholdings and share option 
rights, and the terms and duration of service contracts. However, 
this approach was rejected as impractical an the. grounds that 
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Temuneration is generally treated as highly confidential and few 
Company Secretaries would get the permission of their Boards to 
release such sensitive information. 
A limited amount of information can be gleaned by shareholders 
who are legally entitled to view directors, service contracts at the 
company's head office for a short period prior to the AGM. However, 
few companies have all the information listed above in assembled 
form. nor would they generally be prepared to devote time to preparing 
this information. The fact that less than one-third of companies 
were prepared to respond to the second appendix to our letter which 
asked only for aggregate company pension contributions for directors, 
testifies to the difficulty of gleaning information this way. 
Rejecting the direct approach as not feasible, more roundabout 
methods were employed which relied on information disclosed in 
companies' Annual Reports and Accounts. Ever since the 1948 Companies 
Act, companies have been forced to disclose details of directors' 
shareholdings and subsequent Companies Acts and Stock Exchange 
regulations have extended the disclosure requirement to include 
share options and the like. These requirements exclude any share- 
holdings in subsidiary companies by directors and any debenture 
holdings by directors, focussing on equity holdings in the parent 
company, so they can understate the proprietorial interests of 
directors. Shareholdings are listed only for directors in office at 
the accounting year-end, but this was easily adjusted to include 
shareholdings of directors who left during the year by consulting 
the previous year's accounts. Details were also collected about 
directors' share options, their holdings of part-paid shares, 
incentive shares and deferred shares. Fifty-eight of the companies 
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had option or other incentive share schemes for directors. 
Shareholding information was fed into a programmable calculator 
which computed aggregate shareholdings, means and standard deviations 
for all directors and for executive directors only. Multiplication 
of these mean shareholdings by the appropriate gross dividend rate 
gave directors' dividend incomes. Information was also recorded about 
the 1chairman's shareholding and dividends, the number of shares held 
by ýhe hiýhest-paid director and dividends thereon; and the share- 
holdings of the director with the largest holding. All these holdings 
included shares owned beneficially by directors and, their immediate 
families (wives and children). To some extent this can understate 
their interests since it excludes shares held by their grown-up 
children. 
The 1967 Companies Act extended the disclosure requirements for 
directors' salaries, fees, and taxable benefits. * Not only must 
companies show aggregate salaries, fees and pension contributions, pdid) 
they must also show the chairman's precise salary and that of the 
highest-paid director, as well as a breakdown of other directors' 
salaries and fees into appropriate salary bands with the number of 
directors whose remuneration falls within each band. From 1967 the 
salary-bands went up in steps of E2,500 per year, but this was 
Section 196 of the Companies Act 1948 and Sections 6 and 7 of the 
Companies Act 1967 adopt a wide ranging definition of remuneration, 
including: "Fees and percentages, any sums paid by way of expenses 
allowances in so far as those sums are charged to UK income tax, any 
contribution paid in respect of him under any pension scheme and the 
estimated value of any other benefits received by him otherwise than 
in cash. " It also requires companies to include: "Any endowments 
paid to or receivable by any person in respect of his services as 
director of the company or in respect of his services, while director 
of the company, as director of any subsidiary thereof or otherwise in 
connection with the management of the affairs of the company or any 
subsidiary thereof. " 
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broadened to bands of Z5,000 per year by the 1976 Companies Act to 
reflect the influence of inflation upon salaries. With such narrow 
salary bands it is possible to calculate reasonably precisely 
aggregate directors' salaries and fees, average salary and the 
standard deviation of salaries, by taking the mid-point of each 
salary band and assuming that all directors lying within that salary 
band are paid that amount. 
Precise information is given about the chairman's salary and 
since he is identified by name his salary can be related to his share- 
holdings and dividend income. Yet only 26 companies had an executive 
chairman in charge. throughout the periodi the other three-quarters 
of companies had non-executive chairmen, with a Managing Director or 
Chief Executive or Deputy Chairman heading up the company. In these 
cases it has been assumed that the salary of the highest-paid director 
specified in the accounts is that of the chief executive and this 
salary is then related to that person's dividend income. Where one 
chairman takes over from another during the year salaries are quoted 
for the two separately and these were added to obtain the total 
salary attaching to the office of chairman for the year. 
A small number of companies volunteered information about 
company pension contributions for executive directors in their 
annual accountsi for the others a direct question was asked as part 
of the postal inquiry, However, many company secretaries refused to 
give this information, so that complete or partial pension data was 
available for only 36 companies. 
Calculation of the capital appreciation (depreciation) of 
directors' shareholdings involved some quite complex adjustments. 
It would be inaccurate just to take share prices at the start and 
end of each year and multiply these by the numbers of shares held by 
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directors at the start and end of the year to calculate appreciation 
of share values, because directors could have bought or sold shares 
during the year. Instead the author set out to measure the capital 
appreciation experienced by directors on their year-end share-. 
holdings, by multiplying these share-holdingsby the increase 
(decrease) in share price during the year. 
Share price change is affected by company share issues during the 
year and adjustments were made for two main kinds of share issues: 
Where a company makes a bonus or scrip issue by capitalising 
reserves, if the Stock-Market takes a neutral view of the 
company's prospects then, say, doubling the number of shares 
will simply halve the share price leaving no net capital 
appreciation. Directors will have twice as many shares but 
I each will 
be worth half as much. By halving the opening share 
price and comparing this with the closing price, any not 
appreciation will be evident. Sixty-three companies had bonus 
share issues during the period. 
2. Where shares are subdivided or regrouped into shares of different 
nominal values then directors' shareholdings will be affected. 
Again the opening share price must be adjusted accordingly 
before any comparison with the closing price of the new shares. 
I For example, when one company's El ordinary shares were sub- 
divided into four 25p shares-then the opening share price was 
divided by four. Ten companies altered their nominal share 
values during the period, all of them moving to 25p nominal 
values. 
Capital appreciation of directors, share options was calculated 
in a similar manner. 
117 
4.5'-Statistical Analysis of the Data 
The previous chapter described the general statistical problems 
involved in tracing the relationship between directors' remuneration 
and company performance-and showed how these problems 
have beset 
previous researchers in this field. The present section outlines the 
various analytical approaches adopted in the present study. 
. As a 
first step in analysing the data, basic descriptive 
statistics such as means and variances were calculated for the 42 
variables measured, and several hundred more calculated variables 
derived from the original 42. Some of these descriptive statistics 
are summarised in tabular form in chapter five. 
Next correlation coefficients were generated for all variables. 
Pearson correlatidn coefficients were presented in a series of matrices 
showing the interlinkages between variables, 'one matrix covering 
variables expressed in money terms; another inflation-adjusted 
variables; another the natural logarithms of the variables; and yet 
another matrix the size-adjusted variables (that is, variables 
divided by net assets). Four final matrices covered the changes and 
percentage changes in variables; and real changes and percentage 
real changes in variables. 
The matrices showed high correlations between certain independent 
variables like sales, net assets and profit, warning of probable 
multicollinearity problems in any regression. The matrices showed a 
negligible "reduction" in the intercorre lat ions between independent 
variables as a result of inflation-adjusting the datai some modest 
reduction in intercorrelation from taking the logarithms of the 
independent variables; and a quite dramatic reduction in inter- 
correlation from size-adjusting the independent variables. Lagging 
the relationship in order to relate present remuneration to independent 
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variables in the previous period, made little difference to the 
intercorrelation between independent variablesi but focussing upon 
changes in the variables significantly reduced intercorrelation, and 
taking percentage changes in the variables reduced mu lticol linearity 
to negligible proportions. 
These intercorrelations were somewhat disappointing for it was 
hoped that the economic turbulence of the period chosen would have 
helped reduce multicollinearity. To the extent that the period 
embo died the 1973 and 1978 oil-price shocks to the economy, the 
high inflation rates of the mid-1970's and the severe economic 
recession of the early 1980's and that these events would tend to 
affect companies in a range of industries at different times, with 
e- 
differing severitýj and with ýffects upon differing size/performance 
variables, one might have expected less correspandenco between them. 
The matrices also highlighted the relatively high correlations 
between chairman's salary, that of the highest-paid director, the 
average salary of all board members and average salaries for executive 
directors, hinting at the possibility that any one of these could stand 
as proxy for the others. However they also showed a low correlation 
between salaries alone, salaries plus dividends, and salaries plus 
dividends plus capital appreciation, suggesting a need for several 
remuneration measures. They also showed a modest relationship 
between directors' salaries and both aggregate and average wages 
within the companyi 
The final stage of the analysis consisted of a number of multiple 
regression runs, using the "Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences" computer software (Nie-et al, 1975). These were undertaken 
with a variety of different specifications of the regression equation, 
replicating the specifications of previous researchers and using a 
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I 
narrow, salary-only definition of directors' remuneration. This 
enabled some comparison of previous conclusions with our own 
findings. In addition these various specifications were run using 
broader definitions of remuneration as the dependent variables and 
compared with the initial runs. 
Each group of regression runs consisted of fourteen regressions 
witti a variety of dependent variables. These dependent variables 
encompassed four different director groups and up to five definitions 
I 
of remuneration, as follows: 
Chairman's Salary; ChairTnan's Salary and Dividendsi Chairman's 
Salary and Dividends and Share Appreciation. 
2. Highest-Paid Director's Salaryj Highest-Paid's Sal . ary and 
Dividends; Highest-Paid's Salary and Dividends and Share 
Appreciation. 
3. Average Salaries for all Directorsi Average Salaries and Average 
Dividends for all Directorsi Average Salaries and Average 
Dividends and Average Share Appreciation for all Directors. 
4. Average Salaries for Executive Directorss Average Salaries and 
Average Dividends for Executive Directors; Average Salaries 
and Average Dividends and Average Share Appreciation for Executive 
Directors; Average Salaries and Average Dividends and Average 
Share Appreciation plus Average Pensions for Executive Directorsi 
Average Salaries plus Dividends plus Share Appreciation plus 
Pensions and Capital Appreciation of Share Options. 
Despite the high correlations between the salaries of the four different 
director groups revealed in the correlation matrices it was decided 
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to persevere with all four of these dependent variable groups, an the 
grounds that the four groups were less correlated for broader 
definitions of remuneration embracing share income. 
Two alternative sets of independent variables were employed in 
conjunction with the. various dependent variables. One set consisted 
of eight independent variables in three sub-groups, the first group 
containing three company size variables - Sales, Net Assets and 
Employee Numbers; the second three performance variables - Profit, 
I 
Return on Net Assets and Return on Equity; the third group two 
background variables Industry and Year. These three groups of 
variables were introduced sequentially in step-wise regressions an 
some computer runs and introduced simultaneously on other computer 
runs. The second set of independent variables was drastically 
reduced to just two - Sales as a size measure, 'and Return on Net 
Assets as a performance measure, to avoid the problems of multi- 
collinearity between Sales, Net Assets, Employee Numbers and Profit, 
and to focus specifically upon the size versus profitability dimension 
in directors' remuneration. 
The first regression runs adopted the linear form of equation 
4.1: 
Remuneration =a+b. Sales + c. Assets + d. Employees 
e. Profit + f. Return on Capital 
9. Return on Equity 4 h. Industry 
i. Year . .................................... 4.1 
This demonstrated strong multicollinearity between Sales, Net Assets 
and Profit with correlation coefficients in the range 0.93 to 0.96, 
so a reduced form of the equation was tried (equation 4.2): 
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Remuneration =a+b. Sales + c. Return on Capital ........... 4.2 
with two indýpendent variables which were largely independent of one 
another, correlating only to the extent of 0.17. The two equations both 
showed modest relationships between independent and dependent variables 
with correlations around 0.4 to 0.5. 
Industry was entered in the expanded equations as if it was a single 
continuous variable rather than a categorical one, in the interests of 
summarising the effect of industry as a single figure. The smallest nominal 
number (2, on the scale 2 to 6) was attached to companies in the industry 
group with the lowest average proportion of company shares held by 
directors (chemicals and minerals), and the largest nominal number to 
companies in the industry group with the highest average proportion of 
company shares held by directors (retailing and other services) (table 5.4). 
interestingly this proved roughly to mirror the industry size rankings and 
capital int ensities, with typical companies in the lower-numbered inLstry 
groups like chemicals and minerals being largest in terms of assets and 
sales, and companies in the higher-numbered industry groups like retailing 
and other services having the smallest sales and assets (table 5.24). 
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Additional stepwise regression runs using five separate industry 
dummy variables, and application of the analysis of variance procedure 
yielded very similar parameter estimates and t values for the independent 
variables. The same independent variables were statistically significant 
however industry was incorporated in the model. 
Both the above equations were fitted to the pooled cross- 
sectional and time-series data. In addition separate regression 
equations were estimated for each year's data separately. These 
showed some variation in the goodness-of-fit of the regr6ssion 
equations year by year, R2 ranging from 0.38 in one year to 0.53 for 
another year. Regression coefficients also tended to vary somewhat 
from year to year. This necessitated the inclusion of year as a 
separate independent variable to help improve the model specification 
(see Dielman 1983). Further regression runs fitted the two equations 
to the ten-year average variables calculated for-all companies. These 
were designed to test long term relationships between remuneration and 
performance, discounting the effects of short term fluctuations in 61 
perfomance. 
Two further equations C4.3 and 4.4) used inflation-adjusted 
values for the dependent remuneration variables and the various 
monetary independent variables. taking the Same 'form as equations 
4.1 and 4.2. The independent variables real Sales, real Net Assets 
and real Profit were still highly correlated in the longer equation 
formi and the two independent variables in the condensed equation 
remained relatively independent of one another. Relationships 
between ind; pendent and dependent variables remained modest with 
correlations around 0.4 to O. S. 
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Another two equations (4.5 and 4.6) focussed upon lagged nominal 
values, relating the dependent variable, 'remuneration this-year, to 
the previous years_' independent variables. These equations took the 
same form as equations 4.1 and 4.2 above. Applying these equations 
to the nine years pooled data available revealed a continuing high 
intercorrelation between Sales, Net Assets and Profits, which 
disappeared when the condensed two-variable equation was substituted 
for, the longer one. They also showed the same modest correlations 
between independent and dependent variables of around 0.4 to 0.5. 
An inflation-adjusted version of this lagged model took the same 
structural form as the equations for the nominal values 4.5 and 4.6, 
continuing to display high intercorrelation in the longer equation 
which disappeared once the shorter, two-variable equation was 
substituted (equations 4.7 and 4.8). 
Further lagged equations (4.9 and 4.10) related the nominal 
value of the remuneration variables this period to the performance 
variables of the next_period, taking much the same form as th3 
previous equations 4.5 and 4.6. This formulation was included to 
test the possibility that directors first award themselves additional 
remuneration then seek to achieve performance improvements to Justify 
these salary increases. Applying these equations to nine years 
pooled data gave a poor fit with the data, the coefficient of 
determination R2 reaching 0.4 at best, and with continuing high 
collinearity between the independent variables. An inflation- 
adjusted version of this reverse lag model took the same form as 
the equations for the nominal values 4.9 and 4.10. Again the fit 
of the equation to the data was poor, the coefficient of determinat- 
ion R2 reaching 0.4 at best, and Multicollinearity remained high 
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(equations 4.11 and 4.12). 
The next regression runs employed logarithms to adjust the 
potentially curvilinear relationships to a linear form. The first 
adjustment took the traditional double-logarithmic form of equation 
4.13: 
log Remuneration a+b. log Sales + c. log Assets 
+ d. log Employees + e. log Profit 
+ f. log Return on Capital 
g. log Return on Equity + h. log Industry 
i.. Iog Year ............................... 4.13 
This form still left marked multicollinearity between Sales, Net 
Assets and Profit of the order of 0.71 to 0.88, so a reduced 
equation (4.14) was tried: 
log Remuneration =a+b. log Sales + c. log Return on Capital... 4.14 
This had negligible multicollinearity. Correlations between independ- 
ent and dependent variables remained in the modest 0.4 to 0.5 range. 
Thereafter various combinations of natural numbers and logarithms 
were tried, replicating the formats tried by other researchers. One 
paijý of equations mixed natural values of the dependent variables with 
logs of the independent variables to generate modified forms of 
equations 4.13 and 4.14 (4.15 and 4.16). These had no effect on the 
multicollinearity measures and left the correlations between 
independent and dependent variables unchanged. Another pair of 
equations mixed natural values for some independent variables with 
logarithms for others to generate equation 4.17t 
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log Remuneration =a*b. log Sales + c. log Assets 
" d. log Employees + e. log Profit 
" f. Return an Capital 
" g. Return on Equity + h. Industry 
" i. Year ................................. 4.17 
and its condensed form 4.18: 
log Remuneration =a+b. log Sales + c. Return on Capital ... 4.18 
Yet another version of the equations used the natural values of the 
dependent variable with the above mixture of natural and logarithmic 
independent variables to create amended forms of equations 4.17 and 
4.18 (4.19 and 4.20). None of these transformations had any effect 
upon the multicollinearity of Sales, Net Assets and Employees which 
remained in the range 0.71 to 0.88, though again in the condensed 
two-variable version collinearity was minute. All displayed similar 
modest correlations between independent and dependent variables. 
Some of the logarithmic models were fitted to the ten-year average 
data as well with similar results. 
One adjustment which did help with the multicollinearity problem 
was to divide all variables by a common size measure, here net 
assets. This generated equation 4.21: 
Remuneration a+b. Sales 
_+c. 
Emplayees + d. Profit 
Net Assets Net Assets Net Asset Net Assets 
e. Industry ................................. 4.21 
Here the profit term becomes return on capital when size-adjusted. 
In condensed form, a second equation C4.22) was created: 
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Remuneration =a+b. 
Sales + c. Return on Capital ........ 4.22 
Net Assets Net Assets 
In the earlier equation Sales over Assets, and Employees over Assets 
were not highly correlated (0.38), and Sales over Assets correlated 
weakly with return on capital (0.35). Correlations between independ- 
ent and dependent variables were unaffected by the adjustment, remain- 
ing in the 0.4 to 0.5 range. These equations were fitted to the ten- 
year average data as well, with similar results. 
Some final versions of the regressions focussed not on the 
absolute amounts of the independent and dependent variables but 
rather on the change in each variable (A), as in equation 4.23: 
Remuneration =a+b. A Sales + c. A Assets + d., & Employees 
e. A Profit + f. A Return on Capital 
g. Industry ............................... 4.23 
The condensed version of this equation took the form of equation 4.24: 
A Remuneration =a+b. A Sales + c. A Return on Capital ....... 4.24 
These equations view remuneration levels as increasing by a series of 
increments, each increment being related to changes in the independent 
variables. This form of the model showed little collinearity between 
Sales, Net Assets and Number of Employees CO. 3 to 0.4). However 
correlations between independent and dependent variables fell sharply 
to around 0.1. Inflation-adjusting all the money variables in 
equations 4.23 and 4.24 allowed the construction of two further model 
equations relating real changes in the variables (equations 4.25 and 
4.26). These versions retained the low multicollinearity character- 
istic but also showed the same low relation between independent and 
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dependent variables displayed in their nominal counterpart. 
Modificat ion of the change in variables models (equations 4.23 
and 4.24) allowed construction of models which focussed upon the 
rate of change of each variable. Percentage changes in the variables 
were related through two structural equations of similar form to 
equations 4.23 and 4.24 (4.27 and 4.28). These test the somewhat 
different, restated proposition that the rate at which directors' 
remuneration changes depends upon the speed of change of the various 
independent variables. Inflation-adjustment of all the monetary 
variables allowed construction of two further equations which 
concentrated upon real percentage changes in the variables (equations 
4.29 and 4.30). All showed very little multicollinearity between 
independent variables but disappointingly low correlations between 
the dependent variable and the independent regressors. 
Now that the reader is acquainted with the data sources employed 
in the study and the analytical techniques employed, we can move on 
to consider the results of the study presented in chapter five. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION AND COMPANY 
PERFORMANCE: RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
The analytical approaches described in the previous chapter 
yielded a wealth of statistical-output in the form of descriptive 
statistics, correlation matrices and regression results. To impose 
some order upon this output the current chapter is sub-divided into 
four major subsections. The first presents information about boards 
of directors and their shareholdings, the second focusses upon 
directors' remuneration and the third touches upon the performance 
of their companies. A final section concentrates upon the links 
botween remuneration and performance, presenting the. results of the 
regression analyses. 
5. 'I*'Directors'and Their Shareholdings 
The average size of the board of directors of large British 
companies has changed little over the ten-year period from 1973 to 
1983, as table 5.1 at the end of the chapter shows. The average size 
of the board remained at around ten, with about seven executive 
directors and three non-executive directors. However there were 
variations in the average size of boards between companies operating 
in different industry divisions, as table 5.2 shows. In the chemicals, 
minerals and metal division ("Chemicals") average board size was 
around thirteen, comprising eight executive directors and five non- 
executive directors; while in the engineering and vehicles sector 
("Engineering") and other manufacturing division ("Manufacturing") 
average board size was about ten, with around seven executive directors 
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and three non-executivej the construction and building ("Construction"), 
and retailing and other services ("Services") divisions having a 
board around nine strohg, of whom about seven were executive 
directors. The averages mask wide variations in the size of boards: 
for the sample as a whole, board size ranged from 3 minimum to 23 
maximum, whilst executive numbers ranged from one to twenty. 
These findings are mirrored in other surveys of the composition 
of British company boards, notably one published in the Bullock 
Committee report in 1977 and t'hree published by the Bank of England 
in 1979,1983 and 1985. All four surveys looked at the boards of 
the companies listed in "The Times 1,000". Bullock using the 1975-76 
edition and the Bank the 1978-79 and 1982-83 editions. 
The Bullock report survey showed that few boards had more than 
15 directors and that three-quarters had ten or less. A quarter of 
the companies had no non-executive directors. The Bank surveys found 
that the average size of the board fell very slightly over the period 
1979 to 1982 whilst average numbers of non-executive directors rose 
slightly, the figure standing at 8.7 directors in 1982, of whom 
2.7 directors were non-executive. However there was some marginal 
reduction in the size of boards as companies became smaller. The 
average board size for companies in the top 250 by sales in 1982 
was 11.1 (of whom 3.6 were non-executive), whilst the average for 
companies in the next 750 size group was only 7.8 board members 
(of whom 2.3 were non-executive). 
i 
It is interesting to compare our information on company boards 
in the UK with data an US boards cited in Herman (1981). Herman 
referred to a 1973 Conference Board survey which showed that the 
median-sized manufacturing company board had 11 directors, though 
.0 for the very large companies board size was. 15.. Herman's own data 
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for the hundred largest industrial companies in 1975, compiled 
from proxy statements, showed a median board size of 14. A later 
Conference Board survey in 1976 showed some variations between board 
size. in different industries, manufacturing companies having a median 
board size of 13 whilst retailing-merchandising companies had a 
median board size of only S. 
US companies not only had larger boards than UK companies, they 
also tended to have a higher proportion of non-executive directors. 
The 1973 Conference Board survey showed that the median percentage 
of insiders on boards of large manufacturing companies was 40 per- 
cent. Herman's own results for the hundred largest industrial 
companies in 1975 showed an average proportion of 44 per-cent, which 
is low compared with the 70% or so of executivý directors on the 
boards of UK companies. 
Directors' shareholdings have shown a tendency to decline over 
the period both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the company's 
total ordinary shares. Table 5.3 charts this decline over time. In 
1973/74 the chairman held on average 3.9% of his company's ordinary 
shares, yet by 1982/83 this holding had declined to 1.6%. This trend 
is mirrored in the declining proportion of shares held by the 
highest-paid director, the shareholding of the average director, 
and the average executive director's shareholding. The director with 
the largest shareholding controlled on average 5.4% of his company's 
shares in 1973/74 but by 1982/83 this had fallen to 2.0%. 
Falling shareholdings are the result of the retirement from 
Boards of founders or their families who held large blacks of shares, 
or sales of some of their shares by directors with large share- 
holdings. The consequences in terms of declining potential for 
control by the Board are demonstrated in the final two columns of 
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table 5.3. In 197a/-74 the total Board on average controlled 9.3% of 
the company's shares, whilst the executive directors together held 
7.3% of company shares-. This gave the directors a sizeable block of 
shares to act as a locus for potential control, provided that they 
acted cohesively. By 1982/83 these shareholding blacks had dwindled 
to 3,4% held in total by all directors and 2.5% held by all the 
executive directors together, well short of the arbitrary 5% or so 
which was suggested as a possible basis for control in chapter two. 
Average shareholding figures mask significant variations in 
director's shareholdings between companies. Though the chairman's 
shareholding averaged 2.4% of total shares over the ten-year period 
for all companies, this ranged from zero per-cent in one company to 
42.9% in another. Again, though the total shares held by all directors 
averaged 6.2% over the ten years for all companies, this ranged from 
0.004% for one company to 72.29% for another. 
The proportion of shares hold by the Board varied greatly between 
industry groups as table 5.4 'shows. In the chemicals and minerals 
division and the engineering and vehicles division the proportion of 
shares held by the Board tended to be quite low, the chairman's or 
highest-paid director's or average director's shareholding being 
generally under one per-cent; whilst the total shareholdings by the 
Board were of the order of one and a half to three and a half per- 
cent. By contrast, in the construction and building division and the 
retailing and catering services division the proportion of shares held 
by the Board was much higher, the chairman's and highest-paid 
director's shareholding averaging between two per-cent and five and 
a half per-cent, while the total shareholdings of the board were 
of the order of eight per-cent to eleven and a half per-cent. These 
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differences tend to reflect the different capital intensities of these 
industries, the large capital requirements of chemicals and engineer- 
ing firms causing a large dilution of family control over the years, 
whilst, the much smaller capital needs of construction and retailing 
companies enabled founding families to fund most of the companies' 
capital from' generated funds with a much less marked dilution of 
family control. 
To talk of the average shareholdings of company directors can be 
rather misleading for within the typical board of directors the 
distribution of shares is highly skewed with one or at most two 
directors, often members of founding families, controlling large 
blocks of shares, while the remainder of the board have modest 
shareholdings. This skewness shows up in tables 5.5 and 5.6 which 
record the distribution of directors' shareholdings analysed over 
time and by industry group. Table 5.5 shows how total shares held by 
directors fell from 2.2 million in 1973/74 to 1.6 million in 1982/83, 
while the holding of the director with the largest single shareholding 
fell from 1.2 million shares to 1.0 million. Consequently, the 
director with the largest shareholding was responsible for between 
half to two-third's of the total shares held by the average ten-man 
board. Further evidence of skewness can be detected from the middle 
columns of the table, where the standard deviations of shareholdings 
were almost twice as large as the average shareholdings. Such 
skewness in share distribution seems to be typical of company boards 
regardless of the industries in which they operate, as table 5.6 
shows. 
Much of this skewness reflects the continuing family influence 
in company boards. As Wheatcroft (19811 reminds us, while many of 
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the largest British companies like ICI and BP have shrugged off their 
family connections, the next tier of large quoted companies still have 
the ring of family concerns. The appendix lists the companies in our 
sample and identifies the largest shareholding director and his 
approximate shareholding. Within that list many "founding family" 
names are still prominent. Indeed as one moves down the company size 
rankings, a large director's shareholding is relatively uncommon among 
the largest quarter of companies but almost universal amongst the 
remaining three-quarters of companies. 
Though directors' shareholdings are tending to decline over time 
they still represent an important source of wealth to directors as 
tables 5.7 and 5.8 show. These tables were compiled by multiplying 
the directors' year-end shareholdings by the share price ruling on 
the Stock-Exchange at the year-end date. For example, the chairman's 
average share wealth was almost three-quarters of a million pounds in 
1973/74, fell rapidly in the first year or. two as share prices 
tumbled in the aftermath of the 1973/74 oil crisis, then gradually 
rose again to E1.3 million by the end of the period. Similar move- 
ments occurred in the nominal share wealth of other directors, thougq 
the absolute amount of their wealth was generally smaller., For 
example, the average executive director's shareholding was worth OL 
quarter of a million pounds at the start of the period, fell quickly 
to flOO. 000 as share prices Plummeted, then slowly recovered to 
reach a quarter of a million pounds again by the end of the period as 
share prices recovered. Wealth holdings of such magnitude could 
serve as significant motivators for managers, though the skewed 
distribution of shares within a typical board means that much of 
this wealth will accrue to just one or two directors, whilst the 
remainder have much more modest holdings. 
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Though directors' nominal share wealth tended to increase over 
time, once the effects of inflation were allowed for, directors' real 
share wealth fell. *The right hand side of table 5.7 shows the real 
share wealth of directors expressed in terms of 1974 base year price 
levels. As inflation-adjusted, year-end share prices fell rapidly 
over the first two years real share wealth fell rapidly. Thereafter 
though share prices recovered a little'over the next two or three 
years, causing real share wealth to recover slightly, real share 
prices fell over the final four years or so, so that directors'share 
wealth at the end of the period was less in real terms than at the 
beginning. For example, the chairman's real share wealth fell from 
000,000 to just over E400,000; while the average executive director's 
real share wealth fell / from quarter of a million pounds to under 
Z801000. 
-he wide variations in share wealth between Table 5.8 shows 4. 
industry divisions, with fairly modest share wealth figures in highly 
capitalised industries such as chemicals and minerals where share- 
holdings were small, offsetting any benefits from higher average share 
prices in these industries. At the other extreme, the combination of 
Tnodest share prices and high shareholdings in the services and 
retailing sector gave high directors' sh6re wealth. These results are 
again 'subject to the important qualification that skewness of share 
distribution within most boards gives the benefit of high share 
wealth to only a few directors. 
Turning from directors' share wealth to the capital appreciation 
experienced by directors on their Year-end shareholdings as a 
consequence of share price movements, tables 5.9 and 5.10 show the 
potential benefits which accrue to directors as the market value of 
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their shares increase. Over the first two years as share prices fell 
directors experienced negative capital appreciation an their shares, 
their share values falling by ilOO, 000 in the first year and by about 
half this amount in the second year. Thereafter they experienced 
positive capital appreciation as share prices rose throughout the 
rest of the period, though rises were somewhat spasmodic. For example, 
rapid share-price increases in 
. 
1975/76 and 1977/78 gave large capital 
appreciation of shareholdings in those years*whilst more modest share 
price increases in other years gave smaller appreciation figures. 
Adjusting the capital appreciation figures for inflation reduced them 
dramatically, though modest real appreciation was experienced in all 
except the first two years. 
Capital appreciation varied greatly between industry divisions, 
as table 5.10 indicates, with large capital appreciation in sectors 
like services and retailing where directors' shareholdings were 
larger, and much more modest appreciation in groups like chemicals 
and minerals where average shareholdings were smaller. Indeed in real 
terms the latter group showed no capital appreciation, the real gains 
in the final eight years serving only to offset the substantial falls 
in the first two years. 
In reviewing data on directors' share wealth and capital apprec- 
iation of their shareholdings it must be remembered that these 
represent potential wealth and gains which could only be realised by 
directors selling their shares. This they rarely did whilst they 
were directors. Our evidence showed general stability in directors' 
shareholdings, with very little buying activity apart from the 
exercise of options or subscriptions to occasional scrip issues, and 
few share sales. Any gains appear to be realised by share sales after 
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the directors have retirad, unless shares are passed on to relatives. 
B oth share wealth and share appreciation figures are sensitive 
to share prices and changes in these prices over the period in question. 
Trends in the thirty-share "Financial Times Ordinary Share Index", 
which are graphed periodically in the "Stock Exchange Fact Book", 
showed share prices falling dramatically from March 1973 to an index 
of around 250 in March 1975. Thereafter share prices increased 
falteringly, reaching around 625 by March. 1983 and accelerating to 
over 900 by mid-1984. Average share prices for our sample companies 
follow this same pattern from 1973 to 1983. It is interesting to 
speculate about the effects of the 50% increase in general share 
prices in the fifteen months after the end of the sample period on 
directors' share Wealth and the capital appreciation of thair share- 
holdings. 
5.2 Directors' Remuneration 
The average salary received by directors is shown in table 5.11, 
along with their average dividend income. The chairman's salary more 
than doubled over the period from E22,000 per year to E57,000 per 
year. This compared unfavourably with the highest-paid director, 
whose salary was larger and rose much more rapidly. This reflects the 
presence of part-time. non-executive chairman an some company boards 
whose lower salaries bring down the average chairman's salary compared 
with that of the full-time, highest-paid executive director, The 
same factor explains the disparity between the average director's 
salary and the average executive director's salary, the former group 
which includes part-time, non-executive directors averaging about a 
quarter less salary than the executive directors. 
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The most interesting feature of table 5.11 is the comparison of 
directors' salary incomes with their dividend incomes. In the early 
years of the period the chairman's dividends were half as great 
again as his salary. However, dividends grew less rapidly than 
salaries, so that by the end of the period the chairman's dividends 
were about the same as his salary. This pattern was somewhat less 
marked for the highest-paid directors his dividends being about 
three-fifths of his salary at the start of the period and about 
half his salary at the end. Turning to the total board, the average 
director's dividends were about the same as his salary at the period 
start but were only one-third as large as average salary by the 
period-end, having remained much the same in money terms while 
average salaries roughly tripled. Executive directors' average 
dividends were about two-thirds of their salaries at the beginning 
of the period but fell to about one-fifth of salary by the period- 
end, having declined slightly in money terms whila salaries tripled. 
Nevertheless, even though dividends had declined vis-a-vis salaries 
over the period they still represented a sizeable proportion of an 
average director's income. 
Directors' salary incomes are often matched by the capital 
appreciation of their shareholdings, as a comparison of tables 5.11 
and 5.9 shows. For example, for the period as a whole the chairman 
experienced average capital appreciation of E91,000 per year on his 
shares whilst his salary averaged only E35,000 per year. However, 
the chairman's capital appreciation varied considerably from year 
to Year as share prices fluctuated, ranging from capital depreciation 
of E259,000 in the first year to capital appreciation of E252,000 in 
the final year. Much the same pattern was evident in the remuner- 
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ation of the highest-paid director, his capital appreciation for the 
period as a whole averaging E52,000 per year, compared with his 
salary of E44,000, though again with considerable year to year 
variation in capital appreciation. For the board as a whole capital 
appreciation averaged E20,000. per year over- the period, compared with 
average salaries of 121,000 per year. Focussing upon executive 
dire I ctors. their smaller shareholdings gave an average capital 
appreciation of only E18,000 per year over the period, compared with 
an average salary o-f E28,000. 
Putting together information on directors' salaries, dividends 
and capital appreciation an shareholdings, it was apparent that the 
combined performance-related remuneration components (dividends and 
capital appreciation) tend to dwarf salaries in the remuneration 
package. over the period as a whole the chairman's dividends and 
capital appreciation averaged around E130,000 per year compared witt) 
average salary of E35,000 per year. The highest-paid director's 
remuneration pacKage had mord-modest proportions with combined 
dividends and capital appreciation of E75,000 per year, compared 
with salary of 144,000 per year. For the board as a whole the 
average director's dividends and capital appreciation came to 
E31,000 per year compared with salary of around E21,000. Only for 
executive directors did the two groups of remuneration match, the 
average executive director's dividends and capital appreciation of 
E28,000 per year exactly matching his annual salary. 
Industry differences in remuneration were quite marked, as 
table 5.12 shows. Chairmen of the (generally larger) chemicals and 
minerals companies got approximately twice as big an average salary 
as chairmen of services and retailing or construction companies. 
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On the other hand, chairmen of chemical and mineral companies had 
I much smaller shareholdings and 
dividends than chairmen of services 
and retailing companies, their dividends averaging only one-quarter 
those of chairmen of services companies. Consequently, the combined 
salary and dividend income of chairmen of chemical companies averaged 
only E71,000 per year, compared with E104,000 per year combined income 
received by service company chairmen. This disparity was even more 
marked if capital appreciation of shareholdings was taken into 
account. Adding the capital appreciation figures from table 5.10 to 
the salary and dividend information in table 5.12, we found that 
chairmen of chemicals companies received total remuneration of 
E86,000 per year on average, while chairmen of services companies 
had total remuneration of E316,000 per year. 
Comparing salaries with the combined performance-related 
remuneration components (dividends and capital appreciation) chairmen 
of chemical companies had a larger salary'CE53,000) than share-related 
income (E32,000)- while chairmen of services companies had a smaller 
salary U27,000) and a larger share-related income CE289,000). It 
would seem plausible that proprietorial involvement by the chairman 
is likely to be more marked in companies falling into the latter 
group than in companies in the former sector. Companies in the 
other industry divisions lay between these two extremes with a more 
even balance of salary and share-related income. 
The remuneration patterns described in the previous paragraph 
for company chairmen applied to much the same extent to the highest- 
paid director. The highest-paid director in a chemicals company 
received twice the salary of the highest-paid director of a services 
company, but less than one-fifth the dividend income and less than 
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one-twentieth the capital appreciation. Consequently, his performance- 
related income was only one-quarter as large as his salary, while the 
highest-paid director of a services company had performance-related 
income over five times as large as his salary. 
Much the same pattern emerged when we focussed upon the average 
director's remuneration. The average director in a chemicals company 
had 
: : 
'a salary of E26,000 per year, dividends of E5.000 and capital 
appreciation of E5,000 per year; while the average director in a 
services company had salary of E18,000, dividends of E19,000 and 
capital appreciation E41,000 per year. Executive directors of 
chemicals companies averaged E39,000 per year in salary and a 
further E8,000 in dividends and capital appreciationj while the 
executive director of a services company averaged 122,000 in salary 
and E60,000 per year of dividends and capital appreciation. Directors 
in the other industry divisions had remuneration patterns which fell 
between these two limits. 
Table 5.13 shows the distribution of directors, salaries 
analysed over time. The figures suggest that we can talk with some 
confidence about average salaries, for there was only a modest 
variance in the distribution of salaries among members of the board. 
Taking the board as a whole, standard deviations of directors I 
salaries were between half and two-thirds of the average director's 
salary; and the highest-paid director's salary accounted for only 
one-fifth of the total salaries of the average ten-man board, these 
proportions remaining constant throughout the period. Focussing 
specifically upon the executive directors, standard deviations were 
about one-third of the average executive director's salary throughout 
th e period, while the highest-paid director's salary accounted for 
about one-fifth of the total salaries paid to the seven or so 
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executive directors. The narrowing of the distribution of directors' 
salaries within the typical board as we switched from considering the 
whole board to focussing upon executive directors was a direct 
consequence of excluding low paid, part-time directors. 
Variations in the distribution of directors' salaries between 
industry divisions were slight as table 5.14 shows. Total directors' 
salaries for the chemicals and minerals companies were somewhat 
larger reflecting the bigger company boards in this group (see 
table 5.2) and higher average salaries, the converse being the case 
with services and construction companies. Nevertheless, standard 
deviations were half to two-thirds of average salaries for all 
directors in all the industry divisionsi and standard deviations 
were about one-third of average salaries of executive directors for 
all groups. 
It is interesting to compare the distribution of directors' 
salaries shown in tables 5.13 and 5.14 with the distribution of 
directors' shareholdings shown in tables 5.5 and 5.6. Shareholdings 
within the. typical board showed a skewed distribution with the 
largest shareholder owning half to two-thirds of the total shares 
held by the board, leaving the remaining nine or so directors with 
the remainder, and with standard deviations of shareholdings almost 
twice as big as average shareholding. By contrast, salary 
disparities within the typical board were less marked, with the 
highest-paid director's salary accounting for only one-fifth of 
total board salaries and standard deviations of directors' salaries 
amounting to half to two-thirds of average salary. 
Discounting for the effects of inflation, table 5.15 shows how 
directors' real incomes have changed over'time. Though the chairman's 
141 
nominal salary more than doubled over the decade. this failed to 
keep him abreast of the rapid inflation of the period and his real 
income fell from E22,000 to E17,000 per year. Again the growth of 
the chairman's nominal dividends failed to keep pace with inflation 
so that his real dividends fell from E30,000 to E17,000 per year. 
These inflation adjustments did not affect the proportions which 
different income components contributed to the chairman's total 
remuneration, and it remained true that at the period-start the 
chairman's salary was only two-thirds as large as his dividends 
whilst at the period-end his salary and dividends were the same. 
The highest-paid director survived the ravages of inflation 
somewhat better than the chairman, his real salary and real dividends 
each declining by only two or three thousand pounds over the decade. 
.. The average director's real salary fell only slightly over the 
decade while his real dividends fell by two-thirds. Executive 
directors' salaries almost kept pace with inflation over the 
decade, their real salaries falling slightly around the middle of 
the period then recovering towards the end of the decade. By 
contrast, executive directors' real dividends declined rapidly at 
the beginning of the period, stabilised briefly, then fell rapidly 
in the final years to one-third of their original amount. 
Table 5.16 shows much the Same pattern of industry differences 
in real salaries and dividends as typified the nominal incomes of 
table 5.12. 
Tables 5.17 and 5'. 18 analyse employees@ remuneration over time 
and between industries. Table 5.17 shows how the average number of 
UK employees fluctuated a little from period to period in the early 
years and how from 1979/80 numbers employed fell sharply by about 
twenty per-cent. Average wages more than triplod from around 
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El,, SCJO per year to E6,400 per year keEping slightly ahead of the rate 
of inflation, so that real wages remained stable in the first half of 
the period and even grew slightly in the latter half. 
Table 5.18 shows the significant size disparities between 
average numbers of UK employees in different industries. The generally 
large chemical and minerals companies employed two and a half times 
as many people as service and retail companies, despite their more 
capital-intensive operations. General manufacturing companies were 
the largest employers and engineering companies were also big employers. 
Average wages were highest in the chemical and minerals companies, 
reflecting their high skill levels and predominantly full-time male 
workforces; and lowest in the services and retailing companies who 
employ large numbers of unskilled, part-time women workers. 
The relationship between directors' salaries and employees' 
average wages is of particular interest because it gives some indicat- 
ion of salary differentials between directors and the workforce, and 
whether these have changed over time. Table 5.19 shows that salary 
differentials have become compressed over the decade. The chairman's 
average salary was 13.2 times as big as average employees' wages in 
1973/74, but his average salary failed to grow as rapidly as his 
employees, wages so that by 1982/83 his salary was only 9.2 times as 
large as average wages. Similar compression of salary differentials 
can be noted for the highest-paid directbr, the average director and 
the average executive director, each of these finding that their 
salaries had failed to rise as fast as those of employees in general. 
Table 5.20 indicates that there are also marked industry 
differences in salary differentials, directors' salaries as a multiple 
of employees' average wages being larger in industries like chemicals, 
a 
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engineering and manufacturing which have larger numbers of employees. 
This accords with Simon's (1957) hypothesised relationship between 
senior executives' remuneration and numbers of employees. 
Two final tables, 5.21 and 5.22, list some other components of 
directors' remuneration: - company pension contributions paid on 
behalf of executive directors and the number and value of share 
options granted to executive directors. However, it was only possible 
to get pension data for one-third of the sample companiesi and the 
information on options, part-paid an d incentive shares relates only 
to those three-fifths of the sample companies operating such schemes, 
so these tables are much less complete than the previous ones. 
However, they do give some rough indication of the order of magnitude 
of these additional remuneration components evcn if we cannot place 
the same confidence in them as the earlier data. 
Average pension contributions paid to executive directors rose 
from over E2,000 per year in 1973/74 to E9,000 by 1982/831 a four- 
fold increase which more than kept pace with inflation, so that real 
pension contributions rose. Pension contributions seemed to rise in 
sympathy with executive salaries but at a faster rate than salaries 
which increased only threefold from E16,000 to E48,000 Csee table 
5.11). Over the period as a whole pension contributions were 
approximately one-fifth of executive salaries, being slightly less 
than this in early years and a little more in later years. Industry 
variations in executive pension contributions in table 5.22 mirrored 
industry differences in executive salaries shown in table 5.12, 
pension contributions being highest in chemicals and minerals companies 
where salaries were highest and lowest in services and construction 
companies where salaries were lowest. 
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The average number of share options, incentive shares and part- 
paid shares held by executive directors showed a tendency to 
decline 
over time as the rate at which new options were granted'faileq to 
keep pace with the rate at which options lapsed or were exercised to 
acquire shares. Not surprisingly the number of options held fell 
sharply over the first two years for as share prices were falling 
dramatically at this time, options were not worthwhile. However, 
over the final two years options held rose significantly as options 
became more popular again. Appreciation of these options was negative 
in the first two years of declining share prices. then a small 
positive amount each year thereafter. However, the amount of 
appreciation was small compared with directors' salaries or dividends. 
Numbers of optioný held varied considerably between industry groups 
as table 5.22 indicates, ranging from almost 54,000 options for 
executive directors in the services and retailing sector, to a 
quarter of that number for executive directors in the construction 
industry. 
.. 5. *2.1 'Comparison'With'Surveys of Directors' Remuneration 
A number of commercial organisations undertake surveys of 
executive remuneration and evidence from these surveys can provide 
valuable data on salaries, bonuses and the like. The following 
paragraphs outline some of this information for comparison with the 
evidence from our sample. 
The Charterhouse Group undertakes twice-yearly studies of 
directors' remuneration based upon the company reports and accounts 
of over a thousand large companies, supplemented by more detailed 
surveys of salaries and benefits in over a hundred companies. Their 
information for the period 1980 to 1983 shows some close similarities 
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ýith our own results for the comparabl. e period. Their median salary 
and bonus figures for the highest-paid director were slightly lower 
than our own, increasing from around E32.000 per year to E50,000 per 
year. This reflects their larger sample which encompassed smaller 
companies than are included in our sample. Like our own sample, 
salaries showed big variations between industries and even between 
companies in the same industry. 
Two-thirds of smaller companies in the Charterhouse surveys had 
bonus plans for executive directors, these typically adding 15% to 
straight salary when performance warranted bonus. However, bonus 
schemes were less common in large companies, only 30% of big companies 
having plans. Company pension contributions for executive directors 
averaged around 20% of salary and bonus payments. ranging from 15% 
of salary for smaller companies to 25% or more of salary for larger 
concerns. This corresponds closely with our own pension findings. 
Over the early 1980's several consecutive Charterhouse surveys 
reported that approximately 20% of companies had executive share 
schemes, but in 1983 the proportion of companies with share schemes 
rose to over 40%. reflecting the increased popularity of share 
incentives for executive directors. 
Reward Regional Surveys produced the first of its annual surveys 
of directors' rewards in Autumn 1981, published jointly with the 
Institute of Directors (DJ-xon M., 1981). The survey reported on the 
remuneration of between 2,000 and 3,000 executive directors of UK 
companies, and it showed that the median annual salary and bonus of 
the managing director was around E20,000 in Autumn 1980, E23,000 in 
1981 and E29,000 in 1982. These figures were much lower than our own, 
but since almost 90% of their sample companies were small, with 
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annual sales less than E50 million. this was hardly surprising. 
Focussing on sample companies with sales of E75 million a year or 
more, the managing_ director's median salary was 
E28,000 per year in 
1981 and E32,000 in 1982, more in accord with our figures. Remunerat- 
ion levels varied between industries, like our own results. Their 
surveys also touched upon performance bonuses, pointing out that 
many directors looked for 10% to 20% of their total remuneration 
from performance or- profit-related bonus schemes. 
A number of other arganisations publish information an executive 
remuneration. Lloyd Incomes Research studies managerial pay and 
perks in over one hundred UK manufacturing and service companies 
every other year. The latest comparable survey showed that the 
median annual salary of executive directors in 1982/83 was E21.000, 
ranging from E23,000 for finance directors, to only E18,000 for 
production directors (Dixon M., 1983). 
Inbucon produces an annual survey of-salaries and fringe benefits 
of executives. which showed the average executive director receiving 
around E26,000 per year in the year to July 1981, with average bonuses 
working out at around 11% of basic salary for those 37% of executives 
entitled to them (Inbucon, 1982). In 1983 the Labour Research 
Department undertook a survey which showed some narrowing of salary 
differentials between directors and employees between 1979 and 1982, 
but the incomplete nature of the information presented makes direct 
comparison difficult (Wintour, 1983). 
HAY-MSL consultants also produce occasional reports on executive 
remuneration. One of their earlier reports was a background paper 
for the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth 
(1976). This suggested that about one-third of UK companies provided 
incentive payments for senior executives. However, two-thirds of 
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these incentive-paying companies had some form of foreign ownership, 
particularly North American ownership, payment by results being much 
more common there. 
One survey published in The Economist (1982) used company annual 
accounts information from Datastream to examine the chief executive's 
pay and its relationship to performance. Their data showed wide 
industry differences in the median annual pay of the chief 
executives of the 100 largest British companies in 1981/82, ranging 
-from over E130,000 year for chief executives of oil companies to 
just over E50,000 year for chief executives of retailing companies. 
These figures accord closely with our own. The chief executive's pay 
was then related to company sales that year and the average annual 
return on shareholderý' capital between 1978 and 1981. Their results 
suggested that there was no obvious connection between the chief 
executive's salary and the performance of the companies they run, 
and that company size was often a better guide to the chief executive's 
salary. 
5. '3 'Company Performance 
Companies appeared to grow rapidly over the ten-year period, 
though progress in real terms was much more. modest once allowances 
were made for the effects of high inflation rates. Table 5.23 shows 
an almost fivefold increase in average company sales over the periodi 
a fourfold increase in net tangible assetsi and a threefold increase 
in net profit. By contrast, real sales increased by only fifty 
per-cent over the ten years; real net assets increased by fifteen 
per-cent; and real profit barely increased at all. 
Company profitability declined significantly over the ten years. 
Return on long term capital employed fell a little over the firnt half 
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of the period then deteriorated much more rapidly over the latter 
half, registering only two-thirds its former average by 1982/83. 
Return on equity was rather more volatile because of the influence 
of rapidly changing share prices on the denominator of the return on 
equity equation, but it too registered a significant fall over the 
latter half of the period. 
-Company size varied greatly between industry divisions as table 
5.24 shows. Chemicals and minerals companies had average sales of 
J1.8 million, two and a half times the sales of manufacturing companies 
and nine times the sales of construction and building companies or 
services and retailing companies. This reflects the massive sales 
of the very large chemicals and minerals companies included, such as 
BP and ICI, which dwarfed the smaller companies in the sample. The 
same disparities showed up in the net tangible assets figures. 
Chemicals and minerals companies averaged over one million pounds 
of net assets, because of their great size and capital-intensive 
operations, whilst smaller, less capital-intensive companies in 
retailing and services had under E100,000 of net assets. Net profit 
figures also reflected the size disparities, chemical and mineral 
companies earning an average over 1300,000 per year profit whilst 
companies in the other industry divisions made only one tenth of 
this profit. 
Similar size disparities between the large and small companies 
show up in the inf lation-adjusted figures in table 5.24. Real sales 
of chemicals and minerals companies were two and a half times as big 
as real sales of manufacturing companies and eight times as large 
as real sales of services and retailing companies. Real not assets 
of chemicals and minerals companies were more than ten times as large 
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as real net assets of services and retailing companies, with an even 
greater disparity in real profit between the two groups. 
Once the effects of size are discounted, as in the calculation 
of return on capital, then "bottom-line" financial performance can be 
evaluated. Profitability ranking showed a different industry order. 
Chemicals and minerals companies earned a slightly poorer return on 
capital than services and retailing companies, as table 5.24 shows. 
General manufacturing companies had the poorest return on capital of 
all, engineering and construction companies doing slightly better. 
Return on equity figures, which reflect both profit and share prices, 
showed a different profitability ordering. 
Further dimensions of the financial performance of sample 
companies is recorded-in table 5.25 where results are stated on a 
"per share" basis. Total issued shares doubled over the period, 
caused by a modest number 'Of share issues designed to raise new capital. 
and a much larger number of bonus issues to existing shareholders, 
reflecting the ploughing back of company profits. Net tangible 
assets per share grew by 30% over the period because of new invest- 
ment financed largely from retained profits. Share prices more than 
reflected this investment, falling rapidly over the first two years 
as share prices plummetted in the post oil-crisis period, but 'rising 
overall by almost 50%. However, market sentiment tended to discount 
the asset backing of shares. share prices being only half of net 
tangible assets per share. 
Profit per share rose by over 50% over the first half of the 
period then fell dramatically over the second half, returning to about 
the same amount in money terms. Price-earnings ratios varied 
considerably over time with profit per share ranging from over 60% 
of share price in the second year when share prices were generally 
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depressed, to around a quarter of share price in the final year. 
Dividends grew modestly over the first seven years of the period, 
then fell back a little over the final three years. 
Dividends per share rose then fell in sympathy with profit per 
share. However, payout ratios tended to change in the latter part of 
the period as companies strove to maintain dividends in the face of 
deteriorating profit. Over the first six years companies paid out 
around 17% of profit per share in the form of dividends, retaining 
the rest, while over the final four years companies were paying out 
over a quarter of profit per share in dividends. 
Once the effects of rapid inflation are allowed for then real 
performance shows a much more dramatic decline, as table 5.25 shows. 
The 30% growth in-net 'tangible assets per share failed to keep pace 
with inflation, so that real capital per shara fell modestly over the 
first half of the period and much more rapidly thereafter, reaching 
about 40% of its original amount by the end of the period. Real 
share prices fell dramatically cver the first two years, recovered 
a little in the middle years then declined again thereafter, ending 
at under half their original level. Real profit per share fell by 
about a quarter over the first half of the period, then by a further 
50% over the latter half, leaving real profit of only twelve pence 
per share at the end of the period. Real dividend rates fell by 
almost a quarter over the first half of the period and by almost 50% 
thereafter, paralleling the decline in real profit per share. 
Table 5.26 highlights the considerable industry variations in 
financial performance. The 
. 
greater size and capital intensity of the 
chemicals and minerals companies, meant that they had many more 
issued shares than the services and retailing companies, or the 
construction companies; and net tangible assets per share around twice 
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as big as the services and construction companies. The large asset 
backing per share and generally "blue chip" image of the large 
chemicals and minerals companies no doubt accounted for the fact 
that their average share price was 50% higher than that of the 
services and construction companies. The profit per share of chemicals 
and minerals companies was over twice as great as that of services or 
construction companies and they paid twice as big a dividend per 
share. 
Real differences between the industry groups reflect much the 
same pattern as shows up in the nominal data. Chemical and mineral 
companies had larger real net tangible assets per share, higher real 
share prices. bigger real profit per share and larger real dividends 
than services and-retailing companies and construction companies. 
The manufacturing companies lay between these two extremes. 
5.4 Remuneration and Performance 
Only a small proportion pf the various regression runs described 
at the end of chapter four will be reported in detail here, these 
regression results being reproduced in tables 5.27 to 5.35. Results 
for the majority of the regression runs will be touched upon towards 
the end of the chapter but less comprehensively. Wherever possible 
these results will be compared with those of previous researchers as 
reported in chapter three. 
Table 5.27 shows the regression results for eight possible I 
independent variables when applied to the Pooled cross-sectional and 
time-series data pith 973 observations, using the general form of 
equation 4.1, namely: 
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Remuneration =a+b. Sales + c. Assets + d. Employees + e. Profit 
f. Return on Capital + g. Return on Equity 
Industry + i. Year ....................... 4.1 
The first equation of table 5.27 linked the Chairman's salary 
with a number of size variables (sales. net assets and employees)j 
some profit variables (profit, return on capital and return on 
equity)j and two background variables (industry and year), in a 
linear additive relationship. Virtually all of these, apart from 
return on equity, proved to be valid predictors of ChairTnan's salary 
insofar as the calculated t values of their regression coefficients 
were significantly different from zero at the 0.01 probability level. 
The calculated value for overall F was also significant at the 1% 
probability level showing that the overall relationship between 
ChairTnan's salary and all eight variables together was statistically 
significant. Finally the coefficient of determination (R 
2) 
was 0.51, 
implying that 51% of the total variation in Chairman's salary could 
be explained by variations in'-the eight independent variables. 
Similar results obtained for the Highest-Paid Director's salary 
(equation 33, the Average Director's salary Cequation 5) and the 
Average Executive Director's salary (equation 7). In all three of 
these equations most of the size variables proved to be significant 
except for number of employees, and most of the profit variables were 
significant apart from return on equity. Industry and Year proved to 
be significant in all four equations. Coefficients of determination 
(R 21 were quite high for all four salary equations, ranging from 0.37 
for the Highest-Paid Director's salary to 0.58 for Executive Director's 
salary. 
When a broader definition of remuneration embracing salary and 
153 
dividends was taken as the dependent variable (equations 2,4,6 and 
8). R2 dropped sharply compared with the narrower, sala . ry-only 
variable Cequations 1,3,5 and 7), the coefficients of determination 
ranging from 0.15 for the Chairman's salary and dividends to 0.28 for 
Executives' salary and dividends. Overall F values also fell markedly 
for broader remuneration measureq, though the calculated F's in equations 
2,4,6 and 8 were all still significant at the . 1% probability level. 
In these latter equations for broad remuneration most of the independent 
variables remained significant at the 1% level. 
Pooled cross-sectional and time-series data can give rise to 
problems of interpretation in regression work, as Deilman (1983) 
pointed out, because of variations in the variables over time. This 
variability was colnfirýmed in Roberts' results (1959) when he found 
that directors' compensation varied modestly from year to year, sales 
were slightly more variable from year to year and profits were much 
more volatile. This prompted Roberts to use four-year average figures 
for the variables in his regressions. To test whether variability 
over time has much effect on the estimated regression coefficients and 
their t values a number of regressions were tried which fitted 
equations to each year's data separately, using equation set 4.1 as 
a model. 
The results of one such regression run which employed Chairman's 
salary as the dependent variable are reproduced in table 5.28. 
Coefficients of determination for each year varied slightly, R2 
ranging from 0.38 in year one to 0.53 in year nine'. Overall F values 
also varied slightly, though they were all significant at the 0.01 
probability level. Few of the independent variables were consistently 
related to Chairman's salary. Only the constant and the regression 
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coefficient of the industry variable had t values which were statistic- 
ally significant for virtually all of the ten years. The sales 
coefficient was significant in three of the ten years, as was the net 
assets coefficient. The profit coefficient and the return an capital 
coefficient were each significant in four of the ten years. The 
coefficients of numbers of employees and return on equity were not 
significant in any years. 
The inconsistencies in the significance of regression coefficients 
in table 5.28 are hardly surprising given the turbulent industrial 
environment of the 1970's and 1980's, with rapidly falling share 
prices in the early years of the period, falling profitability, and 
large reductions in the workforce in the latter years. indeed the 
results presented earlier in section 5.3 should lead us to expect 
such variability. This variability casts doubt upon any general- 
isations drawn from regression models which concentrate upon the 
short-run relationship between directors' remuneration and company 
performance in a single year, --such as the Royal Commission Study (1976). 
and the Smyth, Boyes and Peseau study (1975)j or even a few isolated 
years' data such as the Meeks and Whittington survey (1975), the Cosh 
study (1975). and Cox and Shauger's survey C1973). It may also serve 
to explain why McKean and Monsen C19753 preferred a model relating 
remuneration to cumulative performance rather than current performance. 
Long-run_ relationships between remuneration and performance should be 
more stable. 
In order 'to focus on long-run relationships, period averages were 
calculated for each of the independent and dependent variables for 
each company, covering the whole ten-year period or the life of the 
company concerned where this was less than ten years. Cross-sectional 
regressions could then be performed on this long period average data, 
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to get at the long-run relationships involved. This also had the 
beneficial effect of avoiding the technical problems involved in using 
pooled cross-sectional and time-series data. It is interesting to note 
that only two of the studies reported in chapter three used pooled data 
(McKean and Monsen, 1975 and Fatemi, Ang and Chua, 1983). 
Table 5.29 is similar in style to table 5.27, relating independent 
size, profit and background variables to various directors' remunerat- 
ion measures, using equation set 4.1 as a model. However, because 
table 5.29 uses period-average data rather than pooled data it records 
long-run relationships rather than short-run ones. By and large the 
regression equations for average variables shown in table 5.29 gave 
a better fit with the data than the pooled variables shown in 
table 5.27, the coefficients of determination being considerably 
larger in most cases. For example, the R2 for the chairman's salary 
2 
increased from 0.51 to 0.55 while the R for the chairman's salary 
and dividends rose from 0.15 to 0.22. 
The coefficients of determination in table 5.29 showed a distinct 
pattern with the R2 values falling dramatically as the remuneration 
measure was broadened to include dividends as well as salary, then 
stabilising as the remuneration measure was broadened still further 
to include share appreciation as well. This accords with Lewallen and 
Huntsman's (1970) finding that their narrower remuneration definition 
gave better R2 values, and Cox and Shauger's (19733 finding that R2 
dropped from around 0.5 to 0.4 as broader remuneration measures were 
employed. Overall F values for all twelve equations were significant 
at the 0.01 probability level. 
The significance of the regression coefficients of the independent 
variables also showed a distinct pattern. Concentrating on salary 
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alone as the dependent variable (equations 1,4.7 and 101, the 
coefficients of the size variables (sales and net assets) tended to be 
significant, as did the profit coefficient and the coefficient of 
industryl while the coefficients of employee numbers, return on 
capital and return an equity were rarely significant. . 
At the other 
extreme, if the broadest remuneration measure was taken as the 
dependent variable (equations 3.6.9 and 12), only the coefficients 
of return on capital and return on equity tended to be significant, 
the size variables not counting as significant explanatory variables 
in any of these equations. If the intermediate remuneration measure 
of salary plus dividends was taken as the dependent variable 
(equations 2,5,8 and 111, the coefficients of profit and return on 
capital were significant in all four equations, whilst a few size 
coefficients such as the sales and net assets coefficients were 
significant in some of the equations. 
The pattern displayed in the results of table 5.29 shows up much 
more clearly when the number of independent variables is reduced to 
just two: - sales as the size variable and return on capital as the 
profitability variable. using equation 4.2 as a model: 
Remuneration =a+b. Sales + c. Return on Capital ........... 4.2 
Table 5.30 reports the results of stepwise regression runs 
using period average data. These first introduced sales as an 
explanatory variable then later added return on capital as a second 
explanatory variable. If directors' salaries were taken as the 
dependent variable (equations 1.4,7 and 10) then sales alone served 
as a virtually complete predictor of directors' salaries. The 
addition of return on capital as an . extra explanatory variable 
added very little or nothing to the goodness Of Sit of the equations, 
4e, 
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the coefficients of determination remaining at around the 0.2 to 0.3 
level. This point was underlined by the t statistics of the regression 
coefficients, only the coefficients of the constant and the sales 
coefficients being significant at the 1%. level in equations 1,4, 
7 and 10, while return on capital was not significant in any of these 
equations. 
By contrast, for models incorporating the broader dependent 
variable, salary plus dividends (equations 2,5,8 and 11 in table 
5.30). and the formulations employing the broadest dependent variable, 
salary plus dividends and share appreciation (equations 3, S. 9 and 123, 
sales had negligible effect while return on capital predominated. 
For these equations embodying a broad remuneration measure as the 
dependent variable, the initial introduction of sales as an 
independent variable left the explanatory powor of the equations low, 
with coefficients of determination (R 
2) 
of 0.07 at best. Addition of 
return on capital employed as a second independent variable raised 
the explanatory power of the equati( 
to around 0.2. The t statistics of 
underlined the relative explanatory 
the broader remuneration equations. 
where broader remuneration measures 
3n significantly, with R2 rising 
the regression coefficients 
power of the two variables in 
In none of the eight equations 
were used was the t statistic 
of the sales coefficient statistically significant, whilst in seven 
of the eight equations the t values of the return on capital 
coefficients were statistically significant at the 1% probability 
level. 
Comparing the coefficients of determination in tables 5.29 and 
5.30 it was noticeable that R2 fell sharply by about half in all 
twelve equations as the number of independent variables was reduced 
from seven to two. Deletion of net assets and profit was likely 
0 Iss 
to have little effect on R2 since these two variables were highly 
correlated with sales which was retained in the two-variable equations, 
correlations between the three being in the 0.95 to 0.98 range. 
Again, deleting the employees variable should have had little effect, 
since this correlated moderately with the retained variable sales and 
was rarely statistically significant in the seven-variable equations 
anyways 
The explanation for the across the board fall in R2 as we move 
from table 5.29 to 5.30 would appear to lie in the exclusion of the 
industry variable which was statistically significant in'six of the 
twelve seven-variable equations. This underlines the importance of 
industry differences in remuneration pointed out earlier in section 
5.2 and confirms the importance of industry as an important 
explanatory variable. Other researchers such as Williamson (1963) 
and Yarrow (1972) have argued that industry has a significant effect 
on compensation, and Yarrow's different results for two broad industry 
groups led him to argue that there shoulý be separate regressions 
_ -for 
each_industry. 
In the present regression results the effects of industry upon 
remuneration ref lect, in part, the ef f ects of dif f erences in company size and 
directors' shareholdings. The industry variable roughly ranks industry groups 
in reverse order of average company size, industries like chemicals where 
companies have the largest sales and assets having the lowest rank and 
industries like services where companies have smaller sales and assets 
having a higher rank. Consequently if directors' salaries are determined by 
company size then we would expect to find a relationship between salaries 
and industry, with a negative sign preceding the parameter estimate, 
reflecting this ranking of the industry variable in size terms. This is 
conf irmed in table - 5.29 where the industry Parameter is 
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significant and negative in equations 1,4,7 and 10. In addition, the industry 
variable ranks industry groups in direct order of directors' shareholdings, 
with industries like chemicals where directors own a small proportion of 
shares being ranked lowest and industries like services where directors, 
shareholdings are large being ranked highest. Consequently we would expect 
that as the remuneration definition is broadened to include dividends and 
share appreciation, industry type would become more important in 
explaining broad remuneration with a positive parameter estimate reflecting 
this ranking. This is confirmed in table 5.29 by the parameter sizes and 
signs of equations 2 and 3,5 and 6,8 and 9, and II and 12. A similar pattern 
can be detected in table 5.32 where the parameter of the industry variable 
becomes larger and changes from negative to positive as the remuneration 
definition is broadened. 
The above two factors (company size and directors, shareholdings) are 
likely to be interdependent over the long term for we would expect that the 
need to finance acquisition of large net assets in industries like chemicals 
would result' in dilution of founders'/directors' shareholdings, while the 
smaller asset requirement of companies in service industries allows 
founders/directors to retain larger residual shareholdings. The generally 
high profitability of chemicals and minerals companies in table 5.24 is a 
product of high profit margins (profit/sales ratios) reflecting their high 
value added, and their capital intensive operations requiring large amounts 
of net assets to generate each El of sales (sales/asset ratios). In such 
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industries the large capital requirements inevitably lead to small directors' 
shareholdings through dilution. By contrast, the high profitability of 
services and retailing companies in table 5.24 is the product of slim profit 
margins (profit/sales ratios) and low capital requirements, using small 
amounts of net assets to generate sales turnover (sales/assets ratios). In 
these industries directors have needed little additional external capital and 
so the directors have been able to retain larger shareholdings. 
However not too much significance should be attached to the precise 
values of the industry parameter estimates in the regression tables because 
the sample sizes were very small, with as few as ten companies in the 
smallest industry group, and because entering the five-category industry 
variable in the regression as a continuous variable gives inexact industry 
parameters. 
Turning from the significance of the partial regression coefficients 
for the moment, it is interesting to look at the coefficients themselves and 
at what they tell us about the effect on remuneration of changes in the 
independent variables. When salary only was taken as the' dependent 
variable (equations 1,4, Tand 10 in table 5.30) the constant terms were all 
positive, implying that directors' salaries rise less than in proportion to 
changes in the independent variable, here sales. By contrast, for equations 
using a broad remuneration measure as the dependent variable (equations 3, 
6j 9 and 12) the constant term was negativet suggesting that directors' total 
remuneration rises more than in proportion to changes in the independent 
variable, here return on capital. 
z 
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The signs of the partial regression coefficients of the two 
independent variables also provide useful insights into their effects 
on directors' remuneration. For the salary-only equations in table 
5.30 Cl, 4,7 and 10) the regression coefficient of the sales. variable 
had a positive sign, so that increases in sales should lead to increases 
in salaries; while the regression coefficient of the return on capital 
variable was negative, implying that improvements in return on capital 
would act to reduce directors' salaries. For broader remuneration 
measures the signs of the two independent variables were reversed. 
For example, taking the broadest remuneration measure (equations 3, 
6,9 and 12) the partial regression coefficients of the sales variable 
were all negative, so that broad remuneration declines with increasing 
sales; while the regression coefficient of return on capital was 
positive, suggesting that improvements in return on capital will lead 
to increases in broad remuneration. 
The size of the partial regression coefficients can also be 
interesting insofar as they suggest something about the magnitude of 
the effect on the dependent variable of changes in each of the 
independent variables. In principle, the partial regression 
coefficient reflects the slope of the regression line and shows the 
expected change in directors' remuneration resulting from a one-unit 
change in one of the independent variables, the effects of the other 
independent variable being held constant. Thus the size of the sales 
and return on capital coefficients should give some indication of 
their'relative effects on remuneration. However, the relative effects 
of the two independent variables are hard to gauge when they are 
measured in different units as is the case here, sales and remunerat- 
ion being measured in EOOO's while return on capital is expressed as a 
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percentage. To overcome this problem one can standardise both the 
independent and dependent variables so that they have unit variance, 
their standard deviations both being equal to one. This makes the 
partial regression coefficients directly equivalent to each other. 
Standardisation also has the effect of setting the constant term to 
zero, allowing it to be omitted. 
IThe standardised regression coefficients or beta weights generated 
by ýransforming the equations in table 5.30 are reproduced in table 
5.31. Whilst these beta weights do not enable one to estimate 
remuneration values in the original raw value units, they do allow one 
to compare the relative effect on directors' remuneration of each of 
the independent variables. The beta coefficients indicate the number 
of standard deviation units change in remuneration that would be 
predicted when sales or return on capital change by one standard 
deviation unit. For the salary-only equations Cl, 4,7 and 101 the 
standardised regression coefficients for sales were large and 
positive whilst those for return on capital were small and negative, 
highlighting the predominance of sales in affecting directors', 
salaries. By contrast, in the equations which employed a broad remuner- 
ation measure as the dependent variable (3,6,9 and 12), the standard- 
ised regression coefficients for sales were small and negative whilst 
those for return on capital were large and positive, underlining the 
predominance of return on capital in affecting directors' total 
remuneration. 
A number of previous researchers employed linear additive models 
to represent the relationship between directors' remuneration and 
company performance, and it is interesting' to compare results so far 
with theirs. McKean and Monsen (1975) examined the effects of Sales, 
Assets and Profits on the chief executive's salary in large US 
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companies, finding that R2 was as high as 
0.71 when all three variables 
were included. This was a somewhat better 
fit than our own results for 
equations I and 3 in table 5.27 which offered 
the nearest comparable 
model. On the other hand, SmYth, Boyes and Peseau 
(1975) related 
Sales and Profits of large US companies to the average executive's 
salary with an R2 value of only 0.21, somewhat lower than our result 
for equation 10 in table 5.30. 
Since the majority of previous studies adopted varieties of 
logarithmic models it is necessary to apply logarithmic model 
specifications to the present data if comparisons with previous 
research are to be made. Various alternative models were employed 
linking logarithms of all the independent variables with logs of the 
dependent variable (equation sets 4.13 and 4.14)j mixtures of 
logarithmic and natural independent variables with logs of the 
dependent variable (equation sets 4.17 and 4.18)j and logarithms 
of all the independent variables with the natural values of the 
dependent variable (equation 'sets 4.15 and 4.16). 
Tables 5.32 and 5.33 present the results of one set of regression 
runs using period average data. These link the logarithms of size- 
related independent variables and the natural values of profitability 
independent variables to the natural values of dependent remuneration 
variables, using equation 4.19 and 4.20 as models: 
Remuneration =-a + b. log Sales + c'. log Assets 
d. log Employees + e. log Profit 
+ f. Return on Capital + g. Return on Equity 
+ h. Industry ................................. 4.19 
Remuneration -a+b. log Sales + c. Return on Capital ....... 4.20 
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The first table includes seven independent variables whilst the 
second table reports the results for a summary model including just 
two of the original seven variables. 
The results in table 5.32 were somewhat inconclusive, only the 
partial regression coefficients of the constant term and the industry 
variable being consistently significant in most of the equations, 
again underlining the importance of industry differences in remunerat- 
ion. Coefficients of log sales, log net assets and log employees 
variables were significant in some of the salary-only equations 
C1 and 7). while the coefficient of the return on capital variable 
was significant in some of the broad remuneration equations CS and 8). 
Coefficients of determination CR 
2) in table 5.32 were larger 
than the comparable coefficients in table 5.29, suggesting that taKing 
the logarithms of the size variables rather than their natural 
values helped improve the fit of the equations. This tends to support 
the views of Roberts (1959) and Baker (1969) that a logarithmic or 
semi-logarithmi-C specification of the equations givesa better fit. 
The results of table 5.32 repeat a familiar pattern. As before, 
the. coefficients of determination were reduced by about half as the 
dependent remuneration variable was expanded to include dividends as 
well as salary. The problem of multicollinearity was not helped much 
by logarithmic transformations, the logarithms of sales, net assets, 
-) profit and employees 
having correlation coefficients in the 0.8 to 
0.9 range. Consequently, any one size variable could stand as proxy 
for all the others, allowing the number of independent variables in 
the equation to be reduced. 
Comparing the coefficients of determination in table 5.32 with 
those in table 5.33 it can be seen that there was some loss of 
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"goodness of fit" in moving from seven independent variables to just 
two, the R2 values falling by about one-third, largely as a result of 
2 
removing the industry variable. Again the R values were reduced by 
half as the remuneration variable was expanded to include dividends, 
The pattern of significance of the individual partial regression 
coefficients was a little clearer in the shorter model 4.20 used in 
table 5.33. For the equations employing a narrow Csalary) dependent 
variable the partial regression coefficient of the sales variable 
was significant in all four equations (1,3.5 and 7). whilst the 
coefficient of return on capital was not significant in any of these 
equations. By contrast, 'inthe equations utilising salary and dividends 
as the dependent variable C2,4,6 and 8). the partial regression 
coefficients of sales were significant in only two of the equations 
while the return an capital coefficient was significant in three of 
the four equations. 
Comparison of these results with those of previous researchers 
was difficult given the variety of log-linear, semi-log and partial 
logarithmic models adopted by different researchers. Only for the 
Meeks and Whittington (1975) results could an exact comparison be made. 
They took the salary of the highest-paid director in large UK quoted 
companies and related this to the logarithm of sales and the natural 
value of return on capital, the coefficient of determination (R 
23 for 
this model being 0.39. This was directly comparable to equation 3 
in table 5.33 Where the goodness of fit of the equation was almost 
identical to that of Meeks and Whittington, R2 being 0.37. 
Cosh (19751 looked at return on capital in large UK quoted 
companies, but he took the logarithm of net assets rather than log 
sales as his size variable, though given the high correlation between 
sales and net assets in our data (0.971 this should have made little 
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differ6nce. However, Cosh also took the log of the highest-paid 
director's salary rather than its natural value, arriving at a coeff- 
icient of determination of 0.51 for his model, compared with 0.37 
for our roughly equivalent model (equation 3 in table 5.33). To be 
precise the highest-paid director's salary equation in equation set 
4.18 in table 5.36 provided a more exact comparison, this having an 
21 R of 0.39. 
Cox and Shauger (1973) took the logarithm of-the broadly- 
defined remuneration of the chief executive and related this to log 
sales and return on equity arriving at an R2 value of about 0.4 for 
their US data. This specification was roughly comparable with equation 
3 in table 5.33 based on equation set 4.20 but the differences in 
variables used preclude exact matching. In fact, the highest-paid 
director's salary and dividends equation in equation set 4.18 in table 
5.36 provided a closer match. 
BaKer's (1969) model related the President's salary with log 
sales and log profit, giving -an R2 of 0.76, higher than the coefficient 
of determination in equation 1 in table 5.33, a roughly comparable 
model. More precisely, the Chairman's salary equation in equation 
set 4.16 in table 5.36 offered a closer match with an R2 of 0.44. 
Finally Roberts (1959) took the log of the highest-paid director's 
salary and related this to log sales and log return on capital with 
an R2 of 0.59 for his US data. This again was roughly comparable 
with equation 3 in table 5.33; but more accurately should have been 
compared with the Highest-Paid Director's salary equation in 
equation set 4.14 in table 5.36, where R2 was 0.39. 
A number of previous researchers, notably Lewellen and 
Huntsman (1970), divided all the independent and dependent variables 
by net assets in order to reduce the collinearity between sales and 
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i 
profits and improve the fit of the equation. Following this precedent, 
size-adjusted variables were computed and substituted for the original 
variables in various regression runs, using equations 4.21 and 4.22 
as models: 
Remuneration a+b. Sales + c. Employees- + d. Profit 
Net Assets Net Assets Net Assets Net Assets 
e. Industry ................................ 4.21 
Remuneration =a+b. 
Sales + c. Return on Capital .... 4.22 
Net Assets Not Assets 
This restatement of the model had the desired effect of reducing 
collinearity between size-adjusted sales, profits and employees, 
correlations between these falling to around 0.1 to 0.4. The results 
of one set of regression computations based on equation sets 4.21 
and 4.22 and using period average data are recorded in tables 5.34 
and 5.35. The coefficients of determination for the four-variable 
equations in table 5.34 were. generally higher than those for equations 
containing non size-adjusted variables recorded in table 5.29. The 
improvements in R2 were particularlym'arked for the broader remunerat- 
ion equations encompassing dividends as well as salaries. The 
improvement in R2 was even more dramatic for the shortened two- 
variable equations, as can be seen by comparing the coefficients 
of determination recorded in table 5.35 with those in table 5.30. 
The results presented in table 5.34 conform to a now-familiar 
pattern. As attention was switched from salary only as the dependent 
variable (equations 1,3,5 and 7) to salary-plus-dividends as the 
dependent variable (equations 2.4,6 and 8) the R2 values showed a 
tendency to fall. More specifically, in the salary-only equations 
the partial regression coefficients of the size variables, sales 
166 
and employees, tended to be significant in all four equations; while 
the coefficient of the profitability variable was not significant in 
any of the four equations. By contrast, for the salary-p lu s -dividends 
equations the coefficient of the profitability variable was significant 
in three of the four equations, while the coefficients of sales and 
employees were less frequently significant. Much the same pattern 
emerged in table 5.35, though the results were less clear cut. 
Comparison of these size-adjusted results with those of previous 
researchers was again difficult because of the variety of size 
adjustments made by these researchers. Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) 
took return on capital and asset-divided sales as their two independ- 
ent variables, like those in table 5.35, and size-adjusted the 
chief executive's-salary for their dependent variable. The results for 
equation 3 in table 5.35 provided a rough match for this model 
specification, these results showing a lower R2 value for the UK 
data than Lewellen and Huntsman's results for US company information. 
Smyth, Boyes and Peseau 11975) took the size-adjusted value of 
average executive compensation as their dependent variable, and used 
the same two independent variables, arriving at a coefficient of 
determination (R 23 of 0.65. This was broadly comparable to the 
results of equation 7 in table 5.35 where R2 was 0.451 but since 
Smyth et al divided through by weighted net assets this comparison 
must be treated with caution. 
Finally, Meeks and Whittington (1975) applied a size-adjusted 
model to their UK company data and arrived at an R2 value of 0.43. 
However, their model specification added the logarithm of net assets 
as a third independent variable, and did not size-adjust their 
dependent variable (the Highest-Paid Director's Salary), so any 
comparison with equation 3 in table 5.35 would be inexact. 
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In addition to the regression computations reported in detail 
above many other model specifications were formulated and tested against 
the data available. Some brief summary results of these regression 
computations are recorded in table 5.36. Inflation-adjusting the 
pooled data and using real variables in the models did not improve 
the general fit of the models, the coefficients of determination for 
the equations using real variables Cequation set 4.3) being smaller 
overall than those for equations using nominal variables (equations 1 
to 8 in table 5.27). 
Some of the various logarithmic, semi-logarithmic and partial 
log transformations (equation sets 4.13,4.15 and 4.17 in table 5.36) 
gave improved goodness-of-fit of the log-style equations compared 
with R2 values for the linear-style equations used with pooled data 
in table 5.27. Equation set 4.17 which mixed logarithmic and 
natural independent variables with logs of the dependent variables 
had better coefficients of determination, especially for the equations 
employing broader remuneration measures. Equation set 4.13 which 
used logs of both independent and dependent variables also had better 
R2 values than the comparable linear equations in table 5.27. By 
contrast, equation set 4.15 which mixed logs of independent variables 
with natural dependent variables had much the same R2 values as the 
linear equations in table 5.27. 
The factor which served to improve the coefficients of 
determination of the equation sets was taking logarithms of the 
dependent remuneration variable, since this feature was common to 
equation sets 4.13 and 4.17. This helps explain why the majority of 
previous researchers who opted -for logarithmic transformations used 
logarithms of remuneration as their dependent variable. These results 
also suggest that the R2 values for the earlier, log-style models 
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using natural remuneration figures in equation sets 4.19 and 4.20 
(reported in tables 5.32 and 5.33) were rather low, because of the 
choice of natural remuneration in the model, to make it compatible 
with Meeks and Whittington's (1975) model. 
Two alternative lagged models were tried, one relating remunerat- 
ion to the previous year's independent variablesi and another linking 
remuneration to next year's independent variables. The summary 
results of the two models are presented in equation sets 4.5 and 
4.9 in table 5.36. Both models had much lower R2 values than were 
found for the model relating current year's remuneration to current 
year's performance, reported in table 5.27. This'corresponds to 
McGuire, Chiu and Elbing's (1962) finding that introducing short lags 
has no beneficial-effOct, Yarrow C1972) coming to the same conclusion 
from his analysis. 
A final set of models related year to year change3, in the 
independent and dependent variables and annual percentage changes in 
independent and dependent variables. Two variants of these models 
took real changes in variables and percentage real changes in 
variables as the ingredients for model specification. Results for 
these models are reported in equation sets 4.23,4.27,4.25 and 4.29 
in table 5.36. In all cases the coefficients of determination were 
very small, suggesting a very poor fit with the data. These results 
are hardly surprising for whilst taking changes in variables signific- 
antly reduces collinearity between sales, net assets, employees and 
profit, it also dramatically reduces the correlations between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable. It is noticeable 
that only two previous studies employed changes in the independent 
and dependent variables - Masson (1971) and Meeks and Whittington 
(1975) - and that the latter researchers found that R2 fell from 
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0.39 to 0.09 as they moved from a model linking current nominal 
values of variables to a model linking changes in variables. 
_5*'S' 
Summary 
It is useful to summarise the results presented in the present 
chapter, for the sheer volume of those results threatens to obscure 
the main findings of the study. Two broad threads are evident from 
analysis of the data. First, the proportion of company shares held 
by directors has fallen over the Years from over nine per-cent in 
the early 1970's to only three per-cent or so in the 1980's. 
However, because of the skewed distribution of shares within a 
typical board, most directors' shares are concentrated in the hands 
of one or two directors who can continue to exercise effective control 
over their companies. Second, shareholdings of directors are large 
in absolute terms and generate a significant proportion of directors' 
total remuneration in the form of dividends and shýý appreciation. 
Typically a director will own around two hundred thousand shares, 
with the largest shareholding director owning around a million 
shares, though the extent of directors' shareholdings varies consider- 
ably between industry groups. Dividends on these shareholdings were 
about as large as directors' salary incomes in the 19701s, though as 
shareholdings fell dividend incomes failed to grow and so became 
smaller relative to salaries in the 1980's. Even so, combined 
dividends and capital appreciation of shareholdings together match 
the remuneration which directors receive as salary income. 
Section 5.4 explores the possibility that directors' direct 
pecuniary interests might cause them to attach priority to profit- 
ability goals which tend to be associated with dividends and share 
appreciation, rather than growth goals. Following the methodologies 
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employed in previous sta. 
iistical analyses of the relationship between 
directors' remuneration and company performance, various regressions 
linked remuneration and performance. The findings suggested a strong 
link between company size and management salary, confirming the 
results of most previous studies. However when directors' dividend 
income is added to salaries, or remuneration is defined more broadly 
to include share appreciation as well as salaries and dividends, 
profitability becomes the key determinant of (broad) remuneration and 
size factors are insignificant. This concurs with the results of two 
earlier US studies by Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), and Cox and 
Shauger (1973). who also found that profitability related well to 
broader compensation measures. The implications of these findings 
are explored in the final chapter. 
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TABLE 5.1 AVERAGE SIZE OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS (BY YEAR) 
Year All Directors Executive Directors 
1973/74 9.8 7.1 
1974/75 9.9 7.3 
1975/76 9.9 7.2 
-1976/77 10.0 7.2 
1977/78 10.0 7.1 
1978/79 9.9 7.1 
1979/80 9.9 6.9 
1980/81 9.9 6.8 
1981/82 10.1 6.8 
1982/83 10.0 6.7 
Whole Period 9.9 7.0 
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1' 
TABLE 5.2 AVERAGE SIZE OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS (BY INDUSTRY) 
Industry Group All Directors Executive Directors 
Chemicals 13.2 8.0 
Engineering 9.6 6.5 
Manufacturing 10.6 7.6 
Construction 815 6.7 
Services 8.5 6.6 
Total 9.9 7.0 
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TABLE 5.17 EMPLOYEES' REMUNERATION (BY YEAR) 
Year 
Number 
of UK 
Employees 
Averag 
,e Employee's 
wages 
-CEOOO, s) 
Inflation Adj. 
Average 
Employee's 
Wages 
U000's 19741 
1973/74 14,752 1.8 1.8 
1974/75 14,942 2.0 1.7 
1975/76 14,444 2.5 1.7 
1976177 14,247 2.9 1.7 
1977/78 14,209 3.2 1.7 
1978/79 14,824 3.7 1.8 
1979/80 15,138 4.4 1.8 
1980/81 14,369 5.1 1.9 
1981/82 13,045 5.8 1.9 
1982/83 12,396 6.4 2.0 
Whole Period 14,264 3.7 1.8 
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TABLE 5.18 EMPLOYEES' REMUNERATION (BY INOUSTRY) CEOOO's) 
Industry 
Number 
of UK 
Employees 
Average 
Employee's 
Wages 
U0001s) 
Inflation Adjusted 
Average Employee's 
Wages 
CEOOO's Jan. 19743 
Chemicals 17,647 4.5 2.2 
Engineering 14,982 4.2 2.0 
Manufacturing 24,504 3.2 1.5 
Construction 7,751 4.4 2.2 
Services 6,978 3.2 1.6 
Total 14,264 3.7 1.8 
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TABLE 5.19 DIRECTORS' SALARIES AS MULTIPLE OF 
EMPLOYEES' AVERAGE WAGES (BY YEAR) 
Year Chairman 
Highest 
Paid 
Director 
Average 
Director 
Average 
Executive 
Director 
1973/74 13.2 15.7 7,4 9.3 
1974/75 12.0 14.4 6.9 8.9 
1975/76 10.7 12.8- 6.3 8.0 
1976/77 9.6 11.9 5.9 7.5 
1977/78 9.2 11.5 5.7 7.3 
1978/79 9.3 11.9 5.8 7.5 
1979/80 9.2 11.3 5.7 7.4 
1980/81 9.2 11.4 5.6 7.4 
1981/82 9.1 11.6 5.7 7.5 
1982/83 9.2 12.5 5.7 7.8 
Whole Period 10.1 12.5 6.1 7.9 
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TABLE 5.20 DIRECTORS' SALARIES AS MULTIPLE OF 
EMPLOYEES"AVERAGEVAGES (BY INDUSTRY) 
Industry Chairman 
Highest 
Paid 
Director 
Average 
Director 
Average 
Executive 
Director 
Chemicals 12.5 14.8 6.0 8.8 
Engineering 9.5 12.0 5.2 7.0 
Manufacturing 10.9 14.2 6.9 8.9 
Construction 6.5 8.4 5.0 6,0 
Services 9.9 11.8 6.6 7.8 
Total 10.1 12.5 6.1 7.9 
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'TABLE 5.30 REGRESSION RESULTS: STEPWISE REGRESSION OF 
NCMINAL VARIABLES (COMPANY PERIOD AVERAGE DATA) 
Sales then Return on Capital Using equation 4.2 
Coefficients cf Variables n- 100 significant at 1% level 
(and their absolute t values) significant at 5% level. 
I 
Eq. 
N Dependent 
Variables Constant' Sales 
Return an 
ca ital 
Overall 
F R2 o. p 
Chairman's Salary 30.71 0.62 42.36 0.30 
31.99 0.63 -0.72 21.02 0.30 
(6 42)** C6.29)** (0 28) . . 
12 Chairman's Salary 71.47 0.40 0.88 0.01 
and Dividends -1.89 -0.49 4.12 7.66 0.14 
(0.903 (0.121 (3.78)00 
3 Chairman's Salary, Dividend 
. 
140.70 -0.28 0.03 6.00 
and Share Appreciation -189.53 -0.23 18.54 10.92 0.18 
C2.48)* (1.51) (4.67)0* 
Highest Paid's Salary 40.48 0.54 26.46 0.21 
44.51 0.57 -0.23 13.50 0.22 
(8.11)** (5.15300 10.80) 
5 Highest's Salary and 64.19 0.48 4.13 0.04 
Dividends 46.92 0.37 0.97 3.28 0.06 
C3.87)** C1.52) (1.54) 
6 Highest's SalaryDividends 107.80 0.73 0.00 0.00 
and Share Appreciation 
-29.93 -0.78 7.73 3.62 0.07 
1 
(0.54) (0.70) (2.691** 1 
7 Average Salary- 19.81 0.15 12.42 0.11 
18.09 0.14 0.96 6.56 0.12 
(8.33)** (3.13)0* (0.85) 
8 Average Salary 31.80 0,59 0.36 DODO 
and Dividends 14.60 -0.48' -0,97 7.92 0.14 
(3.08)0* (0.50) (3.93) 
9 Average SalaryDividends 51.32 -0.13 0.11 
jo. 00 
and Share Appreciation 
-32.17 -0.65 4.69 11.66 0.19 
(1.72) (1.72) (4.81)* 
1 
10 Executive Salary 25.55 0.33 44.38 0.31 
26.81 0.34 -0.71 22.16 0.31 
(10.30)** (6.51)** (0.52) 
11 Executive Salary 36.82 0.25 6.88 0.07 
and Dividends 19.35 0.14 0.98 12.26 0.20 
(4.17)** (1.55) (4.07)** 
12 Executive SalaryDividends 57.23 0.56 1 0.02 0.00 
and Share Appreciation 
-29.92 -0 48 4.89 12.60 0.21 
C1.591 (1.281 
. 
(5. C2)** 
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TABLE 5.31 REGRESSION RESULTS: 
STANDARDISED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (BETA WEIGHTS) 
(Company Period Average Data) Using equation 4.2 
Eq. No. Dependent Variable Sales Return an Capital 
I Chairman's Salary 0.56 -0.02 
2 Chairman's Salary -0.01 0.37 
and Dividends 
3 Chairman's Salary,, Dividends -0.14 0.45 
and Share Appreciation 
4 Highest Paid's Salary 0.48 -0.07 
5 Highest's Salary and 0.16 0.16 
Dividends 
6 Highest's Salary. Dividends -0.07 0.27 
and Share Appreciation 
7 Average Salary 0.31 -0.08 
Average Salary -0.05 0.39 
and Dividends 
9 Average Salary, Dividends -0.16 0.46 
and Share Appreciation 
10 Executive Salary 0.57 -0.05 
11 Executive Salary 0.15 0.39 
and Dividends 
12 Executive SalaryDividends -0.12 0.47 
and Share Appreciation I 
Remuneration =a+b. Sales + c. Return on Capital ............... 4.2 
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'TABLF- 5.33 REGRESSION RESULTS: 
SHORTLIST'NATURAL AND'LOGARITHMIC INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
. (Company'Period*Average Data] Using equation 4.20 
Co6fficients of Variables (and their absolute t values) n- 100 
Eq. Dependent Variable Constant Log Sales Return on Overall R2 No. Capital F 
1 Chairman's Salary -136.32 13.48 0.23 48.90** 0.50' 
(7.86)** (9.71)** (1.08) 
2 Chairman's Salary -119.51 9.72 3.96 8.82** 0.15 
1 
and Dividends C1.401 (1.42) (3.831** 
3 Highest Paid's -107.11 12.14 0.44 28.16** 0.37 
Salary C5.27)** (7.463** (0.18) 
4 Highest's Salary -129.67 14.32 1.07 9.57** 0.16 
and Dividends (2.75)** (3.79)** (1.87) 
5 Average Salary -30.29 3.90 0.15 20.76** 0.30 
C3.801** C6.11)** C1.54) 
6 Average Salary 1.54 1.11 0.92 8.07** 0.14 
and Dividends (0.79) CO. 71) (3.881** 
7 Executive Salary -60.29 6.96 0.95 44.72** 0.4B 
(6.46)** C9.32)** (0.84) 
8 Executive Salary -33.24 4.24 1.03 15.77** 0.25 
and Dividends (1.79) (2.85)** (4.59)** 
significant at the 1% level 
significant at the'5% level 
Remuneration =a+b. log Sales + c. Return on Capital ............ 4.20 
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TABLE 5.35 REGRESSION RESULTS: 
SHORTLIST SIZE ADJUSTED VARIABLES (DIVIDED BY NET ASSETS) 
CCompany Period Average Data) Using equation 4.22 
Coefficients of Variables Cand their absolute t values) n- 100 
Eq. Dependent Variable Constant Sales Return on Overall R2 No. Capital F 
1 Chairman's Salary -0.52 0.18 -0.15 30.64** 0.39 
CO. 35) (7.38)** (0.19) 
2 Chairman's Salary -1.61 0.30 0.11 16.20** 0.25 
and Dividends C2.69)** (2.92)** (3.52)** 
3 Highest Paid's 0.16 0.20 -0.34 27.26** 0.36 
Salary CO. 92) (7.02)** (0.39) 
4 Highest's Salary -0.39 0.44 0.14 33.48** 0.41 
and Dividends C1.12) C7.33)** CO. 78) 
5 Average Salary -0.64 0.13 -0.23 40.20** 0.45 
CO. 72) CS. 39)** (0.48) 
6 Average Salary -0.31 0.19 0.21 24.92** 0.34 
and Dividends C1.57) C5.58)** (2.051* 
.7 
Executives Salary 0.58 0.15 -0.28 39.97** 0.45 
CO. 55) (8.52)** (0.51) 
,8 Executives Salary -0.32 0.22 0.21 30.01** 0.38 
, and Dividends (1.53) (6.32)" P. 93) I I 
significant at the 1% level 
significant at the 5% level 
Remuneration a+b. Sales 
_+c. 
Return on Capital ....... 4.22 Net Assets Net Assets 
0 
206 
C: ) 
LL. 
0 w $-A 
.Z 
CL 
Z 
C: ) 
C: ) 
LU 
11- 
ch 
-i w 
0 
C: ) Z: 
e 
0 
LL 
(n w 
ci 
kn cn LU Cý ti w 
of 
Co c9 
U) 
-i CO 
cri 
I. 
C. 
(a I r-4 I 
(D 
0. 
X: 
0- 
c 0- 
CD 
J3 
go 
N 
.c 
J3 
tu I 
co 
0 
0 -1.4 4.3 
V4 
E 
0 
4- 
0 
(a 
4-3 
c 
0) 
C2 ti) 
>+ 'U 
vi c 
4-3 >% a) 0 co Ln v- I,, m G3 0 C3 N M S. m ý- 0 VN -T N N 0 0 0 0 C3 0 -H 
-4 > C; C; 
6 C; C; C; C; C3 C; C; C; C; C; C; C3 x 10 -4 
w rn o 
41 &1 0 Itr cr) 0 m C3 Ln to Ln o qw 0 CV) TI. N (%A 3 to V, N co v ED v in m cr) v cn v 0 C3 0 0 0.1. 
(D to C; C; C; C; C; C; C; C; C; C; C; C; C; x U) 
+ 13 . . ... ....... ...... .... . ....... :.... :... ... .. 0 C: 
to >% 0) 
' T- 
r., Ln c) rý N Ln cr) Ln CC) CY) 0 M N -W to " 0 T- 0 cr) V- cr) N0 T- T- C0 0 0 0 ý. tu 
*, 4 
0 
ID -4 > -c; C; C; C; C; C; 
8 
C; C; ; > to V4 C < 
W 
10 
t. to 
N C) 
N0 
0 
Ln 0) 
CO 0 
Ln cn 
CO CO 
V, N 
V- (14 
NN 
0 
1 a) 1-4 
NC 4 0 D 0 - C3 
> co 
< U) I C; C; C; C; C; C; C; C; 6 C; C; C; C3 C; C; C; , 
in . + '13 .. ..... ..... .. . .... ... 4J c 
(A >% (1) 
' 
fý% cr) p, -4- C3 .00 CO C N 0 C) S. D 00 cr) V- cn T- N W- V- 0 T- C3 C 0 0 z to -H 0 ba ý4 > C; c; C; C; C; C; C; C; ci C; C; C; C; C; ; to V4 C 
En C 
Q ý, 
z to 
a) 14, 
N T- 
CY) - CY) Ln Cr) 
N cn 
co cr) 
rý, to 
cr) N 
-*- co 
NN 
co N 
N T- 
0- N T- 
03-4 m 0 0 0 0 
-ri to 0 C; C; 
6 
C; C; C; C; C; C; C; 
c 13 
ac 
E >1 a) F 'a V- CO -0 EO Ln rý, Ln CO to 0 0) . 
vi to " 
% N C 0 C3 0 
(U -4 > 
.C to " 
C; C; C; C; C; C; C; C; C; C; C; 
L) in c 
.. ..... .... 
C Ctl 
, 
Ln V- 
r 00 CV) 0 (a 
9-4 
V N cr) c i cr) cr) Ln V- v V, v cr) 0 CD 0 0 
" to 
09 . C; 
8 C; C; C; C; C; C; C; C; C; C3 C; C; C; C; 
.c L) 
tý CD cri V, r%: cc &n co cr) M LU tn 0) c! N CN C14 
Ll 
4.3 43 
(r) .0 3 (D 3 c 
(n 
44 
43 c 
m ri -f 
tn 13 a) 
(r) 
(D c (D 
' 
M ý-, CD co (D a) -4 ul Q 13 
'0 c 
go to 
-H > 
-r-4 
13 S r-I 
4. ) m (1) 
co 113 to c 03 S. -4 cu ra . 
13 c 
to C) 
(U W (D 
43 c" 0) CL to 4-2 > -, -f -C) -H c r-4 M 
D 
CL (D >c t4 ;. r n ID ri 
4J > 
00 CD 
4-3 It) 
(a 41 
>c 
- (a (D 
> (I 
cu 
%A 
to 
c 
c aW cc (D a) t4 to (a CO -4 
' 
"0 a) 0) 
- 
4.. W -t3 4.3 13 
c 
.1 
CD to 
0 
c 
D to 
-1 tic 
0 CL 
( ca cc F 
ba 
ku 
> L) 
0 0 
c 1) 
a) C3 
(D 03 
'D Ex 
M 
13 
U) 4J a (D 
-ri 1 
Cl E _j 4J CL c a) c ul 
co 
bo 
c 
(D ba 4. D V4 ' 
(1) -4 (1) 13 (1) - 
to 
to C) Z D 
-2 'D to Uc cl "D 
c 
t 
2 (n 4J 
ý4 4- U) 
c 
" 4J 
c 
to w 
c ý4 
H :3 
0) 
0 0 
o 
z ID 
co 
ba 
r_ 
0) 
c CD c 0) 4.2 0 
C -H M u CL cn 
* 
4- tu -4 =1 
ý4 
-4 CD 
0) fu 
J3 
lu 
0 C) (a J3 C) z fu 0 to CL n C 14 
z (D _4 
r-4 
c 1. (a c -H 
-H 
c to 
o 
c 
lu J3 
C to 
u tL n 
to bD Cl 4-1 ý4 bO 4J > E co 
-4 41 -1-1 E x . 1-4 -H -H V-4 V-4 r4 
. 
0) fa 0 0) (a 03 0 V-1 0" 
ý. 
0 0) 
E E 14 to to &4 cr- > -1 C3 z> z a- Q Zc > 
0 0 ru (1) (1) to 
> a: ct: > 
1ý 
207 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
Two broad themes are evident from the results of the study 
reported in-the previous chapter, and both warrant further discussion. 
The first is the issue of who exercises control over large companies 
- the shareholders or the directors and managers. The second is the 
effect of remuneration patterns upon the pecuniary interests of 
managers and the company goals they pursue. Both themes command our 
attention in the pages which follow. 
Directors' shareholdings are sufficiently large to suggest that 
divorce of ownership from control may not yet be as extensive in 
British companies as many economists have assumed. Employing the 
somewhat arbitrary criterion of five per-cent or more of company 
shares in the hands of a person or cohesive group -a criterion 
adopted by many previous researchers - only a minority of the companies 
would rate as. owner-controlled, insofar as the, directors collectively 
hold five per-cent or more of shares. With a less stringent criterion, 
say, two per-cent of shares or more, most sample companies would rate 
as owner-controlled because most boards have combined shareholdings of 
this magnitude. The precise percentage required for control varies 
from company to company depending on the overall distribution of 
share ownership and groupings amongst shareholders, as Pitelis and 
Sugden (19841 point out. Indeed Pederson and Tabb (1976) suggest 
that a shareholding by insiders as small as one per-cent may serve as 
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a basis for control. 
, Whether 
directors would act cohesively as a board in using their 
share votes as a nucleus to accumulate sufficient votes 
to repel any 
challenge to their authority, is an open question. 
Because the 
distribution of shares within a typical board is highly skewed, with 
most of the directors' shares concentrated in the 
hands of only one 
95- 
or two directors - often company founders or their descendEints - 
cohesion may be easier to achieve. In addition, if any outside 
challenge to their control becomes evident, directors would be under 
pressure to suppress any differences between themselves in the 
interests of unity, if only because of apprehension about a largely 
unknown outside challenger. In essence though, this issue boils 
down 
to the question of what influence the larger shareholding directors 
I 
have within the board by virtue of their positions as executive 
directors, chairmen or the like. Here the internal dynamics of the 
boardroom and factors like personality, power and patronage become 
paramount. 
In addition to their modestly substantial blocks of shares, 
directors also find some basis for control in what Herman C1981) 
calls their "strategic position". Cubbin and Leech C1983) elucidate 
some of the advantages which directors have simply by virtue of their 
position as incumbent controllers. As directors they have control 
over the agendas of meetings, they have direct access to internally 
generated information and they have control of the company's communica- 
tions machinery. Finally, directors can rely on shareholder inertia 
to help give them a greater degree of control for any given personal 
shareholding than an outsider. In addition, the opportunities which 
directors have to communicate with their larger shareholders such as 
financial institutions and their advantage in operating the proxy . 
voting machinery at company Annual General MeetIngs makes it difficult 
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in most cases for other shareholder groups to dislodge them. 
Goldsmith and Clutterbuck C1985) suggest that in successful companies 
the culture created by the founder endures and gives the company a 
distinct personality, creating executive loyalty, and this too my be 
a source of strategic power for the founder's heirs. 
Though the combination of modest proportionate shareholdings and 
strýtegic position can leave directors with considerable residual 
powers of control in many firms, the picture is not a clear-cut one. 
Directors' shareholdings vary greatly from industry to industry, with 
small shareholdings in chemicals and engineering companies, which have 
needed to raise large amounts of share capital, and large share- 
holdings in retailing and construction companies which have had less 
need to resort to the capital market and dilute founders' interests. 
Consequently the extent of management control varies considerably from 
industry to industry, making it difficult to generalise about the 
divorce of ownership from control across a range of industries. 
Directors' shareholdings not only vary from industry to industry, 
they also vary with company size, bigger companies having small 
directors' shareholdings and smaller companies having large directors' 
shareholdings. For example, few of the top quarter of the hundred 
sample companies had large directors' shareholdings whilst almost all 
of the bottom quarter had big directors' shareholdings. This suggests 
that if we were to concentrate upon say, the largest 100 or so British 
quoted companies, we would find few large shareholding directors 
amongst their ranks. while moving down the company size ranking a high 
proportion of companies would have directors with substantial propri- 
etorial interests. Demsetz (1983) suggests a similar pattern in the 
USA with significant continuing ownership interests outside the very 
largest firTns; and Prais C1976) helps confirm the British situation, 
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noting a small and declining shareholding amongst the hundred largest 
manufacturing firms. This again maKes it difficult to generalise 
about ownership and control, except in the context of a given 
size-class. 
Over time there has been a continuing slow decline in the number 
of shares owned by directors so that their shareholding proportion 
has/fallen from over nine per-cent in the early 1970's to only three 
peý-cent or so by 1983. The holdings of the family groups who 
dominated companies fell progressively and control has tended to pass 
out of the hands of founding families. With this long-term, decline 
in directors' shareholdings one can expect to see the remaining few 
family names disappearing from the directors lists of the top 100 
companies over future decades, and more and more of the next few 
hundred largest companies coming to be run by salarie directors with 
small share stakes. 
All three trends outlined above are interrelated, for companies 
in capital intensive industries like chemicals tend to be larger; 
larger companies are likely to have experienced greater share dilution; 
and the proportion of companies with non-owning directors is liKely to 
grow over time as directors' shareholdings diminish. In the face of 
this complex pattern one must sympathise with Nyman and Silberston's 
(1978) argument that a case by case approach is necessary to identify 
the locus of control by identifying family owners, financial institu- 
tions' involvement, the relationship of directors to the firm's 
founder and interlocking directors, as well as directors' share- 
holdings. All that can be offered here as a tentative generalisation 
is that within the long-term context of a gradual trend for companies 
to start as owner-controlled and end as management-controlled, a. t 
present a sizeable proportion of companies are controlled by directors 
211 
with large share stakes, though proprietarial 
directors are much 
rarer among the largest firms. This leads directly to the question 
of how directors choose to exercise their residual powers of control, 
that is, what company objectives they will pursue. 
The issue of who controls a company is only important to the 
extent that there is a divergence between the goals of the owners 
and those of the controllers. If the two groups have broadly similar 
objectives then shareholders will bear few "agency costs", for the 
directors exercising control over company resources will pursue 
policies that shareholders themselves favour. The essence of the 
agency cost concept is that as the owner-manager dilutes his owner- 
ship proportion he will be tempted to manage the firm in a mannger 
which diverges from the interests of the shareholders, for as a 
minority shareholder he bears only a small fraction of the additional 
costs or reduced profitability resulting from pursuit of his own 
interests. However as Nyman and Silberston (1978) and Herman (1981) 
have pointed out, though the percentage of shares owned by directors 
is small, the absolute value of these shares is high and may well 
induce shareholder-orientated behaviour. The findings of the present 
study confirm these suppositions, showing that the balance of the 
remuneration structure will affect directors' motives. 
Salaries earned by executive directors are best considered as a 
payment for their management efforts in supervising the manufacturing 
and marketing activities of the business. By contrast, the dividends 
and capital appreciation which directors receive on their shareholdings 
are best regarded as partly an implied interest payment on the funds 
they have tied up in shares and part risk premium to compensate for 
fluctuating returns and the risk of losing some or all of their 
invested funds. Thus the share-based income which a director receives 
212 
loo 
has little "direct connection with his role as manager in the company, 
and merely reflects the extent of his shareholding. Ultimately 
though our concern is with the effect of share-based income on the 
motivations of directors, regardless of whether they have built up 
their shareholdings through investment, inherited the shares or 
maintained a residual shareholding as founders. 
The evidence of the previous chapter suggests that the weightings 
of their remuneration elements can cause directors to behave in a 
prof it-orientated way, for dividends and share appreciation typically 
match or exceed the income which directors receive as salaries. In 
turn these motivational patterns are reflected in company performance, 
so whilst salary is strongly linked to company size, profitability 
predominates when directors' salaries and share-based incomes are 
considered. 
Most previous empirical studies which concentrated upon the 
determinants of directors' salaries took only a partial view and 
arrived at a partial conclusion, namely that directors would pursue 
growth because salaries are linked to size rather than profitability. 
The easy availability of salary data compared with the more painstaking 
processes involved in assessing share-based income, 'and the higher R2 
regression results which ensue when salary only-is considered, have 
steered many previous researchers towards blinkered conclusions. In 
contrast the few empirical studies which have attempted direct 
questioning of directors and managers, such as the work of Francis 
(1980), confirm that high levels of profitability are perceived by 
them as the most important company objective, with no evidence of any 
tradeoff between profitability and growth. 
In companies where directors have a reasonable number of shares 
and reap sizeable share-related incomes from them we might expect that 
213 
their pecuniary interests would lead them to behave in a profit 
orientated way. However, in addition to their pecuniary motives, 
directors will also be subject to the competing pulls of power, 
status and prestige urges which might impel them towards company 
growth and size goals at the expense of profit. It is very 
difficult to assess the comparative force of these non-pecuniary 
motives, though many management writers argue that such impulses can 
be important in shaping the behaviour of senior managers. However it 
t 
is doubtful that such motives are strong enough to outweigh pecuniary 
considerations. Management megalomania and self-aggrandisement are 
unlikely to predominate when directors' own financial interests are 
at stake, except in rare cases where founders identify very strongly 
with their companies. 
Already directors of the very largest companies are salaried 
executives with minute token shareholdings who have no pecuniary 
incentive to identify with shareholders' interests. Over time this 
will become typical of the next largest companies as well, as 
directors' average shareholdings decline with the retirement of 
founders or their descendants and their replacement by salaried exec- 
utives. At this juncture the agency costs inherent in corporate 
organisations may become significant and managers may pursue growth 
I 
or adopt other goals which conflict with shareholders' interests. 
In the shorter term though, there is still a substantial number of 
predominantly middle-sized companies where directors' shareholdings 
are still moderately large and where income derived from these 
shareholdings is big enough to ensure 'attention to shareholder 
interests. The potential challenge posed by these middle-sized, 
prof it-orientated companies to the largest concerns may be sufficient 
I 
to exert a useful discipline over the salaried managers of larger 
214 
companies, preventing them from deviating too sharply from profit 
goals. 
Responding to the declining proprietorial interest of directors, 
an increasing number of large firms have launched share option and 
profit-sharing schemes for executive directors to give them an 
ownership staKe in the business and encourage profit seeKing behaviour. 
Such schemes are already widespread in the United States, where 
directors now frequently receive a large proportion of their total 
income in the form of share-related earnings, and are becoming more 
common in Britain. The growth of such schemes in Britain is high- 
lighted by the Charterhouse Surveys reported earlier, which found that 
between 1980 and 1983 the proportion of large companies adopting share 
schemes doubled to around 40%. More recently a report by Beresford 
and Davies (1985) of the latest Datastream survey of directors' salaries 
suggests that British industry is moving swiftly to rewarding its 
directors strictly according to performance. 
Option schemes have legitimacy in this context for as Beck and 
Zorn [1982) point out, it is worth selling shares more cheaply to 
executive directors to expand their proprietorial stake and reduce 
agency costs, to the benefit of the shareholders. Indeed some writers 
such as Breakwell (1983) argue that the general efficiency benefits of 
such schemes warrant amending the tax system to encourage profit- 
sharing and subsidised ownership schemes for managers. To the extent 
that such moves change the balance of directors' remuneration 
packages toward share income and profit related elements, we are 
likely to see directors paying fnore attention to profitability goals 
in the very largest compapies, like their counterparts in middle- 
sized companies. 
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